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This thesis provides an analysis of the causal factors
leading to the increased influence and authority of the
Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) in the defense resource decision
and allocation process. A discussion is provided on the
various Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reforms which led to the
enhancement of the CINCs' role in the Planning, Programing,
and Budgeting System (PPBS) . Major issues, constraints,
control, and implementation problems currently confronting
the CINCs are explored. A brief summary of the initiatives
begun by Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) Taft to
increase the involvement of the CINCs in the defense
programing process also is provided. The policy issues
related to implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act of 1986 are
reviewed along with some of the positive and negative
aspects of the increased demand for CINC participation in
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Since World War II, a major issue of national political
concern has been the structure and organization of defense.
In the early 1980' s Congress and the DoD and its agencies
responded to the need for increased attention to resource
decision making and management.
Incremental attempts at reform implemented previously led to
Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (herein
referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act or the Act) , and
focused on reorganization by mission instead of functions.
After the creation of the Unified and Specified Commands in
1953, a resource participation dichotomy began to emerge
between those in the DoD's administrative and logistics
chain of command responsible for force structure, and the
concerns of the combatant commanders over the "readiness"
and "sustainability" of their global forces.
In the early 1970' s, an effort was made to increase
participation of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Combatant
Commands (CINCs) in the Planning, Programing, and Budgeting
(PPB) process to obtain a better balance of the CINCs
short-term view with DoD's long-term orientation to improve
resource allocation decision making. In the 1980' s under
President Reagan this trend continued. Then, in the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress directed that the CINCs be
given even more voice in the defense budget process . It has
been up to the services to implement that mandate. The
CINCs are participating in the Planning, Programing, and
Budgeting System (PPBS) in a way never required before,
without additional staff to accomplish that goal.
The activities of the CINCs and DoD in accomplishing
this goal is the issue investigated in this thesis.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis project researched the expanded role of the
CINCs in PPBS mandated by the Reorganization Act. Major
issues in increased participation including constraints,
controls, and implementation problems currently confronting
the CINCs are the focus of this research. Both positive and
negative implications of the Act and its impact on the PPBS
resource allocation process are presented.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Consistent with the objectives above, the research in
this document attempts to answer the following primary and
secondary questions
:
1. How can the CINCs be better integrated into DoD's PPBS
and Congressional budgeting?
a. How can improved participation within PPBS be
effected?
b. What types of information do the CINCs in their
expanded role need to participate effectively?
2. What factors impede more effective CINC involvement in
the DoD resource allocation process?
a. What factors impede effective participation within
DoD?
b. What factors impede effective participation from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
?
c. What factors impede effective participation from
the external environment, e.g., Congress, and from
the internal environment, i.e. from within the
commands of the CINCs?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS OF RESEARCH
The main thrust of this research is to examine the role
of the CINCs in the budget process, and to study the policy
problems resulting from implementation of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act.
Limitations are imposed by the fact that many of the
problems resulting from implementation are currently being
addressed. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act is still in
early implemental stage, little data exists on execution of
the Act. Two years have passed since this 1986 legislation
was enacted, ' but there has been no two year budget cycle
completed in the expected time frames due to contingencies
which make evaluation of CINC participation difficult. The
Act took effect in the Fall of 1986 during the Fiscal Year
(FY) 1988/89 cycle when the 1987 budget was in progress.
Much of what was contained in the Act with respect to the
CINCs and PPBS was already being implemented since 1981 in
DoD. In January 1987, the President presented the first
two year budget which Congress did not approve. Congress
2
reduced the FY 88 budget and did not pass the FY 89 one.
Due to the Continuing Resolution of 1988 containing a
defense cut of $32 billion, and the Budget Summit Agreement
on the FY 1988/1989 budget cycle, DoD was forced to
reconstruct the FY 1989 budget. Therefore, the FY 89 budget
year along with the FY 1990-1994 Defense Program will
perhaps provide the better evidence of the role that the JCS
and CINCs can play in the defense resource allocation
process. The fact that this year is an election year may
effect defense budgeting issues and decisions reached during
the course of this cycle.
Because of recent demands for cutback management within
DoD, further complications arise as the CINCs are integrated
into the defense resource allocation system at a time when
new management methods are developed to handle severe
reductions in spending after an era of plenty. Furthermore,
all data gathered on methods for implementation is limited
by the context in which the persons interviewed are
operating.
Assumptions made are that the reader is reasonably
familiar with the PPBS and that the CINCs will participate
in the PPB process as mandated by public law. For an in-
Adapted from interview with Mr. Robert Malis,




3 This budget reduction was one which Secretary of
Defense Weinberger resisted and Mr. Carlucci implemented..
depth description of the PPBS, see Appendix A which contains
DoD Directive 7045.14, The PPBS. This directive discusses
the policy, procedures, and responsibilities of PPBS which
and can be used as a reference with this thesis. Figure 1
provides a useful reference for the PPBS as it shows the
three distinct phases and major documents by responsible
agents and time.
This thesis does not attempt to analyze or forecast all
repercussions of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act
and deals only with selective aspects of the Act primarily
concerning the CINCs and the resource allocation process.
E . METHODOLOGY
A three-step methodology was used in the conduct of
research for this thesis:
1
.
Archival research - Primary archival research will be
conducted using records of congressional hearings and
Senate and House of Representatives reports.
Secondary sources are found in the List of References
.
2. Situational analysis research - The domain for this
research is a case study using USCINCPAC in Hawaii to
observe the process and problems of implementation.
3. Survey research - (a) Informal interviews were used
to uncover problems with CINC involvement in the PPBS
process. These interviews were conducted in December
1987 in Washington D.C. at the Pentagon and Systems
Research and Applications Corporation building.
Offices interviewed were Army Plans, Analysis, and
Evaluation (Army PA&E) ; Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations ana Plans (DSCOPS) ; J-4, Logistic
Directorate; J-8, Force Structure, Resource, and
Assessment Directorate ; CINC, U.S. Special Operations
Command (USCINCSOC) and CINC, U.S. Central Command
(USCINCCENT) representatives present; and the OSD
(b) Another set of informal interviews were conducted
at the Planning and Programing Division, of the J-5
Plans and Policy Directorate at Headquarters, CINC,
U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC) and at the component
command, Western Command (WESTCOM)
(
in Hawaii, to
obtain information on current policies being adopted
by each command to implement the Goldwater-Nichols
Act. The structured questions asked during the
interviews attempted to obtain command feedback on how
best to integrate the CINCs into the PPBS, what
problems were encountered with implementation, and
whether the CINCs are likely to obtain the results

































































. The PPBS[Armed Forces Staff College: 1986 5-8]
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE DEBATE
Given that increased CINC participation in the DoD
budget process is required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act,
this research reviews various alternatives by which to
implement this requirement. In particular, this thesis
looks at the adaptability of the defense structure, data
base and information requirements for budget participation,
and how integration may best be performed. In presenting
alternatives considered by many of the CINCs, the problems
of implementation are analyzed and summarized for further
consideration. Improvements in CINC involvement are
currently sought within DoD.
This thesis also provides a base of information on CINC
resource allocation involvement problems for research in
subsequent theses
.
The document provides a historical summary of selected
events leading to the Goldwater-Nichols Act (Chapter II) to
provide a framework for the role of the CINCs in PPBS
.
Chapter II is a selective historical review of a series of
changes to the overall defense structure beginning with
World War II. In particular, JCS reforms are highlighted
since they led to the establishment of and subsequent
organizational changes in the Unified and Specified
Commands. It also includes the functions of the CINCs as
envisioned up to the passage and implementation of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act. Chapter III begins with relevant
features of the Act itself which impact upon the CINCs. The
chapter then discusses the significant aspects of each of
these features namely, the enhancement of the position of
the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS) , the creation of the position
of the JCS Vice Chairman, the expanded role of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council ( JROC) , and the increased
authorities of the CINCs. Chapter III concludes with a
detailed discussion of special operations, since this
particular area has received a great deal of congressional
interest and is related to the issue of congressional
influence over DoD that is part of the motivation for
greater CINC involvement in budgeting. Chapter IV
articulates the policy issues pertaining to CINC involvement
in the defense budget process including objectives of such
involvement, and contextual factors influencing passage and
implementation of the Act. Chapter V critiques the existing
decision process to evaluate the value added to budgeting by
CINC participation and discusses how the CINCs role can be
improved from the viewpoint of the CINCs, Congress, JCS,
OSD, and other external agencies. Within this chapter, the
information needed for better participation, and the
targeting of participation for greatest impact is addressed.
Structural change requirements are also presented.
Conclusions and summary remarks on the implications of the
Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act are presented in
Chapter VI along with recommendations for further study.
II . ROLE OF THE CINCS IN THE BUDGET PROCESS
A. CHAPTER OUTLINE
This chapter discusses a series of changes to the
overall defense structure; the issues concerning the control
of resource management for a unified special operating force
(SOF) ; the increased role of the CINCs in the Planning,
Programing, and Budgeting System; and selected major
features of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The purpose of this
chapter is to review the background of selected events
leading to the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to
show the evolution of the latest reform movement which led
to that Act. The chapter also provides a framework for
evaluating the role of the CINCs in PPBS. To better
understand both the impact and implications of this
congressional mandate, a brief historical view of our
changing defense structure is needed. An understanding of
the current emphasis on "jointness" and "interoperability"
can then be reached through a review of the various
perceptions that developed after 1953 when the first Unified
and Specified commands were created.
This chapter focuses on the origin and selected effects
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Changes in power, authority,
and control under the restructuring is then examined.
Specifically, the enhanced role of the CJCS, the newly
created position of the JCS vice chairman, and the expanded






The background and framework of the Goldwater-Nichols
Act and are presented in their order of occurrence to aid in
understanding current developments in defense reforms
.
1 . General
A major political concern since the end of World War
II has been the nation' s structure and organization for
defense. In our open political system, debate over military-
reform and defense resource allocation has permeated our
society from the average citizen to the legislative
committee expert. Besides the adversarial air which arises
from our party politics and the shared responsibility of the
separation of powers; the importance of special interest and
lobby groups, and the power of the press, all work to




2 . Incremental ism
Except for two periods when comprehensiveness was
emphasized, military reform has been incremental in nature.
All budgets increase incrementally from the previous year'
s
base, with each Service preserving roughly its fair share of
the budget. Incrementalism therefore implies cautious and
slow policy changes which evolve through incremental steps
taken by participants who "mutually adjust positions" over a
extended period of time.
In a letters to the Chairmen of the House and Senate
Committees on Armed Services on 5 March 1985, Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) Caspar W. Weinberger warned that only
evolutionary changes should be made to the organization of
DoD . He emphasized that selective modification should be
used by changing requirements on an incremental basis, only
as needed, to make the appropriate adjustments to existing
processes and structures. [JCS: 1987 195] In contrast,
comprehensive reforms occurred after World War II with the
The defense budget is predominantly a highly
centralized, top-down budget process with each service
requesting more top line authority which is granted in the
Spring before the budget is sent to Congress.
Traditionally, DoD has asked annually for three percent in
creation of the position of the SECDEF and OSD , and again in
1961 with the development of DoD's PPBS. A discussion of
these two periods follows.
Prior to what is known within DoD as the McNamara
era beginning in 1961, each of the Services operated fairly
independently, using its own system to derive that year's
budget submission to Congress [Roddy: 1981 1]. Basically,
the Services pursued their own interests with relatively
little guidance. The SECDEF' s responsibility was restricted
to dividing DoD's budget ceiling among the various Services,
and reducing any Service budget that exceeded its fair
share, primarily by across-the-board cuts. Under this
system, a programmatic review of Service budget submissions
could not be accomplished. [Joint DoD/Government Accounting
Office (GAO) : 1983 17-18] Comprehensiveness of change
began with the creation of the position of the SECDEF and
his Office when the National Security Act was implemented on
17 September 194 7 and Secretary of the Navy, James
Forrestal, was nominated as the first SECDEF [Cole, et al . :
1978 63] .
The National Security Act instituted the post of the
SECDEF and authorized the appointment of a small civilian
and military staff to assist him. Furthermore, it formally
recognized the JCS, established the National Security
Council (NSC) to advise the President on domestic, foreign,
and military policies, and also established the Department
of the Air Force. The result was three separate service
departments with a civilian SECDEF exercising "general
direction, authority and control," [Hobkirk: 1983 26] over
all. Congress, however, reserved the prerogative to
question each Service individually about its budget
proposals. [Hobkirk: 1983 25-26] See Figure 2 for the
resulting organization of the National Military
Establishment
.
See Appendix A for a brief overview of the PPBS.
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Nat
Fiqure 2. Organization for National Security
itional Security Act of 1947, 30 September 1*47
[Cole, et al.: 1978 62-63]
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The National Security Act of 1947 along with the
Amendments of 1949 were a compromise to the Army's original
proposal for a single unified department. Yet this Act
served as a significant beginning for subsequent
reorganizations. In our system of "Defense by Bargaining,"
we assume apparently that progress is made through a series
of compromises [Hobkirk: 1983 17] . Also important to
remember, is that through this progression of compromises
and mistakes, knowledge is gained.
Weaknesses surfaced within the new defense
organization when problems with the allocation of resources
began to appear [Hobkirk: 1983 26]. President Harry S.
Truman aptly described the circumstances and processes
concerning the reform movement in this statement to Congress
on 7 March 1949:
In my judgment^ these changes will make possible
effective organization and management in the Department of
Defense. They will provide a responsible official at its
head, with strengthened civilian and military assistance,
to undertake the immense job of aiding the President and
the Congress in determining defense needs and in
supervising the administration of our defense activities.
These measures are essential to continued and accelerated
progress toward unification. I am convinced that only
through making steady progress toward this goal can we be
assured of serving our major objectives, the most
effective organization of our armed forces, a full return
on our defense dollar, and strengthened civilian control.
After viewing the problem for 18 months, Mr.
Forrestal began to believe that the checks and balances
within the system were adequate to prevent the abuse of the
broad authority granted to the SECDEF . His public support
for expanding the powers of the SECDEF led to an increase of
authority for the SECDEF in the ensuing amendments and
represented another major step toward unification. As a
result, the following measures were adopted:
"7
1. The executive DoD was created, merging the three
Service Departments.
. Adapted from Public Expenditure Policy Analysis, MN




Created under Title II (63 Stat. 578, Sec. 308. (b)
on 10 August 1949.
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2. The SECDEF was given full control over the Service
Departments, which were still to be separately
administered. The positions in the Secretary's staff
were both upgraded and increased. Later, this office
would be called OSD
.
3. The positions of the DEPSECDEF 8 and CJCS 9 were
created. [Hobkirk: 1983 27]
Comprehensive changes occurred again in 1961 through
1965 with the development of PPBS under SECDEF Robert S.
McNamara. When McNamara became SECDEF, he brought with him
the expertise on how to control large organizations.
[Roddy: 1981 1]
DoD applications to program budgeting were developed
by Rand Corporation in the 1950' s. Mr. McNamara recruited
two of Rand's experts on PPBS for positions in the Pentagon.
His management style and his emphasis on the need to
restrict and control change resulted in each service program
being documented in a single book. The PPB system developed
allowed him to increase the SECDEF' s control over DoD and
improve the balance across the Services. The system also
dealt with many of the weaknesses previously existing in the
defense budget system, such as duplication of effort among
the services; the short term focus on the succeeding year's
budget; the limited analytical base for decision making by
the SECDEF; the disparity between planning and budgeting
decisions; and each of the Services acting as though it
were entitled to a fixed share of the budget without
consideration to the comparative effectiveness of programs
and overall defense requirements. [Joint DoD/GAO: 1983 17-
18]
For over two decades, PPBS has evolved in a dynamic
way. The system is both proactive and future oriented with
many events, players, procedures, programs, and schedules,
g
. The position of the Under Secretary of Defense was
created on 2 April 1949 (63 Stat. 30) . [DoD: 1978 81]
. The position of CJCS was created on 10 August 1949
(63 Stat. 5713, Sec. 211) . The Chairman was designated as
the presiding officer of the JCS but had no vote.
13
all interacting, and still transitioning further from the
system we have today. Nevertheless, the foundation of the
system: budget and program guidance from the SECDEF to the
Services; three phases - planning, programing, and
budgeting; OSD's review of Service proposals; and the use of
quantitative analysis to choose among competing programs
still exists [Joint DoD/GAO: 1983 20]
.
The continuation of this latest reform movement
resulted in the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD
Reorganization Act of 1986 and represents an even more
extensive change from what was done before.
3
.
An Evolving Defense Structure
The large military establishment in existence since
World War II is unique to the history of our nation. At the
time of the inception of our country, our forefathers
recognized a healthy fear of any large standing army which
stemmed from the American Revolution itself.
In 1787, James Madison wrote:
...the means of defense against foreign dangers have
always been the instruments of tyranny at home. " [Herres:
1987 1]
Nevertheless, as the nature of our world and warfare evolved
through developments in new technologies, modern tactics,
superpowers, and third world nations, etc., the need for a
large military force during peacetime became self-evident.
4 Continuing Influences on DoD Reorganization
The National Security Act of 1947, approved on 26
July 1947, served to strengthen the executive by providing
additional military advice to the President without
lessening congressional oversight control of the military.
As discussed previously, the Act created the civilian
position of the SECDEF with cabinet level secretaries to
direct the Services. This structure was responsible for the
formulation of national defense policy at higher levels of
government. The implications of this integrated structure
were for an increase in centralization for policy direction
14
and for greater cohesion among the armed services. The
National Security Act, and the resulting changes that were
implemented, served to strengthen the military advice given
to the President, but at the same time, did not reduce
congressional oversight of the military - a delicate balance
that has been continually weighed [Herres: 1987 1]
.
In 1948, JCS members painstakingly deliberated over
fundamental issues in the text of the new Executive Order
(EO) 9877 u which took effect on the same day that the
National Security Act was signed by President Truman. Under
the direction of Mr. Forrestal, the Service Secretaries and
JCS attempted to revise the Executive Order in an effort to
ensure that its contents corresponded with the new Act.
[Cole, et al.: 1978 265-275]
Continued failure to reach an agreement, coupled
with a specific request of the Joint Chiefs for resolution
at a higher level, caused the SECDEF to meet with them at
Key West, Florida on 11 March 1948. While fundamental
issues were resolved after four days of conference, other
concerns were settled at a subsequent meeting on 20 March in
Washington, D.C.. [Cole, et al . : 1978 275]
Because of the disagreements and the absence of
joint strategic plans, Mr. Forrestal decided not to act on
the Executive Order, but instead, issued a paper, the
"Functions of the Armed Forces and Joint Chiefs of Staff,
"
and submitted the document to President Truman for his
endorsement in lieu of EO 9877. As a result, on 21 April
1948, the President by EO 9950 revoked the former order, and
issued a memorandum more commonly known as the Key West
Agreement. The original paper was only amended with the
words "by direction of the President." [Cole, et al . : 1978
275]
Under Section III of the Key West Agreement,
entitled "Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, " a system
. States the functions of the armed forces
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of designating agents for the Unified Commands was created.
The JCS were declared "the principle military advisors to
the President and to the SECDEF . " Within their specific
functions, the JCS were charged with the establishment of
Unified Commands in strategic locations determined by
national security interests. The memorandum went even
further. Commanders of these Unified Commands were to be
delegated the authority from JCS to enable them to establish
any subordinate unified commands that were necessary.
Finally, one member of the JCS was to be designated as the
executive agent for:
1 . A Unified Command;
Certain operations, and specified commands;
The development for special tactics, technique, and
equipment; and
The conduct of joint training.
To determine the means required for the exercise of a
Unified Command, and to assign individuals the
responsibility of providing such means (recommend to
the SECDEF the assignment to individual military
departments the responsibility of providing such
means)
.
6. To approve doctrines and policies for joint
operations, joint training, and military education.
7. To recommend to the SECDEF the assignment of primary
responsibility for any function of the armed forces.
8
.
To prepare and submit to the SECDEF a statement of
military requirements based upon joint war plans, and
national security obligations, and strategic
considerations, for his consideration when providing
guidance to the services in their preparation of
annual budget submissions. [Cole, et al . : 1978 279-
305]
Modifications incorporated into the National
Security Act of 1947 between 1949 and 1958 fell under eight
major problem areas: the authority of the SECDEF, staff
assistants for the SECDEF, the CJCS, the JCS, the Joint
12Staff
, Unified Command of Operational Forces, Control and
. Bolding shows wording which is removed in a 1953




The Joint Staff is the SECDEF' s military staff for
the operational direction of forces
.
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Coordination of Research Activities, and the Departments of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force. For a detailed summary of
events, see Figure 3. 13 [Cole, et al . : 1978 231-235]
Although amendments to the National Security Act
clarified and strengthened the powers of the SECDEF, major
14
shortcomings within the National Military Establishment
were left unresolved. The objective of the review conducted
by the Eberstadt Task Force, was to search for methods to
improve operations of the defense establishment while
reducing costs. Two of the six major areas addressed in its
report to the Hoover Commission on 15 November 194 8
recognized the need for improved coordination and control
[Cole, et al . : 1978 61-67]. Under the recommendation that
central authority in the National Military Establishment be
strengthened, the Committee recommended that:
1. The SECDEF' s authority over the military budget be
increased "to exercise direction and control" over the
preparation of estimates
.
2. The SECDEF be given control and direction of requests
from the military departments for fund authorizations
to assist him in producing unified and integrated
programs
.
3. The three military departments be administered by
their secretaries subject to the "direction and
authority of the SECDEF." [Cole, et al . : 1978 67]
Under the Committee's recommendation that teamwork
and coordination throughout the National Military
Establishment be improved, the main concern was for more
adequate relations among the various departments and
agencies. Recommendations focused on promoting a:
1
.
Fuller measure of teamwork,
2. Stronger consciousness of mutual interrelation,
3. Fuller consideration of all pertinent elements in the
in the preparation of plans,
13
. The various changes proposed and adopted were
derived from the Amendments of 1949, Reorganization Plan No.
6 of 1953, President Eisenhower's proposals of 3 and 16
April 1958, the version of H.R. 12541 approved on 12 June
1958, and the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958.
14 •
. Later, the National Military Establishment would be
formed into the DoD.
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UNIFIED COMMAND OF OPERATIONAL FORCES
MAJOR MODIFICATIONS CHANGES PROPOSED AND ADOPTED
I. P.P. 216
10 August 1949
JCS, subject to authority and
direction of the President
and the SECDEF, was
authorized to establish






Same as under I, but a
military department, rather
than a Service chief was to
act as the executive agent
for each command.
III. Presidential Messages
3 and 16 April 1958
Authorized the SECDEF, with
the approval of the
President, to establish
Unified and Specified
Commands and to assign
missions and forces to these
commands; remove Secretaries
and Service chiefs of
military departments from the
chain of command to these
commands; and to maintain
forces not assigned to these





Same as under III, but with
the advice and assistance of
the JCS, the Unified
Commanders were to have full
operational command; forces
were to be transferred from
these commands only a s
authorized by the SECDEF with





Same as under IV.
Figure 3.
Security
Summary of Major Modifications to the National
Act of 1947 Concerning the Unified Command of
Operational Forces
[Adapted from Cole, et al 1978 234-235]
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4. Unity of purpose in their execution, and
5. A sense of importance of economy. [Cole, et al .
:
1978 70]
President Truman in his message to Congress on 7
March 1949, reinforced the findings of the Hoover
Commission, the Eberstadt Task Force, and SECDEF James
Forrestal . He recognized that from the lessons learned from
World War II along with the advancing state of science and
technology, the nation needed a more workable organization
of the armed forces in order to support the all-important
goal of world peace. Emphasis was on the lack of adequate
civilian authority and control over the armed forces; the
need for optimum economy and efficiency in defense
expenditures; and improved interservice relations for a more
effective defense. The following statement by General
Herres, current Vice Chairman of the JCS, is an excellent
15summation of the results of the World War II experience:
The current framework in which civilian-military
relations are conducted is, in large measure, an outgrowth
of the structure which developed during World War II, when
it became increasingly evident that the nature of warfare
was undergoing dramatic change. Experience showed that
success in the modern warfare required closely coordinated
and mutually supporting operations by air, land, and sea
forces (the watchword of jointness now applies to this
philosophy)
.
This, in turn, not only required a unity of operational
command (the establishment of Specified and Unified
Commands) but also a coordination process to obtain the
most effective force mix and structure (another aspect ofjointness). [Herres: 1987 1]
President Truman, in his statements to the Congress
further describes the lessons learned and the evolutionary
nature of defense reorganization. The position of defense
reform was well articulated by Truman.
I have long been aware of the necessity for keeping our
national security organization abreast of security
requirements. To this end I recommended unification or
the armed forces to Congress in December 1945. My desire
was to improve our defense organization while the lessons
of World War II were in the minds of all.
. Note the unique nature of the major by-product of
World War II - a large standing military force during
Peacetime . Even the Founding Fathers maintained a healthy
ear of a large standing army and only acknowledged the
authority of a navy in the Constitution.
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A great deal was learned from those four years of
war... we learned that modern war required the combined use
of air, naval, and land forces welded together under
Unified Commands overseas' and under the strategic
direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Cole, et al . :
1978 77-80]
Truman considered the National Security Act to be a
practical basis for beginning the unification of the
military Services and for coordinating defense policy with
economic and foreign policy. However, he contended that
inadequacies existed in developing a chief defense officer,
fully accountable to the President and Congress, and an
organization capable of achieving an efficient and
economical defense program while also attaining informed
civilian control. He determined that the War and Navy
Departments were too rigid and inflexible for war and that
the widely diverse supply policies of the Services were
expensive and inefficient. He believed that differences in
combat and training doctrine provoked great conflicts in our
operational theatres. To combat those problems, Truman
recommended the following amendments:
...convert the National Military Establishment into an
Executive Department of the Government, to be known as the
Department of Defense and... to provide the Secretary of
Defense with appropriate responsibility and authority, and
with civilian and military assistance adequate to fulfill
his enlarged responsibility. [Cole, et al . : 1978 77-80]
An amendment in 194 9 increased the power of the
SECDEF. He became the only cabinet level officer, and was
placed in charge of three military departments (the Army,
Navy, and Air Force) under the new DoD. Yet each of the
Services was to be administered individually precluding
complete unification; something which had been addressed
earlier, but Congress was still not ready to establish.
[Herres: 1987 2]
From 1949 to 1952, the focus was on the build up of
military strength to meet aggression in Korea and other
areas. Only minor changes were made to the National
Security Act. However, at President Truman's request on,
the outgoing SECDEF Robert A. Lovett analyzed the state of
20
DoD and reported his findings in a letter on 18 November
1952.
Lovett also stressed the evolutionary nature of
unification - that improvements should be made as experience
is gained, and that much still needed to be done toward the
development of a more efficient and economical form of
defense establishment. Many of his recommendations became
incorporated into Reorganization Plan Number 6 of 1953. A
few of the more applicable areas in Lovett' s letter are
discussed below:
1. Potential problems created by the vagueness of the
National Security Act such as whether the JCS was
under the SECDEF and the fact that the Act directed
that the Services be "separately administered" while
at the same time provided that the SECDEF shall have
"direction, authority, and control" over DoD which
consisted of three military departments. Problems
cited were in the field or supply and warehousing
where some of the Services had suggested that the
Secretary "play in his own back yard"" and leave the
administration to them. Lovett stated clearly that
the SECDEF possesses the authority to make necessary
changes in those areas as long as ne did not abolish,
consolidate, reassign, or transfer any of the





The problem over what should be the proper arrangement
for the JCS, since it entails striking a suitable
balance between civilian and military control.
Civilian control is judged to be a fundamental in our
form of government. Nevertheless, even civilian
decision making must be based on competent military
advice "given by professional military men in an
atmosphere as free as possible from service rivalries
and Service maneuvering."
3. The weaknesses in the areas of modernization and
improvement inherent in the overlapping functional
structure of the Army's technical services, e.g. Corps
of Engineers and Signal Corps, make administration
and control burdensome. The basic organization
consisted of forming Services based on profession
instead of function. Lovett also focused on the
multiplicity in the many levels of headquarters in all
of tne military Services along with the contagious
duplication of committees. He recommended not only
reducing the number of headquarters and committees,
but also the conduct of a complete study of the
functions and organization of all three military
departments
.
4 Under his first alternative Lovett recommended the
establishment of Unified Commands by the SECDEF with
guidance from the JCS and the Service Secretaries
.
The role of the JCS would not be to "command" or
"operate" except in the event of a war and then only
"by direction. The Unified Commands would be agents
of the SECDEF assigned to a Service Department and not
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to a member of the JCS under his Chief of Service
role. [Cole, et al . : 1978 113-125]
In the matter of the establishment of Unified
Commands, Lovett favored diversification to a separate
operational chain of command. He wrote:
In my opinion, the SECDEF as the "principle assistant
to the President in all matters relating to the Department
of Defense" should, in effect, be the Deputy of the
Commander-in-Chief and, therefore, any Unified Command
should be established by him, report as directed by him,
and similarly, receive orders by his direction.
Since any Unified Command has functions broader than a
single Military Department, it would be well to review, as
apart of the study of the JCS, the present directives of
the Unified Commands to disclose their strengths and
weaknesses and to find ways to improve them, if necessary.
[Cole, et al. : 1978 122]
A revision of the Key West Agreement on 16 March
1954 became DoD Directive No. 5100.1, also entitled
"Functions of the Armed Forces and JCS." The new mandate
would confirm and strengthen the SECDEF' s authority to alter
and establish functions of the armed forces and JCS. Under
Section I, Principles, the directive stated:
No function in any part of the DoD, or in any of its
component agencies, snail be performed independent of the
direction, authority, and control of the SECDEF. [Cole,
et al. : 1978 303]
One major shift that occurred was that the SECDEF,
after consulting with the JCS, would designate one of the
three military departments to serve as the executive agency
for the Unified Commands instead of the former designation
of one of the JCS members as an executive. References to
the authority of a Unified Command to establish a
subordinate command were deleted. Also removed was the
former designation of one of the JCS members as an executive
agent for a Unified Command along with all associated
responsibilities cited in paragraph IB4, items 1-4, page 8.
Furthermore, the degree of control exercised by the JCS was
diminished by another change which gave JCS members the
responsibility for recommending to the SECDEF the
establishment of the Unified and Specified commands, instead
of their former authority to establish those commands [JCS:
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1987 117-118] . Now responsibility flowed from the SECDEF,
to a designated civilian secretary of a military department,
to the Unified Command. Also added was the authority for
the military chief to exercise strategic direction in an
emergency and to conduct combat operations in time of war.
Under such circumstances, the military chief acted in the
name of the SECDEF and was responsible for keeping his
civilian secretary, the JCS, and the SECDEF informed of all
actions and decisions. [Cole, et al . : 1978 279-305]
Over four years later, DoD Directive 5158.1,
"Organization of the JCS and Relationships with the Office
of the SECDEF," replaced DoD Directive 5100.1. This time,
the revisions were significant and conformed with the 1958
amendments to the National Security Act. Commanders of the
Unified and Specified Commands were again held accountable
to the President and SECDEF for accomplishment of their
assigned missions. The JCS were to serve as advisers and
staff in the operational chain of command as further
described in paragraph IB5 below. [Cole, et al . : 1978 266-
318]
5 . Development of Unified and Specified Commands
The National Security Act of 1947 was again amended
on 6 August 1958. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958
served as the last major reorganization prior to the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This 1958 amendment further
subordinated the Service Departments to the authority of the
SECDEF and created the Unified and Specified Commands. It
acted to centralize the authority of the SECDEF and the
control and direction of research and development efforts
.
[Cole, et al.: 1978 161-162]
. The Unified and Specified Commanders are the
combatant commanders of the National Military Command System
(NMCS) . They are legally responsible for maintaining either
large geographical or functional areas of responsibility, as
well as for planning and employing assigned forces in
combat. [Cummings: 19"8 6 2]
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The major focus was the establishment of a separate
structure through which the operational chain of command
would flow from the President, through the SECDEF and JCS,
to the Unified and Specified commands, and to the units.
Although the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
were removed from the operational arena, they remained
responsible for the administration, supply, and training of
the unified and specified forces [Herres: 1987 2],
The original chain of command to the Services is
then concerned with force structure and resource allocation
i 7decisions and has held the politxcal limelight. The newly
declared command structure was established clearly separate
from the military departments, and was intended as a
warfighting command structure. In the Declaration of
Policy, the amendment explicitly stated:
. . .to provide for the establishment of integrated
Policies and procedures for the departments, agencies and
unctions of the Government relating to the national
security; to provide a Department of Defense, including
the three military Departments of the Army, the Navy, ana
the Air Force under the direction, authority and control
of the Secretary of Defense; to provide that each military
department shall be separately organized under its own
Secretary and shall function under the direction,
authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to
provide for their unified direction under civilian control
of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge these
departments or services; to provide for thep establishment
of unified or specified combatant commands , and a clear
and direct line of command to such commands; to eliminate
unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense,
...to provide for the unified strategic direction of the
combatant forces, for their operation under unified
command, and for their operation under unified command,
and for their integration into an efficient team of land,
naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief
of Staff over the armed forces nor an overall armed forces
general staff (but this is not to be interpreted as
applying to the JCS or Joint Staff.) [Cole, et al . : 1978
17 The Service structure is the focal point of
congressional attention because of its responsibility for
the execution of national security policy and also because
of the constitutional ramifications of the original roles
designated to Congress and the military.
1
8
The law refers to combatant commands and later
combatant commanders who are more commonly referred to as
CINCs or Commanders-in-Chief.
19 • .
. Bolding indicates the amendments as indicated in




The intent of Congress was to establish a
comprehensive program which would allow for the integration
of policies and procedures for the agencies, departments,
and functions of government associated with national
security. With the operating chain of command now
established, eight CINCs were organized with operational
control over all forces assigned - the Alaskan, Atlantic,
Caribbean, Continental Air Defense, Eastern Atlantic and
Mediterranean, European, Pacific, and Strategic Air
Commands. See Figure 4 for the organization of DoD as of
April 1959. Furthermore, the SECDEF delegated
responsibility to the JCS to serve as the military staff in
the chain of operational command to the Unified Commanders.
[Cole, et al.: 1978 190-251]
On 10 January 1968, the configuration of the Unified
and Specified Commands was changed. The Alaskan, Atlantic,
Continental, European, Pacific, and Strategic Air Commands
(SAC) were retained. Additionally, two new commands,
Southern and Strike Commands, were formed. Territories
belonging to the Caribbean, and Eastern Atlantic and
Mediterranean Commands were absorbed by the other
territorial Unified Commands. Still, a total of eight CINCs
remained under the purview of the JCS. However, the Joint
Staff now serve a more indirect function between the CINCs
and the JCS. At this time, the JCS also became responsible
for the Defense Agencies of Atomic Support, Communications,
and Intelligence. [Cole, et al . : 1978 238-241]
A Unified Command is a command under the SECDEF
consisting of more than one Service. Examples of current
Unified Commands are U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) , U.S.
European Command (USEUCOM) , and U.S. Southern Command
(USSOUTHCOM) , and U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) , which
have regional areas of operations covering some air or sea,
but mostly land masses, whereas the U.S. Atlantic Command
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Figure 4. Organization of the DoD, April 1959
[Adapted from Cole, et al . : 1978 238-239]
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theatre oceanic commands. The U.S. Special Operations
Command (USSOC) and U.S. Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM) /Military Airlift Command (MAC) are the only two
new functionally organized Unified Commands . Both were
activated in April 1987 as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols
Act. USSOC controls all SOF's under the direction of the
SECDEF, while USTRANSCOM unified the Army's Air Traffic
Control (ATC) , Military Airlift Command (MAC), 20 and Sealift
organizations as component commands, forming a direct line
between DoD and all transportation assets. A Specified
Command is a command under the SECDEF which has a directed
mission and consists of one Service. While Specified
Commands report through the same channels as the Unified
Commands, they are also dual hatted as commanders of their
individual Service' s major command in that same functional
area [Cummings: 1986 4] . There are presently two Specified
Commands, SAC which is an Air Force command, and the
recently established U.S. Forces Command (USCINCFOR) , which
is an Army command charged with the readiness and
deployability of continental U.S. (CONUS) forces. For a
geographic depiction of the current ten Unified and
Specified Commanders areas of responsibility, see Figure 5




In 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower told
Congress that:
. . . separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone
forever,.... [Herres: 1987 2]
showing that the war experiences were a major impetus for
changing the structure of the military organization.
20 •
. MAC disagreed with this reorganization and fought
the restructuring under USTRANSCOM.
21
. These Army forces now report to the CJCS rather
than the Army Chief of Staff. Adapted from telephonic
interview with Jim Blackwell, Staff Director, John Hopkins
Foreign Policy Institute, on 27 May 1988 and Robert L.
Goldich' s Department of Defense Organization
:
Current




















Figure 5. Commanders' Area of Responsibility



















- Quarry Heights, Panama
- Peterson AFB, Colorado
- MacDill AFB, Florida




- Fort Mcpherson, Georgia
- Offut AFB, Nebraska
Figure 6. Current List of Unified and Specified Commands
[Adapted from USCINCPAC list of key staff for execution
review and program review matters]
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Success on the modern battlefield now requires the following
of a closely coordinated air-land-sea doctrine with the
support of multi-service forces. Grenada and the Persian
Gulf serve as vivid examples of this need. After the
Grenada mission, Senator Sam Nunn, the majority chairman of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated that:
...a close look at the Grenada operation can only lead to
the conclusion that, despite our victory and our success,
despite the performance of individual troops who fought
bravely,, the U.S. Armed Forces have serious problems
conducting joint operations. [Herres: 1987 2]
The word jointness is commonly used today to
encompass the many coordination problems found within the
large defense bureaucracy. "Jointness" refers to
coordinating everything from programs to tactics.
7 . The McNamara Era
In 1961, SECDEF Mcnamara introduced the concept of
program budgeting to DoD . As far reaching as the amendments
to the National Security Act were, no clear guidance on the
preparation of national defense policy existed. Therefore,
McNamara focused on procedural changes instead of attempting
any further reorganizations of DoD. From 1961 until 1968,
attention was directed toward better management efforts
rather than bureaucratic restructuring. The development of
PPBS was designed to correct the absence of close
coordination between budgeting and planning, and other
weaknesses. [Hobkirk: 1983 29] McNamara also desired more
control over DoD. A goal which PPBS facilitated. [Joint
DoD/GAO: 1983 18]
The planning phase of PPBS was designed to provide a
coordinated multi-year outline to direct program
development. Programing would also be multi-year oriented,
using a Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) , but limited pricing
decisions to the first year of programs selected in that
phase. Because the SECDEF possessed little analytical base
from which to base decisions among competing service
proposals, McNamara instituted the Office of Systems
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Analysis (OSA) , and staffed it with civilian analysts for a
more independent view. The FYDP became the central data
base for the system. It divided the DoD budget into the
first ten major force programs listed in Figure 7. These
programs represent a consolidation of individual Program
Elements, such as aircraft, construction, and divisions.
Thus, the FYDP becomes the cross-walk between programs in
the programing phase and appropriations in the budgeting
phase. [Joint DoD/GAO: 1983 18-19] As the 1960's
progressed, concerns rose over increasing defense costs and
overall effectiveness of the defense system due to the
Vietnam War. As a result, a series of major studies on
defense organization and management ensued. [JCS Historical
Office: 1987 138]
8 . The Era of Participative Management
In 1969, Melvin R. Laird became the SECDEF and put
into effect the philosophy of participative management under
the Nixon administration. In the early 1970' s the defense
establishment was coming under increasing scrutiny, as large
number of Americans began to believe that too many dollars
were spent on defense [Blechman & Lynn: 1985 ix] . With the
decline of support for defense came a prevailing frustration
with the way in which defense resources were managed.
Concerns arose over the efficiency and effectiveness of the
management of available defense resources. Mr. Laird sought
to restore credibility in the nation's defense system and
became responsible for the first major changes to PPBS.
In July 1969, President Richard M. Nixon and SECDEF
Laird appointed a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel to study and
evaluate the functions, management, and organization of DoD
in the performance of its national security mission. The
panel was chaired by Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, Chairman of the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and consisted of 16
business and professional leaders. [Cole, et al . : 1978 237-
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Figure 7. Major Force Programs of DoD[Adapted from the Department of the Navy's
Practical Comptrollership text at NPGS, p. A-15]
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appointment corresponded to a period when DoD was receiving
increasing criticism for alleged waste and inefficiency from
Congress. Congress' attitude turned into action when the
Senate Committee on Armed Services cut over one billion in
research and development funding. [JCS Historical Office:
1987 139]
One year later, on 1 July 1970, the panel submitted
a 237 page report with 113 recommendations including 15
organizational changes. [Cole, et al . : 1978 237-249]
Concerning the CINCs, the panel concluded the
Unified Commands were without an effective means of
participating in the programing phase of PPBS, which in
fact, determines the composition of their assigned forces
[Lower: 1988 16] . The aim of the chain of command rules
which were advocated by President Eisenhower and became law
in 1958 was to strengthen the authority of Unified
Commanders
.
The panel determined that such reforms had
little impact. [Blechman & Lynn: 1985 113]
A significant recommendation of the Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel was for the addition of three new major
Unified Commands, along with a reorganization containing a
substructure of component commands as follows:
Strategic Command








- Continental Air Defense Command
(CONAD)
- Fleet Ballistic Missile
Operations
- composed of all combatant or
general purpose forces assigned
to organized combatant units;
became
:
* European Command (EUCOM)
* Pacific Command (PACOM)
* Merged the Atlantic,
Southern, and Strike Commands
- composed of Theatre Logistics
Commands and was designed to




combatant forces [Cole, et
al. : 1978 237-251]
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The panel also recommended that the DEPSECDEF for
Operations be given responsibility for Military Operations,
Operational Requirements, the Unified Commands, and several
other functions. Furthermore, all responsibilities which
were delegated by the SECDEF and related to military
operations and Unified Commands should be designated to one
senior military member with his own staff, in order to
provide support for matters proceeding through the
operational chain of command. This senior officer would
report through the DEPSECDEF (Operations) . The person to
hold this function would be designated by the President and
SECDEF. Potential appointees were the Chairman of the JCS,
a tactical commander, or some other senior military officer.
[Cole, et al. : 1978 251]
On 28 February 1985, when the final report on
implementation of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management was issued by DoD, the recommendations
listed above were executed, except for minor alterations in
procedures or changes in details. The final report was
design to summarize those actions that DoD had taken to
implement the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense
Panel. [Cole et al . : 1978 238-258]
Finally, under the panels recommendations, control
and power available to the CINCs would have been greatly
increased. Specifically, the panel recommended that:
The Unified Commanders should be given unfragmented
command authority for their Commands, and the Commanders
of component commands should be redesignated as Deputies
to the commander of the appropriate Unified Command, in
order to make it unmistakably clear that the combatant
forces are in the chain of command which runs exclusively
through the Unified Commander. [Cole, et al . : 1978 251-
258]
However, by the time the final report on
implementation of the panel's findings appeared in February
1975, no decision on this issue was reached. [Cole, et al . :
1978 258]
Such actions would serve to set up a chain of
command from the President and the SECDEF to the Unified
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Commands as well as create a completely separate staff for
operations. To facilitate these recommendations, all of the
existing responsibilities for military operations, to
include JCS's responsibility as a military staff in the
operational chain of command, would have to be rescinded.
[Cole, et al. : 1978 251]
In his United States Military Posture for FY 1971,
Mr. Laird gave his opinion on the state of decision-making
within the defense structure. The following statement
summarizes his conclusions:
I inherited a system designed for highly centralized
decision making. Overcentralization in so large an
organization leads to a kind of paralysis. Many decisions
are not made at all or, if they are made, lack full
coordination and commitment by those who must implement
the decisions. [Laird: 1970 8]
Later, in his final report to Congress on January 8,
1973, Mr. Laird emphasized that underlying most of the
problems in defense organization was a major issue which
needed to be resolved - the question of confidence and
credibility in the defense establishment itself. He
realized the weaknesses in the system and sought to
reestablish credibility in the national organization for
defense. In order to reverse the trend toward even more
centralization in DoD, he effected numerous procedural
changes under his participatory management style to place
more accountability and responsibility within the various
service and defense agencies [Laird: 1973 10] . A major
change directed by Laird within PPBS was aimed at the
programing phase. OSA ceased to sponsor its own program
proposals, and was charged with reviewing service proposals
under set budgetary ceilings, which is now a permanent part
of PPBS [Joint DoD/GAO: 1983 20]
.
9 . Extensive Defense Studies Continue
Minor changes to the structure of DoD occurred again
in 1978 under President Jimmy Carter, who introduced the
Zero-Base Budgeting Concept (ZBB). Carter's SECDEF, Harold
Brown, proposed streamlining the infrastructure of DoD by
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abolishing two Assistant SECDEFs (ASD) and one Assistant
Secretary from each of the military departments. By June of
1978, the combatant command structure was split into three
Specified (Aerospace Defense, SAC, and Military Airlift) and
five Unified (Atlantic, European, Pacific, Readiness, and
Southern) Commands. Mr. Brown was also responsible for
taking one of the first significant steps in increasing the
role of the CINCs in the defense resource allocation process
by requiring the CINCs to submit quarterly reports to the
SECDEF [Cummings et al . : 1986 16]. These reports reflect
each CINCs view on force structure, resource allocation,
research and development, and readiness concerns between the
CINCs and DoD, and are still in use today [Cummings, et al.:
1986 20]. [Cole, et al . : 1978 261-263]
President Carter's platform demanded governmental
reform. Soon after assuming the Office of President, he
directed a review DoD missions and organizations. In
implementing the President's request, SECDEF Brown began
three independent studies: one project was on defense
resource management and was directed by Dr. Donald B. Rice,
President of Rand Corporation; the second was concerned with
defense management structure and was headed by Mr. Paul
Ignatius, President of Air Transportation Association and
former SECDEF; and the last was on improving the efficiency
of the national military command structure and was by Mr.
Richard C. Steadman of J. H. Whitney and Company, a former
Deputy Assistant SECDEF. [JCS: 1987 142-143]
In July 1978, Mr. Steadman' s report, "The National
Military Command Structure, " found that there was neither
any formal spokesman in Washington, D.C. to voice CINC
viewpoints during the decision making process, nor any
military officer to take charge of the direction and
oversight of CINC actions. He criticized the joint planning
and policy system, noting excessive consultation and
coordination problems between the Joint and Service Staffs.
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The result was formal JCS opinions which were "the lowest
common level of assent." He also brought to the forefront
another current concern. Historically, the Services did not
assign their best people to joint duties as these positions
took time away from what were considered more important
assignments for an officer's career progression. The
combination of such factors resulted in an ineffective joint
system, especially in the area of resource allocation.
[JCS: 1987 145-147]
Mr. Steadman recommended the assignment of the
Chairman, JCS, as the SECDEF' s agent for supervision of the
CINCs and that the Chairman with the support of the CINCs be
assigned a formal role in the resource allocation and
decision making process. To improve JCS procedures, Mr.
Steadman recommended that the Joint Staff be held
responsible for all JCS documents, and that action be taken
to improve the quality of personnel filling joint
assignments. While JCS attempted to place servicemembers
with higher qualifications in joint positions, no attempt
was made at improving personnel assignment procedures as had
been recommended. [JCS: 1987 146-149]
In response to the Ignatius and Steadman reports,
the JCS wrote in a message to the SECDEF on 1 September 1978
that studies' recommendations were:
...innovative, positive suggestions directed at continuing
evolutionary improvements in military operations,
functions, and the quality of military advice.
The JCS stance was that in an era of declining resources,
careful management of defense resources compelled an
increased role for both the Chairman and themselves, and
required an enhanced role with the CINCs. [JCS: 1978 148]
In 1979, the study performed by Dr. Rice,
recommended that the CINCs involvement in the resource
allocation process be increased [Lower: 1988 16] . He
22
. Message cited was JCSM-290-78 to the SECDEF, dated
1 September 1978.
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strongly criticized those JCS documents prepared and used in
the PPBS. Dr. Rice recommended that the JCS Chairman be an
active member of the proposed DRB and that the Chairman be
allowed to prepare his own prioritized listing of
initiatives above the Services' base for budget
requirements. [JCS: 1987 151]
10 . Formation of the Defense Resources Board
The final report of Dr. Rice's Defense Resource
Management Study resulted in the formation of the DRB as an
advisory body to the SECDEF on 7 April 1979. The role of
the DRB was to improve efficiency and effectiveness in PPBS.
[JCS: 1987 149]
The DRB was chaired by the DEPSECDEF, and was
composed of certain Assistant and Under Secretaries of
Defense, the CJCS, an advisor for National Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) affairs, and a representative of the
2 3Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) . The size
of the DRB was increased by adding the Service Secretaries
on 27 March 1981, in order to broaden the viewpoints
24expressed, and reduce the number of appeals.
In the early 1980' s, the Weinberger-Carlucci
initiatives expanded the DRB and brought in the operational
viewpoints of the CINCs. The considerations of the board
were again broadened as the CINCs were asked to appear
before the DRB during the planning and programing phases.
The CINCs briefed on the prior year' s Defense Guidance (DG)
,
23
. Adapted from Analysis of the OSD and Department of
the Army Management Changes Resulting from the 1981
Revisions to the Planning, Programing, and Budgeting
tn<System, Dallas T. Lower, NPGS, 1981 and he DoD's Planning,
Programing, and Budgeting System, U.S. Government
Accounting Office (GAO) , 1984.
24
. Adapted from information provided by MAJ Lower on
14 June 19887
25
. Adapted from interview with Mr. Leeland Jordan, of
the Office of the Under Secretary for Defense, Program and
Budget Integration Office, on 16 May 1988.
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the first complete draft of the current year' s DG, and
Service program proposals [Joint DoD/GAO: 1984 21] .
In 1981, the membership and functions of the DRB
were again changed. Its primary role was to assist the
SECDEF in managing DoD's PPBS and remains so today [OSD:
1981] . See Figure 8 for a listing of current DRB members
and Figure 9 for DRB' s role in the PPB process.
11 . Reorganization Developments, 1981-1984
Beginning in early 1981, defense department
reforms, introduced by Caspar Weinberger, the SECDEF,
centered on the concept of "participative management"
discussed previously under the Laird years. [Coggin and
Nerger: 1987 1] On 31 March 1981, Weinberger announced
important changes to DoD's PPBS. He focused on
decentralizing decision making, enhancing service
responsibilities, increasing efficiencies while holding
costs down, instilling long-range strategic planning, paying
attention to savings, and streamlining the PPB process. In
the planning phase, the JCS, along with the Under SECDEF for
Policy, became responsible for developing more comprehensive
plans and policies to develop strategies to fight the
threat, set military objectives, and improve resource
applications. [Lower: 1981 12]
Although a style of participative management
similar to the Weinberger and Carlucci initiatives of the
early 1980' s was attempted under Secretary Laird, a
significant difference affecting the CINCs occurred under
Weinberger. For the first time, the CINCs were requested to
appear before the DRB. This step allowed the CINCs to get
their "foot in the door" of PPBS and influence some of the
2 €>decisions made in the Defense Guidance (DG)
.
However, from 1981 through 1984, the CINCs were
limited to two appearances a year before the DRB in order to
9 c.
. Adapted from a telephonic interview with MAJ Dallas
T. Lower, of Headquarters USCENTCOM on 6 December 1987.
39
THE DEFENSE RESOURCES BOARD
Chairman: Deputy Secretary of Defense, William H. Taft, IV
Permanent Members :
Secretary of the Army, John 0. Marsh, Jr.
Secretary of the Navy, James P. Webb, Jr.
Secretary of the Air Force, Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Robert B. Costello (Designate)
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Fred C. Ikle
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence), Thomas P. Quinn (Acting)
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense
David J. Armor (Acting)
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy),
Frank J. Gaffney (Designate)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics), Robert B. Costello
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Technology), Robert C. Duncan
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Dennis R. Shaw (Acting)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict),
Lawrence Ropka (Acting)
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, David S. C. Chu
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, John E. Krings
Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
LGEN James A* Abrahamson, Jr.
Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs
(0MB), (OEOB, Room 262), Wayne Arny
Comptroller), Robert W. Helm
Force Management and Personnel),
Health Affairs), William E. Mayer
International Security Affairs),
Other Attendees :
Army - General Vuono
Navy - Admiral Trost
Air Force - General Welch
Marine Corps - General Gray
NSC - Michael Donley, OEOB, Room 376
Figure 8. Current list of DRB Members
(and other attendees on 1 October 1987)
[Adapted from Army PA&E's DRB list]
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Figure 9. The DRB' s Role in PPBS
[Mallion: 1981]
41
discuss the adequacy of Service Program Objective
Memorandums (POM) and DG. Since 1984, Implementation
Reviews have been conducted in the "off year" of the new
biennial cycle. The CINCs now spend more time in testimony
and are more able to present their positions. They
currently appear not only before the DRB during the Joint
Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) and budget execution,
27but also before Congress as requested.
The trend in CINC participation is a steady
increase as more CINCs appear before more defense panels and
congressional committees more often. Continuation of this
2 8trend is anticipated. For example, formerly the CINC of
U.S. PACOM testified before the SASC only once each year
after the Presidential Budget was passed. After the
Goldwater-Nichols act was passed almost every committee had
29Service issues which required the CINCs appearance. In
1987, USCINCPAC or his representative testified before four
different committees and subcommittees of Congress. Between
January and April of this year, Admiral Ronald J. Hays has
already made five appearances at the request of several
Congressional committees namely, the House Appropriations
Committee (HAC) , Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC)
,
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) , and Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC) . More such appearances are
on
anticipated in the forthcoming year. [Malis: 1988]
In 1982, after reviewing all of the previous
studies, and on the eve of his retirement, General David C.
Jones, USAF, proposed a major reform of the JCS . He
realized the improvements made in the joint system over the




. Adapted from an interview with the Staff Judge
Advocate Office at USCINCPAC on 6 April 1988.
29
. Adapted from interview with Mr. Bob Malis, Program




Jones believed that "from the top down, " a major problem
with the military system was inadequate intra-service and
joint experience. Several of the areas in which he
recommended changes are listed below:
1. That the Chairman of the JCS be supported by a deputy,
2. That the Chairman, confer with the CINCs, and serve as
interservice spokesman on resource distribution
problems,
3. That the CINCs authority over their component
commanders be strengthened,
4. That service staff involvement in the joint system be
limited.
5. That the experience, rewards, and training involvingjoint duty be increased. [JCS: 1987 163-1^7]
General Edward C. Meyer, Army Chief of Staff, did
not believe General Jones' proposal went far enough,
especially with regard to the CINCs. General Meyer wanted
even greater CINC involvement in the decision making
process. Further, he submitted that the removal of any ties
between the Services and the Chairman, along with General
Meyer's newly proposed council of full-time military
31 . ....
advisors, would facilitate the visibility of the CINCs and
allow them to become more active participants in both
defense policy issues and joint programs. [JCS: 1987 168-
169]
With the two recommendations for major changes from
influential JCS members, Congress began to look at
reorganization of the JCS with the White Bill, named after
Representative Richard C. White, Chairman of the House
Investigations Subcommittee. This bill would have allowed
the CINCs to comment on any Joint Staff document or
recommendation for the JCS. In a related hearing on 14 June
1983, General Vessey testified that the JCS had already
31
. Officers of the council would have no service
related ties enhancing the Chairman's position with the new
council. The Chairman could then speak freely and disagree
with council members. General Meyer stated that with the
council "The real or perceived obsession with
unanimity, . . .with an accompanying tendency for the lowest
common denominator solution would end." [JCS: 1987 169]
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begun to increase CINC participation in the areas of program
and budget decision making. [JCS: 1987 169-183] 32
In the Summer of 1982, SECDEF Weinberger asked
General John W. Vessey Jr., USA, the new JCS Chairman, to
initiate changes to improve the joint system which would not
exact a change in the law. On 18 June 1982, Mr. Weinberger
also requested that General Vessey, as Chairman, become an
active spokesman for the CINCs in both operational and
resource allocation issues, to include participation in the
DRB. Although the directive was oral, it was an important
one understood by every major participant in DoD, to include
the CINCs and JCS. The SECDEF emphasized to the CINCs that
he relied on the Chairman to act as their spokesman. Later,
the SECDEF and JCS agreed that any proposal must meet
certain criteria, the suggested reform should:
1. Increase the nation's ability to fight a war;
2. Improve and speed advice given to the President and
SECDEF;
3. Guarantee that the needs of the CINCs were better met;
4. Ensure improvements in the efficiency and
effectiveness of resource allocation;
5. Coincide with civilian control of the military
historically followed by the nation. [JCS: 1987 172]
As a result, the SECDEF stressed that Service
programs developed by component commanders be coordinated
with their unified commander and that the Unified Commands
be given direct access to meetings of the DRB. Other
actions implemented by the SECDEF and JCS which did not
require revisions to the existing law focused on
improvements in continuity during the Chairman' s absence,
qualifications for joint duty positions, and commitment by
the Chairman and JCS to provide more responsive advice to
the President and SECDEF. [JCS: 1987 171-173]
After completing a study on JCS reorganization in
November 1982, General Vessey provided the SECDEF with the
32
. Also known as H.R. 6954 or the JCS Reorganization
Act of 1982.
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JCS's conclusions and recommendations. The JCS regarded
themselves as the body that should consider the JCS issues
posed by Generals Jones, Meyer, and others. The major
problem, from which other issues arose, was the poor
relations between OSD and the Office of the JCS (OJCS) .
They sought to work with the SECDEF to clarify these staff
roles to better assist the SECDEF. One suggestion was to
assess the DoD structure from the standpoint of eliminating
33duplication and overlap, improving the conveyance of
military advice, and decentralizing the administration of
policy by the JCS and the CINCs . Policy direction would
remain centralized. As a statutory change, the JCS
recommended the Chairman be removed from the chain of
command between the SECDEF and the CINCs. [JCS: 1987 175-
176]
On 29 July 1983, the Investigations Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Armed Services adopted H.R. 3718.
The bill was aimed at reorganizing the JCS and went farther
than any of the former DoD proposals. The role of the




Placed in the chain of command,
2. Responsible for evaluating all nominations for three
and four star positions,
3. Authorized to furnish his own advice to the President,
SECDEF, and NSC,
33
. A study to review CINC staffing requirements for
the purpose of eliminating duplication and overlapping began
in 1987. At the request of SECDEF Frank Carlucci, Mr. Derek
Vandershaft, the Deputy Inspector General (IG) , conducted a
staff study of all unified and Specified Commands which
focused on identifying areas or overstaf f ing . Mr.
Carlucci' s goal in directing this analysis was to ascertain
how to most efficiently perform his function with respect to
the CINCs. The results of this special study were scheduled
for publication in mid-March, but nothing has yet been
released. This tightly held report is expected to produce
7000 manpower reductions. (Adapted from interview with Mr.
Leeland Jordan on May 18, 1988)
.
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. H.R. 3718 was also known as the JCS Reorganization
Act of 1983 or the "Nichols Bill," named after




4. Ascertain when JCS issues should be decided,
5. Grant the Chairman rather,, than the JCS, the authority
to select Joint Staff officers,
6. A member of the NSC,
7. Allowed to supervise the CINCs, and
8. The formal spokesman of the CINC's on operational
matters
.
Furthermore, the bill initiated procedures to let the CINCs
and Service Chiefs comment on any proposal before it was
presented to the JCS. [JCS: 1987 182-184]
On the other hand, DoD supported only those
provisions contained in an earlier proposal, and opposed all
changes, including items five through eight listed in the
paragraph above. Nevertheless, these proposals were later
passed by the House on 17 October 1983 and were attached as
an amendment to the FY 1985 DoD Authorization Bill. Use of
this rider was an effort to force Senate consideration and
bring JCS reorganization to the forefront, for although the
Senate Committee on Armed Services had completed extensive
hearings on DoD reforms (including the role of Unified and
Specified Commands during mobilization and peacetime) no
action was taken. Even without formal statutory changes in
1983, the JCS reorganized the Command, Control, and
Communications (C3) Systems to support commanders of the
Unified and Specified commands with a management structure
designed to improve analysis of C3 requirements. [JCS: 1987
185-187]
In November 1983, three CINCs led by General
Bernard W. Rogers, CINC, USEUCOM, testified before the
Senate Committee on Armed Services as to the CINCs' lack of
voice in the defense decision making process. The Committee
met in open session and was pursuing a series of hearings on
the organization, structure, and decision making procedures
of DoD at the time. All of the Commanders of the Unified
and Specified Commands were called to testify on their
46
relationships with other DoD and executive agencies. [U.S.
Senate: 1983 275-310]
General Rogers was the first CINC to speak and was
supported by the subsequent testimonies of Admiral Wesley L.
McDonald, CINC, USLANTCOM, who was responsible for the
military action in Grenada, and General Paul F. Gorman,
CINC, USSOUTHCOM. He stated that the main function of DoD
is to maintain a balance between Service and joint views and
emphasized that currently, cross-service opinions received
only limited recognition and had only a few avenues open for
formal expression within the current system. General Rogers
addressed a major problem area - the lack of assurance that
cross-service and warfighting views would be a part of
essential trade-off decisions in the Services' program
recommendations, and in the development of strategy, policy,
and doctrine. He stated that the CINCs who actually use the
assets and forces of all the Services had no formal means to
communicate joint needs. Appearances before the DRB were at
the call of the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF. Although General
Rogers recognized the major improvements made under the
current administration, he suggested that further actions
needed to be taken and recommended five major changes
:
1. Place the CJCS in the chain-of-command for both
Peacetime and wartime roles. During time of peace the
JCS would act as spokesman of the CINC on all joint
issues and in the PPBS process.
2. Make the CJCS a member of the NSC to bring cross-
service and warfighting concerns to bear in national
security arrangements
.
3. To establish a permanent Deputy CJCS to serve as a
cross-Service spokesman especially when the Chairman
is not available.
4. Remove the current restrictions on the size of the
Joint Staff to allow the CJCS to have an adequate
staff to provide for joint views
.
5. Formalize the role of the CINCs with the DRB. General
Rogers did not consider legislative action necessary
on this item. The creation of formalized interaction
between the CINCs and the DRB could be accomplished
within OSD. [U.S. Senate: 1983 278-279]
The testimony of General Rogers had significant
impact for several reasons. First, was simply the force of
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"Bernie's" personality. Second, his experience had taken
him as far as he could go. On this the eve of his
retirement, he had already served as the Chief of Staff and
as a JCS member, and was currently the most powerful CINC,
responsible for our nation's presence in Lebanon. And
finally, General Rogers was the first CINC to speak up and
state that the voices of the CINCs were not being heard and
that changes to the system were necessary. The testimonies
of Generals Rogers and Gorman, and Admiral McDonald directly
led to DEPSECDEF Taft's Memorandum in 1984.
A conference of House and Senate Armed Services
Committees passed the FY 1985 DoD Authorization Bill on 26
and 27 September 1984 respectively. Some of the proposals
approved from H.R. 3718 included revisions to Title 10 that
made the Chairman of the JCS the formal spokesman for the
CINCs on operational requirements (under the authority,
control, and direction of the SECDEF) , and allowed the
Chairman to decide when JCS issues would be settled. By 1
May of 1985, both DoD Directive 5100.1 Functions of the
Department of Defense and Its Major Components," and DoD
Directive 5158.1, "Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and Relations With the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
"
were revised to correspond with changes to Title 10
incorporated into the new law. [JCS: 1987 190-192]
At the same time, the JCS were revising their
Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 132, "Coordination and Approval
Procedures for Joint Actions." Their goal was to
streamline the coordination of joint actions and to codify
and highlight current processes in an effort to effect more
timely responses. [JCS: 1987 197]
After passage, a multitude of questions on defense
organization ensued. Answers to the queries of the House
and Senate Committees were prepared by the SECDEF, JCS, the
35
. The bill became Public Law 98-525 when signed into
law by the President on 19 October 1984.
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Services, and Unified and Specified Commanders. [JCS: 1987
195]
In 1982, General Jones brought to national focus
the issue of JCS reform by openly admitting that the JCS
system was not functioning properly and needed to be
changed. Changes in the JCS system naturally led to
involving the CINCs in the reform movement. Then, in
1983, the CINCs, headed by General Bernard Rogers, further
brought the CINCs into the limelight by opening the issue of
CINC participation in PPBS by expressing the fact that the
37CINCs had no voice in the process.
From 1981 to 1984, the CINCs involvement in PPBS
was limited to brief appearances before the DRB during the
planning and programing phases . These appearances were used
3 8to discuss the adequacy of the DG and the Service POMs
.
In the Summer of 1984, the DEPSECDEF, William H. Taft IV,
inquired if the CINCs were listened to in the PPB process.
In general, the opinions of the CINCs were negative.
[Lower, 1988 16]
A major breakthrough for the CINCs occurred on 14
November 1984 when DEPSECDEF Taft issued a memorandum for
members of the DRB, and CINCs of the Specified and Unified
Commands. Taft's memo was based on the problem surfaced by
General Rogers and Meyer, along with other studies which
were done.
The Taft memo enhanced the role of the CINCs in
PPBS by making adjustments to the 1988 POM which would
greatly increase CINC participation. Along with the role of
the JCS with respect to the concerns of the CINCS, four
major areas were addressed:
3 fi
. Adapted from interview with Mr. Leeland Jordan, of
Program and Budget Integration, Office of the UNDERSECDEF of
Defense, Washington D.C. on 16 May 1988.
37
. Adapted from telephonic interview with MAJ Lower on
6 December 1987.
3 8
. Adapted from letter from MAJ Lower on 7 December
1987.
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1. The CINCs' submission of prioritized requirements to
the Service Departments through their component
commanders and forwarding of separate list of higher
priority requirements integrated across all functional
and Service lines;
2. The relationship between the CINCs and the military
departments during the POM development process will
continue through the component commanders;
3. The visibility of responses in the POMs to CINC
requirements and unfunded CINC priorities; and
4. The increased participation of the CINCs in the DRB
program review process. [Taft: 1984 1]
First of all, the memo effectively requested each
CINC to identify priorities to the SECDEF, Assistant SECDEF
(ASD) , and Chairman of the JCS and specified how to transmit
them to the military departments [Coggin and Nerger: 1987
1] . The memo effectively began the Integrated Priority
3 9Lists (IPLs) in use today. Second, it supported ongoing
efforts to strengthen the links between the CINCs and their
component commanders during the POM development process.
Third, the memo created a separate annex for each POM, which
is now called the CINC Annex. This annex clearly sets forth
those requirements that the CINCs submitted, identifies
whether these needs were met in the POM, and substantiates
why any shortfalls were not met. And finally, the memo
increased CINC participation at DRB meetings which formerly
restricted the CINCs to either meetings constructed
especially to hear the their views on the POMs or the Issue
Book One meeting on Policy and Risk Assessment. The CINCs
would now be allowed to advance their Program Review issues
independently and not through a DRB member. The CINCs would
39 . . ...
. IPLs are listings of the CINCs highest priority
needs and were designed to provide visibility in DoD
programing for key problems areas. The IPLs are the CINCs'
warfighting lists and are submitted to component commanders
for POM input. While the CINCs use the IPLs to justify
their programs, OSD, JCS, and the Services use them to
develop and judge the adequacy of the POMs . The IPLs are
used as a scorecard to grade the Services on how they have
supported CINC requirements . An unofficial copy of the IPLs
are transmitted to Congress. The IPLs are used to justify
programs to Congress and OSD. CINC programs assist injustifying Service programs to Congress. Originally, IPLs
were submitted by December 31st. (Adapted from telephonic
interview with MAJ Lower on 11 June 1988)
.
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receive invitations to attend any DRB meeting relevant to
the issues they previously addressed. See Appendix C for
the Taft Memorandum. [Taft: 1984 1-2]
A follow up memorandum from Taft required a review
of the progress made in implementing the initiatives
directed by the 1984 memorandum, which enhanced CINC
participation in DoD program formulation during the
programing phase of PPBS, and assessed the need for
modifications or additional changes [Taft: 1985]. On 18
October 1985, in the final report back to the DEPSECDEF, the
Executive Secretary to the DRB (Programing) expressed a very
positive view of the broader role given the CINCs in the
programing phase. The report went on to address 14 items
requiring further decisions.
1. Findings: Under the CINCs submission of prioritized
requirements, IPLs were determined to make a positive
contribution to program development, but problems
still existed in assessment, costing, distribution,
offsets, and methodology and format.
Decisions: (a) By March 1st, JCS would be required to
submit an assessment of the IPLs to the SECDEF. (b)
The CINCs IPL submission date was changed to November
30th to provide for better utilization of CINC input
in POM development and subsequent program review.
(c) The CINCs would no longer be required to provide
cost data in their IPLs as costing requires expertise
the CINCs do not have and CINC costing would be
redundant and less efficient than data provided by the
Services. Therefore the contribution of such input
was minimal. Also, the CINCs were relieved from the
requirement to identify fiscal offsets in their IPLs.
Several CINCs stated their inability and reluctance to
provide such information at that early stage;
maintaining the requirement may have led to an erosion
of CINC support for the IPL. The Service Secretaries
would now receive information copies of IPLs . The
JCSs' methodology and format for preparing IPLs would
be used for standardization. USCINCPAC's format and
level of specificity was cited as an example.
2. Findings: (a) Under tracking CINC concerns during POM
development, the CINCs desire to improve the
information provided in the POMs by defining specific
theatre allocations was addressed. For example, how
much was for CINCPAC, EUCOM, PACOM, etc. The CINCs
are not able to derive this information for themselves
due to the lack of analytical support staffs at their
headquarters. (b) Under CINC-Military Department
°. CINCSAC and SECNAV opposed the new deadline because
it was too early. IPLs cannot be finished until results of
the previous program review are received and better policy
dictates the CINCs need not commit themselves to a published
IPL before it is necessary.
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Communications, the primacy of the CINC-component
relationship was recognizee: throughout the previous
year in tracking specific data requirements to provide
feedback to the CINCs on the status of their programs.
Specifically, the Army's workshops and updates for
programmers were recognized along with the Air Force'
s
and Army's method of flagging CINC concerns during POM
deliberation. [Cummings: 1986 26]
Decision: The Services, with and through the MIL-5,
would study solutions to the Unified CINCs' need for
visibility in the theatre allocation of service
Programs
.
Finding: Under visibility of CINC requirements in the
POM,, the POM annexes were determined "to assist in the
visibility of CINC requirements, but the level of
detail varied and the annexes were inadequately cross-
referenced to program details found in other volumes
of the POM. while the Air Force and Army agreed to
provide a "CINC Requirement" funding line in the POM
Annex, the Navy opposed the requirement for CINC
Annexes to the POM,
Decision: POM Annexes would be standardized using the
Army's POM 87 Annex as a model and would include a
"CINC Requirement" line to reflect the cost, decided
in conjunction with the CINC, of each priority item in
the IPL.
Findings : Under Participation of the CINCs in the DRB
Program Review Process, distance, inexperience,
information availability, and manpower were found to
be constraints in the CINC participation in the
program review process. Despite these problems, CINC
8articipation was considered oeneficial . Although the
ffice of the JCS (SPRAA) did the best they could in
distributing documents during the compressed Program
Review Process, the distribution system did not permit
fully informed CINC participation and needed to be
improved. Also, under current status, the report
concluded that the CINCs should continue to raise
Program Reviews for DRB consideration independently
(without the former DRB sponsorship) . Of the 270
outlines presented during the 1987 Program Review
[Cummings: 1987 27], 29 of these were from the CINCs
and almost all of these outlines were incorporated
into issues.
Decisions: (a) The Director of OSD PA&E would
investigate, with the assistance of OJCS, the CINCs,
and interested OSD organizations, a means of improving
Program Review document distribution. Electronic
transmission and overnight delivery service would be
explored fully, (b) The need for additional manpower
for the CINCs to enhance their role in PPBS was
acknowledged, but was not approved and would be
reviewed again next year. The main concern was for
the proliferation of analytical and programing staffs
at operational commands.
Findings: Under the role of the JCS, suggestion for
more detailed and timely JCS analysis to bring a joint
focus to decision making in a resource constrained
environment. The CINCs supported JCSs' role during
the previous years activities.
41
.
SPRAA is now the J-8 Office of the JCS
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Decision: In the current year JPAM, JCS will
articulate a clear view on benefits and deficiencies
in the POMs, those strategic objectives that can and
cannot be met by the capabilities expressed in the
POMs, and the necessary changes to the POMs in case of
an increase or reduction in funding.
6. Finding: Under other considerations, codifying the
improvements made was addressed. The CINCs now
provide input into the development of DOD planning
guidance and the POM development process. USCINCEUR
recommended such developments as:
"...the opportunity for CINCs to discuss policy,
strategy, and program issues with the DRB, the
provision of CINC program priority needs to the
Services, the requirement that the Services address
CINC priority needs in POM annexes, and the
designation of CJCS as the spokesman of the CINCs."
[Chu: 1985 19]
USCINCEUR considered such codification necessary to
ensure that the changes made under this administration
were long-lasting improvements and that the CINCs
retain their influence in DoD programing commensurate
with their responsibility for defending that program.
(The Service Departments opposed this measure because
they considered the CINCs role to be still evolving
and that actions taken to codify current initiatives
may serve to stifle future ones. [Cummings: 1986 28]
Decision: The Director of PA&E, in coordination with
the UNDERSECDEF (Policy) , ASD (Comptroller) , the
Military Departments, and the CINCs will revise DoD
Directives and Instructions to codify the expanded
role of the CINCs in the PPBS . [Chu: 1985 2-19]
For the SOFs, another Taft memorandum in 1987
heightened visibility of their resource requirements as
follows
:
1. The ASD. Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
(SO/LIC) , was added as a member of the DRB and allowed
to present appropriate issues at DRB meetings;
2. A revision of Program 11, SOF, to "provide full
visibility of SOF resource levels and program
approvals," was directed;
3. SOF budget justifications must now be included with




Reprograming documents must reflect DoD and
congressional approval and the ASD (SO/LIC) may
initiate appropriate reprograming documents;
5 Restrictions were placed on reprograming SOF resources
which must be identified on all documents releasing
appropriated funds to the services; and
6. Additional management coordination provisions to
enhance visibility and control of SOF resources by the
ASD (SO/LIC) and CINCSOC were also incorporated.
[Taft: Sep 1987 1-2]
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12 . Prelude to The DoD Reorganization Act of 1986
The aftermath of the Iranian hostage rescue, which
was aborted in 1980, aroused questions in Congress about the
effectiveness of the JCS and the Joint System. Furthermore,
the Grenada mission resulted in an even more aroused
Congress, determined to confront the problem of the
inability of the Services to operate together [JCS: 1987
163] . Whether this problem is a real one or only a
perceived and promulgated one is still a matter for
deliberation. The key test of the whether the defense
system works is coordination. The SECDEF, JCS, and DRB were
installed after World War II and the Korean War in part for
the purpose of improving coordination.
In the military community, the Libyan operation and
current actions in the Persian Gulf may be professed as
excellent attestations of the successful employment of our
joint forces, while others such as Senator Nunn, may cite
the problems with joint operations that occurred in Grenada
[Senate: 1983 276]. But what is important is that deep
concerns were created which gave rise to the Department of
Defense Reorganization Act in 1986.
Under the Reagan Administration, three important
initiatives were begun which would impact upon the CINCS:
(a) the CJCS was appointed to full membership on the DRB and
the Defense System Acquisition Council (DSARC)
,
(b) the CJCS
became actively used as a source of independent advice on
joint issues and systems projects, and (c) the establishment
of the Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency (SPRAA)
within OJCS to assist both the CJCS and the JCS in resource
allocation responsibilities. Some of the responsibilities
of SPRAA were to review CINC warfighting capabilities and
requirements, and to develop recommendations, policies, and
procedures for PPBS actions. SPRAA served as an independent
assessment and liaison point on matters concerning the PPB
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process for OSD, the Services, the CINCs, Defense Agencies,
and OJCS . Last year SPRAA became the J-8 Office of JCS. 42
In the development of the FY 87 POM which was the first with
significantly increased CINC participation, SPRAA provided
analysis to compile the CINCs' IPLs for presentation.
[Cummings: 1986 29-31]
The FY 1985 DoD Authorization Bill did not still
the critics of defense reform and further debate quickly
spread beyond Congressional leadership. For the CINCs, this
Act codified the arrangement of the CJCS as the CINCs'
spokesman on defense matters [Cummings: 1986 29] . Since
the Chairman meets with the SECDEF, OSD officials, and is
present at DSARC reviews of major defense programs, his
authority to represent CINC concerns makes his role with
regard to the CINCs a significant one [Cummings: 1986 30] .
In December 1984, the Heritage Foundation published Mandate
for Leadership II, Continuing the Conservation Revolution,
which in part, evaluated national defense capabilities and
called for reform [JCS: 1987 194] . Subsequently, in
February 1985, the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) at Georgetown University printed a report by
its Defense Organization Project entitled, Toward a More
Effective Defense which supported the publics' concern over
significant inadequacies in the organization and management
of the defense establishment. The study group consisted of
members from many sides of the political arena and focused
43
on procedural weaknesses. Although the group was highly
critical, it recommended only moderate changes built on
previous reform efforts. Nevertheless, recommendations were
pervasive, touching everyone from Congress to OSD, the
42 ....
. Adapted from telephonic interview with MAJ Lower on
2 June 1988.
43 ...
. Participants in this project consisted of 71
experts, including former SECDEF' s Brown, Clifford, Laird,
McNamara, Richardson, and Schlesinger; Generals Jones,
former CJCS, and Meyer, former Chief of Staff of the Army;
Congressmen Aspin and Nunn; and Dr. Rice.
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Service Departments, and Joint Staff, to the defense
industry. [Blechman & Lynn: 1985 ix-247]
The House and Senate Committees on Armed Services
pursued answers to many questions on defense organization
after the FY 1985 Defense Authorization Bill was approved.
Responses were prepared by OSD, the Office of the SECDEF,
JCS, the Services, and the CINCs . During the Spring and
Summer of 1985, a series of bills were proposed and hearings
were conducted by the Armed Services Committees on suggested
changes to the defense organization. On 11 June 1985,
Representative Les Aspin submitted a bill to the House of
Representatives which was a composite of bills previously
introduced by Representatives Bill Nichols and Ike
Skelton. Mr. Aspin' s bill would strengthen significantly
the position of the Chairman of the JCS, although it would
not make him a member of the NSC. A part of the bill's
provisions would place the Chairman in the chain of command,
designate him to supervise the CINCs, and allow him to
periodically recommend changes to the Unified Command Plan
45(UCP) . Furthermore, a provision was included for separate
programs and budgets for each of the CINCs which would be
totally independent of the Service Departments. [JCS: 1987
195-199]
A Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management was
established by President Ronald Reagan on 17 June 1985 to
review current progress toward improving DoD procedures and
recommending other changes in acquisition, organization, and
management [JCS: 1987 200]. In the area of JCS reform,
David Packard, former SECDEF, was charged with evaluating
the JCS' ability to provide:
44
. H.R. 2265
45 The UCP delineates areas of responsibility,
designates forces for those areas, and defines
organizational structure for those commands under the
direction of the NCA to facilitate a joint warfighting
effort. The UCP was a product of the National Security Act
of 1947 which established the combatant commands.
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...joint military advice and force development within a
resource constrained environment. [NSDD 175: 1985 803]
The Commission confirmed that weaknesses existed in the
acquisition process for military equipment and material,
justifying the current dissatisfaction and frustration with
defense procurement. Yet, it reached a different view of
the cause and remedy for this dilemma.
The truly costly problems, ... are those of overcomplicated
organization and rigid procedure, not avarice or
connivance. [Packard: 1986]
The interim report of this Blue Ribbon Commission
affirmed that the combatant commands could be better
controlled and organized toward achieving national
objectives. With respect to the CINCs, the Commission
recommended several objectives as listed below.
1. Increase the authority of the CINCs to allow them to
structure component commands
.
2. Ensure that only minimum levels exist in the chain of
command for all deployed forces to facilitate better
performance of both the CINCs and JCS during peace or
war
.
3. Revise the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to align the
current geographic boundaries of the CINCs with real
world situations to promote flexibility in dealing
with global affairs.
4. The SECDEF must ensure that communications, both up
and down command channels between the CINCs and the
SECDEF, go through the CJCS, to allow him to give
better, more informed advice to the Secretary. The
CJCS should provide broad alternatives for military
strategy meeting national objectives with guidance
from both the JCS and the CINCs
.
5. Establish one Unified Command composed of air, land,
and sea transportation. [JCS: 1987 212-214]
In October 1985, on the floor of the Senate,
Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn criticized the
decision making processes and organizational structure
4 6 •within DoD . A progression of their speeches ensued which
culminated in a meeting of defense experts and military
leaders at Camp A. P. Hill, Virginia and resulted in an
extensive staff report, which took two years of preparation,
4 6
. Senator Goldwater was the Chairman and Senator Nunn
was the ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services
Committee at this time.
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entitled Defense Organization : The Need for Change. Later,
Admiral Crowe, a JCS member, would testify before the Senate
Committee on Armed Services regarding the results of this
report. Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., the new CJCS,
found several weaknesses in this extensive study. He
emphasized that the study acknowledged neither the strengths
of the JCS nor the improvements actively pursued and
instituted by the SECDEF and the JCS over the previous three
years to improve cooperation, jointness, and management. He
also advocated the strengthening of the role of the CINCs
and made note of the fact that the JCS were already
reviewing JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces
(UNAAF) for such initiatives. Since appropriate measures
were estimated to be established within six months, no
changes to the existing law were required. Nevertheless,
subsequent bills on DoD reorganization proposed by the HASC
contained items addressed in the SASC s report, to include
measures designed to enhance CINC authority, improve joint
performance, and improve oversight of Defense agencies.
[JCS: 1987 202-211]
The report, written by staffmember James Locker,
III, expounded the criticisms of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services and the positions of Senators Goldwater and
Nunn . The 645 page staff report covered 16 problem areas
and made 91 applicable recommendations. Some of the
problems surfaced were the restricted mission integration at
upper DoD levels; the disproportion noticeable between joint
and Service interests; the lack of balance between
modernization and readiness; the inferior quality of joint
advice; duplication and overstaffing in military
headquarters; the greater emphasis placed on programing and
budgeting instead of achieving a balance with execution,
operations and planning; the insufficient authority of the
47 . .Hearings of the SASC, Organization and
Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense, 99th
Congress, 1st Session, 12 December 1985.
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SECDEF; and the inconsistencies in Congressional oversight.
With regard to the CINCs, the staff report recommended the
elimination of the various Service component commanders
within the Unified Commands from operational command
channels. The Locker Report was noticed because it alleged
DoD failure to adequately execute the unified command
concept. [JCS: 1987 202-204]
On 20 November 1985, the House of Representatives
passed, with a strong vote of 383 to 23, "The Joint Chiefs
of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985," with amendments that
increased the responsibilities of the CJCS . The amendments
also included the requirement that all budget and programing
recommendations would be based upon the SECDEF' s guidance
and both CINC and Service Department proposals. [JCS: 1987
205]
Beginning in 1986, more hearings on DoD
reorganization were held by the Investigations Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Armed Services . In a statement
which he had previously given to the Senate's Committee,
Admiral Crowe reiterated that recent reform proposals were
overreactions in that they tended to overlook the
improvements made within DoD. He advocated evolutionary
rather than revolutionary reforms on the part of Congress.
Furthermore, because of the immense workload, Admiral Crowe
suggested that the position of the Vice Chairman of the JCS
be separated from the dual-hatted function of Joint Staff
Director. [JCS: 1987 209-210]
Regarding the CINCs, Admiral Crowe emphasized that
the recent changes which brought them in during the planning
and budget process alleviated most of the former problems.
However, he did advocate increasing the authority of the
CINCs in the areas of cross-service training, logistics, and
theatre-wide installation management. Again, these matters
could be resolved during the current review of the governing
document, JCS Publication 2, UNAAF . As for the management
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of the CINCs and Defense agencies, he viewed the Chairman
and JCS as the obvious body to provide support. [JCS: 1987
210]
With a unanimous vote of 19 to 0, the SASC ratified
the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (S.
2295) on 6 March 1986. Under this bill's provisions the
CJCS was responsible for keeping the SECDEF informed on how
well programing and budget proposals prepared by the
Services and other departments matched the CINCs' priorities
set forth in their strategic plans and operational
requirements and conformed with national security
objectives. Additionally, many of the duties performed by
the corporate JCS were directly transferred to the CJCS
[Cummings : 198 6 16] . The bill went even further as it
proposed increasing both the authority and influence of the
48CINCs by granting them complete operational command of all
forces within their commands. However, it did limit the
CINCs by requiring them to first confer with component
commanders and Secretaries of the military departments for
coordination and approval of administration and support
matters, to include logistical war plans. And finally, the
chain of command would flow through the President and the
SECDEF, directly to the CINCs. [JCS: 1987 212-217]
One month later, President Reagan directed the
implementation of these findings of his Blue Ribbon
Commission that would not require statutory changes in
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) . To lend
support to those recommendations concerning military command
and organization, and to assure that improvements continued,
he mandated that the SECDEF report to him within 90 days as
to what changes were made in applicable directives to effect
4 8
. The "full operational command" authority which this
bill gave the CINCs refers to all aspects of military
operations and joint training, as well as authority assigned
by the SECDEF for the coordination and approval of
administration and support required for the accomplishment
of their missions. [Cummings: 1986 16-17]
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better communications between the CINCs and the SECDEF
.
Procedures needed to be improved to forward reports through
the CJCS so that he could consider the CINC viewpoints in
his advice to the President and the SECDEF, and to pass
order of the President and the SECDEF to the CINCs. Another
timeline was set at 180 days for reporting revisions to JCS
Publication 2, UNAAF, along with other similar publications.
The focus was now on the CINCs as these changes were
directed to achieve the following goals:
1. With SECDEF approval , CINC authority must be expanded
to allow the CINCs to structure joint task forces,
subordinate commands, and support operations;
2. The design of CINC organizational structures should
allow for the shortest command channels while ensuring
adequate supervision and support for contingencies up
to a general war;
3. Greater flexibility to handle situations that may
crossover current geographic boundaries of the CINCs;
and
4. Continuing responsiveness of the CINCs to national
security requirements. [JCS: 1987 218-220]
On May 7 1986, the Senate also unanimously voted
for the Goldwater Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986. 49 The vote of 95 to [U.S. Congress: 1986 S5531,
D537] indicated the adamant position of the Senate on the
issue of defense reform.
A little over a month later, the HASC ratified the
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
which dealt with the same issues as the Senate did on May
7th, excluding JCS reformations covered earlier in H.R.
3362. [JCS: 1987 222]
The HASC bill significantly strengthened the
authority of the CINCs. The specific elements of this bill
which addressed CINC issues follow:
1 . Gave authority to the CINCs to select commanders of
component commands and other principle elements; to
command all forces assigned to them and to determine







2. Provided for the creation of separate CINC budgets for
the activities of each Unified and Specified Commander
[Cummings: 1986 17] .
3. The authority to establish Unified and Specified
Commands would run from the President to the SECDEF,
who would be provided advice and support by the CJCS
.
4. The CJCS would supervise the CINCs under the
authority, control, and direction of the SECDEF.
5. Create a joint council of commanders consisting of the
CJCS and the CINCs.
6. Delete wording in the current statute prescribing the
Navy's responsibility for naval operations which might
be construed as actions independent of the commanding
CINC. [JCS: 1987 222-223]
On 11 August 1986, the House of Representatives
passed a reorganization bill similar to the one ratified
earlier by the Senate on 7 May. This bill combined an
amendment to the FY 1987 DoD Authorization legislation
attached by Representative Nichols with the JCS reform bill,
H.R. 3622, passed on 20 November 1985.
Under CINC funding, the House Bill provided for the
programing of contingencies, force training, joint
exercises, selected operations, and administrative and
support activities that were transferred to the CINCs. The
CJCS would also review and recommend changes to budget
proposals and Service POMs . Also, the CJCS, after comparing
CINC budget submissions against the SECDEF' s established
priorities, would furnish the SECDEF with a consolidated
budget proposal for each CINC. The CJCS also would become
responsible for creating a system to evaluate the CINCs
capabilities in accomplishing their assigned missions.
[Cummings: 1986 17-18].
The House and Senate then entered reconciliation
proceedings for the two bills on DoD reorganization.
Agreement was reached in mid September, and on 1 October
1986 the President signed into law the Goldwater-Nichols Act
of 1986. [JCS: 1987 224-225]
This chapter has presented a selective historical
review of a series of changes to the overall defense
structure after World War II. JCS reforms were highlighted
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because the establishment of the Unified and Specified
Commands was a natural development from these reform efforts
added to the subsequent organizational changes which
occurred in these commands. The discussion of CINC
functions up to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act
indicates the degree of authority and influence that the
CINCs possessed prior to implementation of the Act. Chapter
III reviews features of the Goldwater Nichols Act that
affect the CINCs and concludes with a detailed discussion of
special operations.
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Ill . THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS POD REORGANIZATION ACT OF 198 6
A . BACKGROUND
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the relevant
features of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that impact upon CINCs
authority and influence within DoD . This chapter reviews
the functions and roles of the CJCS, the new Vice Chairman
of the JCS, the JROC, and the CINCs as envisioned under the
provisions of the law. A separate section deals with
special operations issues since this particular area has
received a great deal of congressional interest and relates
to the issue of congressional control of DoD budgets that is
part of the motivation for greater CINC involvement in the
budget process.
Four years have passed since General Jones presented the
first proposals for reform of the JCS system to Congress.
These proposals initiated a major reform movement within
DoD. His criticism of the JCS and the Joint System produced
one of the most significant reorganizations of the DoD since
the National Security Act of 1947. It had been almost three
decades since the last major reorganization of the JCS
system he sought to reform.
Four major features of the Goldwater-Nichols
Reorganization Act are analyzed here: (a) the creation of a
new military position of the vice chairman of the JCS; (b)
a significantly enhanced role for the CJCS at the expense of
the JCS; (c) an expanded role for the JROC along with other
measures to improve the prestige and rewards connected with
joint duty assignments to better the quality of joint advice
and assistance, and (d) new authorities for the commanders
of the Unified and Specified Commands, including an
increased involvement in resource management through the
PPBS.
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1 . Chairman of the JCS
Prior to the reorganization, the Joint Staff
reported to the entire body of the JCS. Nevertheless, the
staff was actually managed by the Chairman and the Director.
The Chairman's role is to oversee the Services' program
submissions and ensure they conform with the nation's
overall defense strategy. He also serves as spokesman for
the CINCs which was codified by the Act.
Under the reorganization, the Joint Staff has become
directly accountable to the Chairman himself. [Senate
Report 99-280: 1986 39] On paper, they are accountable,
but the question still exists as to actual accountability.
Nevertheless, the importance of this change is that now,
only one man leads the Joint Staff and represents the
priorities of the CINCs. Before the Act, the JCS acted as a
corporate body which meant that one member could veto an
action [Buriage: 1988 8]. Since he now has individual
responsibility, the Chairman has greater control over advice
given and decisions made. Admiral Crowe, the current CJCS
can now produce positions without obtaining the consensus of
the JCS [Buriage: 1988 8]
.
Furthermore, the Chairman, as the President's,
NSC's, and SECDEF's principle military advisor, must consult
with both the CINCs and JCS members in providing military
advice and alternatives. However, the Act also required
that procedures should be implemented which would ensure
that the Chairman's advice would not be delayed while
awaiting the advice of other JCS members
.
The Chairman's powers were significantly enhanced by
authorities relinquished by the corporate JCS according to
the Act. Additionally, the Chairman was granted many new
responsibilities which were subject to the authority,
control, and direction of the President and SECDEF . For
example, the SECDEF might designate the Chairman to oversee
activities of the CINCS. Then the Chairman would serve as
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the spokesman of the CINCs for their operational
requirements. To do this, the Chairman must contact and
obtain information from the CINCs and integrate whatever
details he obtain with the CINCs' priorities, weighing them
and integrating them with national objectives, before making
recommendations to the SECDEF
.
New duties with respect to the CINCs required the
Chairman to inform the SECDEF not only on priority
requirements which were identified by the CINCs but also to
advise the SECDEF as to what extent the programing and
budget proposals of the Service Departments and other DoD
agencies conformed with those priorities and to recommend
alternatives within SECDEF guidelines and fiscal constraints
to better accommodate those priorities. Moreover, the
Chairman is responsible to the SECDEF for recommending
individual budget proposals for each of the Unified and
Specified Commands. Lastly, the Chairman is required to
review on a recurring basis, but not less than every two
years, areas governing the combatant commands such as
mission, functions, force structure, and geographic
boundaries. Any recommended adjustments must be forwarded
to the President through the SECDEF.
Some critics, such as SECDEF Carlucci, who earlier
expressed doubts about this most powerful provision in the
law that gave the CJCS duties formerly belonging to the JCS
as a group, have begun to change their opinion. Mr.
Carlucci recently confessed that the changes worked out well
and that he found it easier to deal with someone (the CJCS)
who speaks with authority for the JCS. [Buriage: 1988 8]
2
. Vice Chairman of the JCS
Because of the increased workload placed on the CJCS
by the new law, the vice' s role was mandated by Congress to
provide the necessary assistance. [Senate Report 99-280:
1986 39] Like the Chairman, he is appointed to office by
the President, with the consent of the Senate, and serves a
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two year term. To provide for a one year overlap with the
Chairman, the appointment is made in the off years. Both
may be reappointed for two additional terms, and in case of
war there is no limit as to the number of reappointments.
[Conference Report 99-280: 1986 18-19] Additionally, the
Vice Chairman must be either a general or flag officer and
outrank all officers in the Services with the exception of
the Chairman himself. However, the Chairman and his Vice
may not be of the same branch of Service, but temporary
waivers could be granted by the President to help in a
transition period for officers appointed to serve in the
Chairman and Vice Chairman's position. Combined service of
any officer serving in both positions cannot exceed six
years
.
The following requirement of the Act serve as
another aid in promoting jointness and readiness:
The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff... has
the joint specialty under section 661 of this title; and
has served in at least one joint duty assignment (as
defined under section 668 (b) or this title) as a general
or flag officer. [HR Conference Report 99-280: 1986 18-
19]
The Vice Chairman acts as a deputy with the power to
carry out either the Chairman's or the SECDEF's guidance.
With only the SECDEF's approval, the Chairman may delegate
any duties he deems necessary to the Vice. Because the Vice
acts on behalf of the Chairman in his absence, continuity is
enhanced. A steady stream of advice and information is then
available to the National Command Authorities with a
continuous chain of command to the JCS [Herres: 1986 2] .
While the Vice can participate in JCS meetings, he can only
vote when serving in the role of the Chairman. As a result
of his new position, the staff of the Vice has already grown
to assist him in his new responsibilities.
Admiral Crowe, the current JCS Chairman, has
designated the following five major duties for the new
vice, General Robert T. Herres, USAF
:
. Adapted from interview with LT COL Lewis Baxter,
USAF, JCS J-8 Office, on 10 December 1987.
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1. Joint personnel policy,
2. Joint professional military education policy,
3. Oversight of defense agencies,
4. Oversight of deliberate war planning, and
5. Resource management. [Herres: 1987 4]
To best describe the role of this new position and
the expanded role of the Chairman, the words of the vice
incumbent, General Herres, are most enlightening:
I must find a way to balance the views of the builders
of force structure - that is, the military departments and
their service chiefs - with the needs and views of the
combatant commanders -that is, the CINCs...one of the
far-sighted results of the reorganization is that the
chairman has not only been given a number of new
responsibilities, he has been given the tools necessary to
carry them out. [Herres: 198/ 3]
Under the resource management category, the Vice
concerns himself with participating in the PPBS through the
Defense Resource Board. He serves as the DRB' s Vice
Chairman and is the board's only uniformed member. [Herres:
1987 3] This role complement's his duty to oversee the
CINC s operational war plans, as he is aware of resource
requirements unique to each of the CINC's, especially
shortages. Secondly, he serves as Vice Chairman of the
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and as Chairman of the JROC.
3
.
Joint Requirements Oversight Council
The JROC is simply the former Joint Requirements and
Management Board ( JRMB) , composed of the vice chiefs of all
the Services, revised by increasing the board's
responsibilities to encompass the new defense acquisition
requirements. The council monitors the beginning of the
acquisition cycle to ensure that while the CINC's
requirements are met, redundancy of effort is minimized.
The major concern is to effect economies of scale in




Most importantly, the authority of the CINCs has
been increased under the reorganization by granting them
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total command of all of the military forces within their
mission area, along with the authority for organization. In
accordance with section 164 (c) of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD
Reorganization Act of 1986:
Unless otherwise directed by the President or the
Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and
control of the commander of a combatant command with
respect to the commands and forces assigned to that
command include the command functions of:
a. Giving authoritative direction to subordinate
commands and forces necessary to carry out missions
assigned to the command, including authoritative
direction over all aspects of military operations,joint training and logistics;
b. Prescribing the chain of command to the command and
forces within the command;
c. Organizing commands and forces within that command
as he considers necessary to carry out missions
assigned to the command;
d. Employing forces within that command as he
considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to
the command;
e. Assigning command functions to subordinate
commanders;
f. Coordinating and approving those aspects of
administration and support (including control of
resources and equipment, internal organization and
training) and discipline necessary to carry out
missions assigned to the command; and
g. Exercising the authority with respect to selecting
subordinates, selecting combatant command staff,
suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial,
as provided in subsections (e)
,
(f), and (g) of this
section and section 822(a) of this title, respectively.
(See Appendix D for extracts from the Goldwater-Nichols Act
and other documents relating to the CINCs
.
)
For the first time, and because of the Act,
commanders of combatant commands were authorized to comprise
evaluation reports on major subordinate commanders'
performance and present such evaluation to the SECDEF, the
CJCS, and the appropriate military department.
The Act prescribes that the creation of a Unified or
Specified Command, along with its subsidiary forces and
structure, can be accomplished by the President through the
SECDEF with advice and assistance of the CJCS. Command
channels run directly from the President to the SECDEF to
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the CINCs; however, the President has the right to designate
that communications go through the CJCS in order to help
both the President and the SECDEF in performance of their
command roles. If, at any time, a CINC thinks his
authority, control, or direction over his assigned forces is
insufficient or restricted, he is responsible for
immediately informing the SECDEF.
Finally, the Act went even further to mandate that
budgets for each of the combatant commands be prepared
separately from the Service Departments . These individual
CINC budget proposals are to be submitted, with the DoD
budget, by the SECDEF through OMB to the President and to
Congress. The CINC budgets would remain individual entities
and would include elements such as contingencies, force
training, joint exercises, and selected operations [JCS:
1987 233] .
General Vuono the Army Chief of Staff, in his desire
to support the CINCs warfighting capabilities, invited the
CINCs to attend any of the meetings held such as the Army
Staff Program Budget Committee and the Select Programing
Committee (SELCOM) . Although recently, signs throughout the
Pentagon ask "What have you done for you CINC today?" this
thought is more than just a fad; many today are genuinely
concerned with instilling more jointness into the system.
General Vuono believes the CINCs should be listened to very
closely, because in time of war, our defense system will





The Goldwater-Nichols Act also created a new Special
Operations Forces Command. The primary mission of Special
Operations Forces is the conduct of unconventional warfare.
52 ...
. Adapted from telephonic interview with MAJ Lower on
6 December 1987.
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These missions are conducted on a small scale with specially
trained and highly skilled teams . The level of operational
activities range from low intensity conflict (LIC) to
theatre level and nuclear war.
In LIC missions, SOFs are used for contingencies,
counterinsurgency, insurgency, peacekeeping, and terrorism
counteraction [Fulghum: 1986 32] . Other missions of SOF are
direct action, strategic reconnaissance, foreign internal
defense, civil affairs, psychological operations,
humanitarian assistance, theatre search and rescue, and
other activities as specified by the President or SECDEF
[U.S. Congress: Senate Section 1224 6].
SOFs are used on the battlefield to distract the
enemy from front line operations and force him to commit
more forces to his rear area. Operations behind enemy lines
are directed at destroying industrial and military
capabilities; disrupting lines of communication;
intelligence collection; assisting with internal native
resistance and psychological operations. [US Army: FM 100-
5 57]
Admiral Crowe described SOFs in an address before
the House Armed Services Committee on July 16, 1986 as
follows
:
They are specially trained, equipped and organized to
conduct operations against strategic or tactical targets
in pursuit of national security objectives during peace or
periods of hostility.
They can support conventional operations or be employed
independently when conventional force is either
inappropriate or infeasible.
Traditionally, they have been manned by volunteers of high
physical and mental agility; relatively free of
administrative burdens, very mobile and lightly equipped,
and often acting as small units or individuals in
hazardous or otherwise unusual missions.
2 . Structure
SOFs are found within the resources of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force. They consist of the following groups:
1. Army - Special Forces (SF)
- Rangers
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- Short and intermediated range helicopter
support
- Other land warfare units
2. Navy - Sea-Air-Land teams (SEALS)
- Special sea delivery vehicles
- Dry-deck shelter capable submarines
- Other sea transportation
3
.
Air Force - Air transport support for Army and Navy
teams capable of night low-level flight,
precision 5-3 navigation, and aerial
refueling.
These forces were separately administered, trained
and financed by their parent services, except units deployed
overseas who fall under their respective unified command.
[Grant: 1987 6-7]
3 . Birth of a New Command
Defense forces in the United States have been
structured to fight in a war which takes place on a mid to
high intensity level battlefield. What has been viewed as a
limitation of our force structure is the ability to deal
with the lower levels of the conflict spectrum.
In 1980, interoperability problems were surfaced by
the attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran. The multi-
service group that conducted this mission was not in
existence prior to this attempt. [Grant: 1987 17]
Problems which caused the failure of this mission, such as
poor command, control, and choice of resources;
communications problems; inadequate planning and mistrust
among the services participating; can all be subsumed under
the general categories of interoperability and inter-
service rivalry. In sum, coordination problems were
prevalent
.
Even though the Grenada mission was considered
successful, the problems of interoperability and
interservice rivalry were again surfaced. The fact that
these type of inadequacies have continued has propelled
Congress into its quest for jointness in military reform.
53 ....Adapted from information contained in Louis W.
Grant's Birth of a Unified Command for Special Operating
Forces. [Grant: 1987 6-8]
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In the programmatic organization of DoD, PPBS ten
major programs formerly existed. Now there are eleven, as
Congress required DoD to create an additional program for
SOF . The intent of Congress in establishing this eleventh
program was to institute congressional control over special
operations to ensure that adequate attention and funding
would be provided for SOFs. This action was not one that
the Defense Department wanted to see happen. One reason for
this opposition was simply the overall Services' structure's
resistance to any major reorganization. This was also why
Congress stepped in and isolated the SOF command in defense
54 ...programing. See Figure 7 for current depiction of major
force programs along with the relationship to major
claimants, functional warfare tasks, supporting warfare
tasks, and other functional tasks. Figure 7 relates
different ways of viewing the PPB system in terms from the
programmatic and appropriation level up to the claimant and
5 5
sponsor level.
4 . The Effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act
Signed into law on 1 October 1986, the substance of
this bill was designed to correct
...serious deficiencies in the capabilities of the United
States to conduct special operations and to engage in low
intensity conflicts. [Senate and House Conference Report:
1986 H10330]
Soon after this bill was enacted, the FY87 DoD Authorization
Act made more specific changes in the control and management
of SOF and LIC [Goldich: 1987 7] .
These statutes specifically targeted 11 major SOF
concerns as outlined below:
54
. Adapted from MN4302 class lecture at NPGS on 2
November 1987.
. Adapted from a MN 4302 course lecture on 30
September 198/ at the NPGS. A Major Claimant, also known as
Operating Budget Grantor, is a bureau, command, or office
which is designated as an administering office under
Operations and Maintenance Appropriations. They receive
operating budgets from designated Service headquarters
offices, such as the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(OP-92) for the Navy, and issue operating budgets to their
responsibility centers. [NPGS: 1979 A- IT]
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1. Concerning the executive branch, it recommended
establishing a board for Low Intensity Conflict with
the NSC and appointment of a Deputy Assistant to the
President of NSC for LIC.
2. Within the Office of the SECDEF, provisions for a
civilian assistant to the SECDEF for SOF and LIC
with oversight authority were made.
3. The establishment of a unified combatant command for
special operations. Implementation of this
grevision has already been accomplished. (The U.S.eadiness Command (USREDCOM) was disestablished, the
majority of its functions were transferred to
FORSCOM, and in its place is the U.S. Special
Operations Comma-nd (USSOC) at MacDill Air Force
Base, Florida. ) 0T>
4. The USSOC Commander will be either an admiral or
general and is responsible for developing strategy,
doctrine and tactics; training assigned forces;
conducting specialized instructions; combat
readiness; interoperability; intelligence needs and
career monitoring of assigned officers.
5. All active and reserve SOF will be assigned to
USSOC.
6. Granted the CINC, USSOC the authority to create a
new Major Force Program (MFP) for SOF in the FYDP;
development of SOF resource requirements and execute
congressionally approved funding programs.
7. Specifically defined ten missions for the SOF.
8. Directed the CINCSOC with the responsibility for
defining the intelligence needs of the new unified
SOF and requested the SECDEFs support for these
issues
.
9. SECDEF became responsible for developing SOF
regulations
.
10. Three implementation review dates were mandated.
120 and 180 days after establishment of the new
command the SECDEF was to report to Congress on the
current progress and one year later, the President
was to give his own assessment.
11. Special provisions for SOF airlift were specified to
ilace a high priority on airlift deficiencies.
;Grant: 1987 28-39]?<
In a memorandum to the President, Mr. Weinberger
attached proposed changes to the UCP to allow for the
establishment of a U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOC)
and to permit the activation of USSOC by 16 April 1987 in
following the directions of Title 10, Section 167 of the
S7National Defense Authorization Act. Approval was also
. Adapted from information provided by MAJ Lower on
17 June 1988.
57
. PL 99-661 dated 14 November 1986.
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requested for the deactivation of U.S. Readiness Command
(USREDCOM) and transfer of remaining missions to the new
Specified Command, FORSCOM. [Weinberger: 1987 1]
Through the law, USSOC was given unique powers . The
Act mandated a minimum headquarters staff be provided to
allow USCINCSOC to participate in PPBS. An amendment,
effective 4 December 1987, established a civilian staff of
up to 120 personnel for USSOC headquarters [Goldich: 1987
9] . Furthermore, CINCSOC became the only CINC with a
5 8
checkbook. ° Congress directed that CINCSOC have a budget
and that a new major force program be established for the
allocation of resources to SOF and LIC missions. The
amendment required that CINCSOC:
...shall have the authority, regarding the procurement of
special operations-peculiar equipment, supplies, and
services, equivalent to that of the SECDEF or a Service
Secretary. [Goldich: 1987 9]
A great deal of support existed in Congress for SOF
programs; Congress did not believe that DoD would implement
S Qthem without statutory direction. DEPSECDEF Taft
emphasized, in his 1987 memorandum to the Secretaries of the
Military Departments and the CJCS, that SOF aircraft had to
be in the CINCSOC budget since airlift was the particular
item which Congress intended to fund in the budget. The Act
directed the SECDEF to create a special new major force
program category in the FYDP for Special Operations.
Special Operations became Program 11 and would be reviewed
by the DRB along with the other ten major force programs.
Another mandate was that the ASD (SO/LIC) , with the advice
of CINCSOC, supervise the preparation and justification of
programing and budgeting matters. The program and budget
for SOC can be revised only by the SECDEF. [U.S. Congress:
Senate 1124 7]
C Q
. Adapted from interview with COL Deason on 1
December 1988.
5
. Adapted from interview with COL Deason, USSOC on 1
December 1987 and MAJ Lower, USCENTCOM, on 30 May 1988.
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The Navy was the most resistant to this change.
While the Departments of the Air Force and Army were not
responsive to CINC requests for support, they reluctantly
complied once directed by OSD [Baxter: 1987 12] . On the
other hand, The Navy Department refuses direct contact with
the CINCs on PPBS matters and requires them to submit these
requests through the various channels within the Navy's
organization, making direct interface very difficult
[Baxter: 1987 12] . DRB minutes reflect that the Navy was
directed to work with CINCSOC because they were unwilling to
60provide information and participate. In a memorandum for
the Secretaries of the Military Departments and CJCS,
DEPSECDEF Taft specifically addressed the Navy issue:
...funding for JSOC requires a discipline and support
not now evident and these resources will be included in
the CINCSOC budget. Navy Special Warfare Forces are and
have been included in DoD descriptions of Special
Operating Forces and their resources must be included
under Program 11. [Taft: September 1987 1]
Other legislative issues were present indicating the
need for revisions of both the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the
FY 1987 DoD Authorization Act that included special
operations statutes. Congress charged that DoD was
responding too slowly and thwarting congressional intent in
establishing the newly mandated SOF command. Specific
allegations were made that (a) USSOC was not given full
control over all SOFs because certain Naval SOFs remained
outside of the command; (b) that DoD was acting contrary by
not naming a new ASD (SO/LIC) until Congress gave DoD the
authority for another assistant secretary; and (c) that
6 1delays incurred in the appointment of a CINC for USSOC;
(d) that establishing USSOC headquarters in Florida instead
of in Washington D.C. was incorrect; (e) that giving the ASD
(SO/LIC) a staff only half the size of other ASDs was wrong;
6
. Adapted from interview with COL Deason, on 18
December 198T.
61
. A CINC was finally designated for USSOC on 15 April
1987.
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and (f) that locating his office outside of the Pentagon,
all reflected DoD's intent to oppose this congressional
mandate. [Goldich: 1987 7] DoD's counter was in part that
the very nature of SOF responsibility and the high
sensitivity of SOF missions required lengthy time frames to
find appropriate leaders and to establish the new command.
In rebuttal, the Chairman and ranking minority member of the
Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Projection Forces and
Regional Defense informed SECDEF Weinberger on 19 May 1987
that no other nominations to DOD positions would be approved
by the SASC until a nominee was received for the ASD's
position, and that nomination was confirmed by the Senate.
[Goldich: 1987 7-8]
Congressional interest in SOF programs secured
additional funds for USSOC after its formation and protected
the command from the severity of the $32 billion of
congressionally mandated cuts in the FY 1989 budget. After
major programs were restored subsequent to a proposed
reduction of a third of all USSOC funds, Lieutenant General
Harry Goodall, Deputy Commander of USSOC, stated the
following:
Members of Congress have accused the Pentagon of
failing to back the congressionally created Special
Operations Command, which takes resources otherwise slated
for the individual services. Consequently, a one-third
reduction in the budget for that command would most likely
have met with vocal criticism from Capitol Hill. [Defense
News: 1988 34]
In the legal mandating of an eleventh MFP solely for
special operations and the creation of a Unified Command for
SOF, the SOF issue serves as a prime example of
congressional control over the military. And it is this
congressional control of DoD budgets that is part of the
motivation for greater CINC involvement in the budget
process. The necessity of the SOF mission as a part of our
national defense strategy is acknowledged, but through the
enactment of the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and
amendments, the area of special operations permitted more
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specific congressional budgeting of DoD. The intent
implicit in the creation of USCINCSOC by the Goldwater-
Nichols Act was the same as the intent in requiring more
CINC involvement in PPBS - to get around OSD
.
This chapter described the significant aspects of
Goldwater-Nichols Act affecting CINC authority and
influence. In summary, these features were the enhancement
of the position of the CJCS, the creation of the position of
the Vice Chairman of the JCS, the expanded role of the JROC,
and the increased authorities of the CINCs . The discussion
of the creation of the eleventh MFP, Special Operations, and
the formation of USCINCSOC, highlight the strength of
congressional interest in this area, and the desire of
Congress to increase its control over DoD.
The next chapter articulates the policy issues
pertaining to CINC involvement in the defense budget process
including the objectives of such involvement, and contextual
factors influencing passage and implementation of the Act.
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IV. POLICY ISSUES
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze some of the
policy included in surrounding the Goldwater-Nichols Act in
order to clarify the roles of defense policy arena
participants including Congress. The chapter also examines
some of the environmental influences on Goldwater-Nichols
Act implementation, to form a basis for understanding the
changes made to increase CINC authority and influence.
A. CONGRESSIONAL EMPHASIS
The influence of strong negative public opinion on
congressional representatives has increased the pressure on
Congress to carry out and codify current DoD reforms into
laws such as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and the
Goldwater-Nichols Act. Criticisms are made in the press and
other media that the costs of defense are too high, or that
the defense resource allocation and management process is
wasteful. [JCS: 1987 139]
In The Politics of Defence Budgeting, Hobkirk suggests
that some problems with defense resource management could be
reduced or eliminated through centralization and unification
of the services. Prior to the initial reform movement in
the 1950' and 1960's the opinion that such centralization
should occur was voiced by many congressmen, but the body of
fa
1?Congress did not act.
Perhaps, as Hobkirk also implies, the reason for such
inaction can be attributed to the congressional perception
that some of its power to control the SECDEF and the
Services over the executive would be lost if the Services
were merged. Congress wants to continue to maintain the
independence of the three Service Departments to enhance its
side of the separation of powers. This also strengthens its
. Adapted from telephonic interview with MAJ Lower
on 10 December 1987.
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ability to micromanage budgetary decisions which is
currently the status quo. Combined with a one year
congressional budget cycle, such an approach lends itself
toward a short-term view of budgetary decision making. The
specific details of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act
show that Congress is continuing to micromanage the
services
.
It should also be noted that research in management
tends to indicate that large complex organizations resist
change. [Hurley: 1983 46] Therefore, consideration should
also be given that a structure as large as the DoD
bureaucracy will resist change, even if the reorganization
is congressionally mandated. No department likes to lose
discretion over what is perceived as its fair share of
resource allocation, because there are no incentives for
doing so.
Another side to this resistance to change is the opinion
prevailing with some members of Congress that much of what
Congress wanted accomplished would not be readily responded
to by the Pentagon without a law. One example is the
clear intent and guidance from Congress for continued
Service support of Special Operations Forces [Taft:
September 1987 1]
.
Congress seeks to have high level resource management
decisions made with the experienced military judgement of
theatre commanders from outside Washington, D.C., in hopes
of striking a better balance in the defense resource
allocation process. The Goldwater-Nichols Act which
increased the role of the JCS and the operational authority
of the CINCs included specific measures to ensure that those
who are held accountable for fighting any war have an
adequate voice in the formation of the Service budgets
responsible for their assets and forces.
. Adapted from interview with COL Deason, of the
Directorate of Resources and Requirements, USCINCSOC, on 18
December 1987.
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The CINCs are called to testify before Congress and in
that respect are held accountable. Many others who perform
analysis and make resource allocation recommendations
neither have this visibility nor are they held
accountable. Yet the CINCs do not maintain the data base
and do not have the staff the Services do for in-depth
analysis, provision of detailed justifications, and making
informed, overall resource allocation decisions. For
example, the CINCs are not knowledgeable of delivery time,
research, development, and other technical problems
associated with major acquisition programs which they may
eventually be recipients of. When coming out of Research,
Development, Training, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and entering
into the acquisition cycle the CINCs are neither aware of
difficulties arising in evaluation which may indicate that
the contract needs to be dropped and more funds placed into
research and development nor that the contract came in way
overbid. 65
The CINCs are concerned with their readiness to fight
and sustain a war. Although their focus is more short-term
than the Services, they also look to the future, and seek
the best and latest equipment for their commands. Yet, the
balance is a tenuous one, with the Services vying more
strongly for modernization at the expense of current
military preparedness for war [Defense News: 1988 34]
.
For those CINCs with geographic concerns, priorities are
compiled based on more immediate needs such as what is
needed to go to war tomorrow in their theatre of operations.
The CINCs look to the future, but are also faced with the
practical realities of their present situation. For
example, the Commander in Chief of European Forces (CINCEUR)
may prefer a larger quantity of older M-l tanks to counter






more expensive and more highly modernized version. However,
in most cases, the "sexier," state-of-the-art equipment is
easier for the Services to sell to Congress, and the
strategies of defense budgeting prevail.
One example of a current success for the CINCs is the
influence they had on the Army's Training, Sustaining, and
Facilities Panels, whereby over $300-million in CINC
requests for modernization were granted during the 1987 POM.
[Coggin and Nerger: 1987 98]
B. THE ARMY'S PROGPAM
Beginning in the summer of 1984, the Army Chief of
Staff, General John A. Wickham, anticipated the upcoming
reforms. His office, along with the guidance of his
Director of Program and Evaluation, developed a framework to
support CINC involvement in the Army' s decision making
process and began implementation. Procedures implemented
increased the visibility of resource priorities set by the
CINCs . The goal was to achieve program balance both within
the CINCs and among rival perspectives. By involving the
CINCs more in the PPB process, the Army hoped for an
enhancement of the resource allocation and decision making
process, CINCs priorities are foremost on readiness and
sustainability - warfighting needs, and secondarily on
future research, development, and acquisition. [Coggin and
Nerger: 1987 98]
The Army began a combat support management review and
opened all meetings up for CINC input. Since then there
have been many examples of greater CINC involvement in the
PPB process. Coggin and Nerger provide support for their
claim that the CINCs have been able to influence decision
makers and obtain funds for priority requirements, as
indicated below:
. Adapted from interview with Mr. Robert M. Malis,
Program and Budget Analysis Branch, Planning and Programming
Division, J53, USCINCPAC, on 5 April 1988.
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5.
During the 1987 POM, programmed Integrated Priority
List (IPL) requirements were maintained against the
claims of others who sought CINC dollars and another
$300 million in CINC requests were approved.
In March of 1986, the Army's Program Budget Committee
accommodated U.S. CENTCOM, EUCOM, LANTCOM, PACOM, and
SOUTHCOM by changing priorities to allow for the
funding of $60-million of tactical communications and
intelligence systems in the Army's program.
Just prior to approval of the Army's program in April
of 1986, key decision makers adjusted resourcing
considerations to deal with one of USCINCLANT' s
sustainment issues which previously received no
support during numerous reviews
.
At that same time when Army representatives went to
Panama to brief General John R. Galvin on the approved
service POM, his arguments for improved living and
working conditions in SOUTHCOM, along with the need
for a critical intelligence capability, resulted in a
restructuring of Army priorities and an "out of court"
settlement prior to the summer 1986 DRB.
CINC priorities were protected during the reviews
conducted prior to OSD' s approval of the Service POM'
s
when fiscal guidance demanded further reductions in
proposed levels of funding. In particular, CENTCOM'
vital communications improvement was retained.
6. In 1986, the Army approved $76 billion out of
approximately $125 billion in CINC requests. In the
fiscally constrained budgetary environment of today
this 61% support rate can be considered a good one.
Furthermore, a high degree of support was maintained
for CINC issues during the summer 1986 DRB and fall
198 6 budget review when $18 billion was removed from
the Army's program. [Coggin & Nerger: 1987 98]
The examples above indicate that CINC participation has
affected the distribution of resources. As the CINCs
participate in PPBS and testify before Congress, their views
are heard. The impetus for CINC participation is summarized
well by the following statement:
Clearly, the door is wide open for the CINCs to declare
and lobby for their interests within the Department of
Defense. [Coggin & Nerger: 1987 98]
See Figure 10 for a model of CINC participation in PPBS.
C. OBJECTIVES OF CINC INVOLVEMENT IN THE BUDGET PROCESS
One variable which currently affects the demand for
increased participation of the CINCs is the constrained
budget and economic decisions that must be made to


























Fiqure 10. CINC Participation in PPBS
[Adapted from USCENTCOM presentation]
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must support its allies to deter aggression against mutual
national interests. In reducing the defense budget greater
levels of risk must be accepted, yet the nation still must
demonstrate the political will needed to support its
doctrine of flexible response.
D. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS INFLUENCING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT
From the standpoint of DoD, much of what the Act
required was already being accomplished, and the various
departments within DoD saw little need for many of the
congressional mandates. In a letter, dated 21 June 1985 to
Representative Nichols, Chairman of the Investigations
Subcommittee, House Committee on Armed Services, General
Vessey, CJCS, discussed the various bills and the 1983 DoD
recommendations concerning changes to the JCS which were not
yet a part of the law. Although General Vessey wanted the
400 officer ceiling on Joint Staff manning removed, and
supported placing the CJCS in the chain of command, he
considered many of the other proposed changes unnecessary.
A list of his concerns is shown below:
1. The CJCS did not need to be designated as principle
military advisor.
2. Chairman did not require a full-time, four-star
deputy
.
3. A council of senior military advisors separate from
the Service chiefs was not needed.
4
.
The Joint Staff should not be subordinated directly to
the Chairman.
5. The CINCs and JCS member should not comment formally
on Joint Staff reports and any recommendations to the
JCS.
6. Finally, that since the changes already placed into
law made the CJCS the CINCs' spokesman for operational
requirements, no need existed to specifically require
the Chairman to supervise the CINCs. [JCS: 1987 200-
201]
From a Congressional viewpoint, DoD was not responding
quickly enough to implement those DoD reorganization
measures which Congress recognized as having a high
priority. Therefore Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols
Act to codify these actions and strengthen its control of
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the process and outcomes. One Congressional goal was to
strengthen the Unified and Specified Commanders . While the
CINCs are held responsible for everything that occurs in
their command, their authority is not commensurate with
67their responsibility. Since the thrust of Congressional
action is control, one element of the Goldwater-Nichols Act
stated that the:
Secretary of Defense shall include in the annual budget of
the Department of Defense a separate budget proposal for
such activities of each of the Unified and specified
Combatant Commands as may be determined under... a previous
provision.
The intent of Congress was to require the SECDEF to submit
CINC budget proposals but to afford him flexibility over the
contents. [HASC: 1988 277] However, the wording of this
go
provision is vague and does not have DoD support. The
impetus for creating separate programs and budgets to be
administered by Congress was twofold. First, a CSIS study
in February 1985 recommended the establishment of these
budgets to grant the CINCs a stronger institutional role in
the resource allocation process. Second, the study also
recommended enhancing CINC participation in PPBS,
Controversies over unreasonable acquisitions, such as $700
hammers and $10,000 coffee pots, further fed the
Congressional momentum to reform DoD. [Baxter: manuscript
4-5]
Considering the incremental process at work in DoD, such
a radical change met with resistance, especially from OSD
69
and the Services who maintained control of budgeting.
The Services and OSD are almost predictable in their
responses, fears, and parochial behavior. The JCS, within
certain limits, is truly interested in achieving the
£- *7
. One such indication was the Lebanon investigation
where the authority of the European commander was not
commensurate with his responsibility, yet in 1983, he was
held responsible.
6 8
. The words "shall" and "as may be determined" were
used by Congress to give the SECDEF latitude over the
content of the CINC budgets. [HASC News Release: 1988 17]
69
. After IPL submissions to the Services and OSD, the
budget process is, for the most part, out of a CINCs control.
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proper balance between keeping the CINCs an effective
warfighting headquarters ana an articulate voice in the
PPBS...JCS clearly balks at large, innovative advances in
budgetary ^authority for the CINCs such as those found in
PL99-433. ^ [Baxter: 1987 12]
Although progress was made in increasing the influence of
the CINCs in PPBS and improving their authority with their
own commands, initiatives promulgated by Deputy SECDEF met
with strong opposition. The Services and some factions
within OSD viewed the reforms as a zero sum game; any gains
acquired by the CINCs were seen as losses to the their power
and a threat to their perceived territories [Baxter:
manuscript 9-10]
.
At times even Mr. Taft's position seemed nebulous. Two
impressions existed as to why Mr. Taft directed the moderate
actions to increase the CINCs role in PPBS. The first
position viewed his actions as a result of the pressure from
the reforms proposed by Generals Jones and Meyer, ex-JCS
Chairman Vessey, and the testimonies of General Rogers and
other CINCs. The second impression is that Mr. Taft saw the
momentum building in Congress for a major DoD
reorganization, and unsuccessfully attempted to preempt
legal action by increasing the CINCs' role in PPBS. OSD
proffered that Taft was simply a benefactor of the CINCs,
however, little support existed for this idea. As a result,
the CINCs remained distrustful of OSD's position on separate
CINC budgets. When JCS was tasked by SECDEF Taft to assess
separate budgets for the CINCs, restraints were placed on
the response, such as that no additional manpower would be
granted to administer and prepare these budgets . With
already limited staffing and the potential for future
7
1
manpower reductions on the their headquarters staffs , the
CINCs were funneled into the most logical answer. Since JCS




PL99-433 is the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
This is another provision of the Goldwater-Nichols
recommendation was not to implement these budgets. [Baxter:
manuscript 10-11]
OSD, the Deputy SECDEF, CJCS, JCS, and the CINCs did not
want to establish separate CINC budgets as Title 10, Section
166 of the U.S. Code dictated. They concurred that the
PPBS, along with the other new authorities established by
the Goldwater-Nichols Act provided sufficient opportunities
for increased CINC participation in the budget process. The
decision reached was to take no further action on the budget
issue, but to await the results of other changes and conduct
a periodic review on the responsiveness of the PPBS to CINC
needs. [Taft: April 1987 1]
At this point, a review of the perceptions of the
participants in this issue is beneficial. Although these
participants concurred, reasons for agreement appeared to
differ. Because of a perceived lack of consensus on the
part of the CINCs, CINC action officers were tasked to
72
comment in reply to the JCS J-8 Office's request , and on
the independent budgets and their content. Most responded
that the CINC staffs would not be able to handle the
function. The action officers responsible knew that due to
the small size of the CINC staffs, saying yes to separate
CINC budgets would mean that the function for implementation
and management would return to them, increasing their
7 3
already heavy workload. Other reasons expressed by the
CINCs were that the increased authority provided by the
Goldwater-Nichols Act should be given a chance to work; lack
of authorized positions to requisition the needed experts,
lack of expertise, and lack of data and documentation; the
limited staff size; and most importantly, the distraction
from the CINCs primary mission - preparation for war. In
general, most of the Unified Commands concluded that
72
. The J-8 of the JCS is the former SPRAA. [Lower:
1988 18]
5 Adapted from interviews at CINCPAC s Planning and
Programing Division, Plans and Policy Directorate.
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separate budgets were not needed and all of the CINCs agreed
the elements of the Act needed time to be given a chance to
work. As expressed in MAJ Lower's article, "An Assessment
of the Unified Commander' s Role in PPBS Programming,
"
...the Unified Commands are neither ready nor able to
implement this new law. [Lower: 1988 17-18]
When JCS conducted the study on behalf of the Deputy
SECDEF, they perceived a lack of consensus on the part of
the CINCs as to how to implement or structure the individual
CINC budgets. As a result, JCS took the opportunity to
recommend that Mr. Taft take no action on the separate
budgets. Separate CINC budgets would make programs more
visible to OSD and Congress, which could then directly fund
selected CINC requirements over the programs of the
Services. JCS's position is that the CINCs, in gaining
added congressional visibility, will receive little
compensation for large effort, and that the CINCs do not
have sufficient manpower even to manage their own budgets
.
Since the Services execute and maintain budgets, almost any
initiative which increases CINC involvement in the PPBS or
acquisition process is opposed. The Service Departments
view themselves as the controllers of the purse strings . In
the past, they were allowed to fund force structure and
modernization improvements over readiness and
sustainability, a balance the Goldwater-Nichols Act sought
to change. Therefore, the JCS study was easily accepted by
Mr. Taft who issued his memorandum for the CJCS concurring
that separate budgets were not needed at this time [Taft:
April 1987 1] . [Baxter: manuscript 11-13]
Congress concluded that DoD had taken advantage of both
the spirit and exact wording of the law when DoD did not
submit CINC budgets [HASC News Release: 1988 17] . The HASC
voted to remove the unintended latitude previously allowed
the SECDEF in deciding whether to submit such budgets. The
committee was adamant and added more measures in Section 705
of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1989,
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requiring the submission of separate budget line items for
the CINCs under combatant command related command and
control activities, contingencies, joint exercises, force
training, and selected operations. [HASC: 1988 277]
E. COMPONENTS OF THE ACT
In passing the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Public Law 99-433,
Congress declared eight specific intentions:
To reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen
civilian authority in the Department of Defense, to
improve military advice provided to the President, the
National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense,
to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the
unified and specified combatant commands for the
accomplishment or missions assigned to those commands and
ensure that the authority of those commanders is
commensurate with that responsibility, to increase
attention to the formulation of strategy and to
contingency planning, to provide for more efficient use of
defense resources, to improve joint officer management
policy,, otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military
operations and improve the management and administration
of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.
[Goldwater-Nichols Act: 1986 1]
The Goldwater-Nichols Act attempts to stimulate
constructive compliance on the part of DoD . The Act
specifically requested speedy implementation to be
documented in a series of reporting requirements to
Congress. Deliberate speed on the part of DoD was requested
to implement changes that the law compelled. Before passage
of the Act the CINCs were not active participants in the
final budget decision process, [Defense Issues: 1988 34]
but were confined to limited appearances before the DRB in
the planning and programing stages . Additionally the Act
served to codify many actions which were already taking
place in DoD. For example, the IPL and its related system
already under operation was codified in statute by this 1986
law [Defense Issues: 1988 34] . According to staff members
at USPACOM, the Act did not grant additional PPBS authority
to the CINCs, but it did codify and endorse the increased
authority and responsibility of CINCs which indicates that
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Congress expects the CINCs to be more influential and
knowledgeable in PPBS actions [Malis: 1988]. 74
This chapter has addressed the roles of the CINCs, as
opposed to the Services' perspective, and has analyzed the
developing interest of Congress in rectifying the perceived
inequitable distribution of resource allocations between the
Services and the CINCs. Measures to increase the influence
of the CINCs in the resource allocation process were
instituted within DoD prior to congressional passage of the
Act. But that Congress received external pressure to do
something and also distrusted DoD. Congress decided to
demand that reform efforts progress more quickly. Several
Army examples of changes in resource allocations resolved in
favor of the CINCs resulted from their increased
participation. On the other hand, internal contextual
factors limited or prevented the CINCs from effective
participation, such as possessing timely, real world
knowledge of the status of RDT&E programs . The next chapter
provides both the positive an negative views of the demand
for increased CINC participation in the resource allocation
decision making process.
.
Currently, the increase in PPBS activity is being
handled "out of hide" by USCINCPAC staff.
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V. ASSESSMENT OF INCREASED PARTICIPATION DEMANDS
A. GENERAL
In analyzing issues arising from implementation of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, this chapter presents both positive
and negative aspects of the defense reform effort. The
purpose of this chapter is to critique the existing decision
process to evaluate the value added to budgeting by CINC
participation and to discuss how the CINCs role can be
improved from the viewpoint of the CINCs, Congress, JCS,
OSD, and other external agencies. Within this chapter the
information needed for better CINC participation is
addressed.
The intent of the provisions of the 1986 Reorganization
Act was to shift budgetary attention from the functional
aspects of the military's resource needs to the needs of
combatant commanders
.
However, many of the changes that are currently emerging
were actually initiated before the Goldwater and Nichols
reforms mandated the expanded roles of the JCS and the
CINCs. The Act caused these changes to become more visible.
Current reformations have been codified and made
irreversible by this legislative action. Yet, whether such
changes are made within DoD, or directed by law, an element
of conflict is inherent in strengthening both the JCS and
the CINCs at the same time. By strengthening the JCS, the
risk of usurping civilian control through the SECDEF is
increased [Baxter: manuscript 5] . One of the JCS's
principle functions is to present the consolidated views of
the Services, forming a mutualistic relationship between JCS
and the Services, yet the HASC and SASC are now requesting
more information from the CINCs which increases competition.
Even if the CINCs confer with the Services prior to
testifying before Congress, they are still able to express
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their own opinions. Adding the viewpoints of the CINCs to
Congress and within PPBS fulfills the perceived
congressional need to express a wider variety of
alternatives to decision makers. Conflict is further
increased by the provision in the law for separate budgets
for each of the CINCs. If implemented, separate budgets
would give the CINCs even greater visibility in Congress.
Therefore, while some military staffs recognize a need for
defense reform, others oppose it. Mr. Weinberger, viewed
such reform as a congressional invasion of DoD civilian
authority [Baxter: manuscript 5]
.
If one of the intentions of Congress is to compel more
analysis to ensure better policy decisions, then the CINCs
add a competitive feature to budgeting. Our entire system
of government is very competitive and contains many
conflicting interests. Using competing viewpoints to
improve decision making may have a variety of results. The
best ideas may be selected. Moreover, competition allows
preparation for facing a threat before it surfaces through
7 S
confrontation of ideas.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act fostered a plethora of
analysis and studies. The conduct of these studies is a
sign of another step taken toward obtaining a synergistic
effect in reaching national objectives from the integration
of the CINCs, the Joint Staff, and the Service Departments
in strategic planning and the allocation of defense
resources. One such study is presently underway at the
Center for Strategic and Intelligence Studies (CSIS) and the
Foreign Policy Institute of John Hopkins University (JHU) in
Washington D.C.. This joint study was developed by these
organizations because of a need they saw for researching
CINC and JCS issues concerning implementation of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act. James R. Schlesinger, former SECDEF,
7 S
. Adapted from MN 4302 lecture by Professor Jones at
NPGS on 7 November 1988.
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is Co-Chairman for CSIS and Harold Brown, also a former
SECDEF, is the Co-Chairman for JHU . Mr. Jim Blackwell is
the staff director for the research effort and is also
responsible for coordinating meetings of the joint study's
steering committee of 40 academics, congressmen, former DoD
officials, and military retirees.
This research is analyzing areas in the Goldwater-
Nichols Act which mandated CINC and JCS involvement. Two
researchers are currently visiting all of the Unified and
Specified Commands and will review the minutes and
requirements of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) , the
DRB, and the JROC. The consensus report of the steering
group is expected to be released in October of this year and
will be based upon data compiled in September. Conclusions
reached will focus on issues and program decisions in this
first normal budget cycle that the CINCs and JCS will
participate in under the requirements of the Act. Data
points will be the areas where the CINCs and JCS played
major roles. Answers to the following questions are being
sought by this research effort:
1
.
Were the CINCs and JCS involved in areas where they
should not have been?
2 Were there areas where the CINCs and JCS were not
participants, but should have been?
3. Was participation of the CINCs and JCS as Congress
intended their role should be?
Mr. Blackwell anticipates that a book on the study's
findings and recommendations will be published in the Spring
of 1989.
B. POSITIVE VIEWS OF CHANGE
In this decade, there has been a trend toward more
interaction and participation in defense policy decision
making [Joint DoD/GAO: 1983 21] . To that end, the roles of
the CINCs and JCS were increased. The result of this
°. Adapted from telephonic conversation with Mr. Jim
Blackwell of John Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute on 27 May
1988.
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congressionally mandated organizational change has been to
shift the influence of power from resource managers, the
builders of force structure, in the direction of the
operational warfighting structure. In doing so, the role of
the JCS Chairman has been significantly strengthened. His
position has transitioned from spokesman of the CINCs (and
sounding board for a committee - the JCS) to that of
principle military advisor to the President, SECDEF, and the
NSC. The corporate body of the JCS formerly held this
advisory responsibility
.
With the reorganization, the views that the Chairman
holds may now be his own. He must now integrate his new
advisory position with the operational needs of the CINCs.
Through the strengthening of the Chairman' s function, the
influence of the CINCs has also increased.
Additionally, the Chairman is now responsible for
advising the SECDEF as to the degree which the Service's
budget submissions coincide with the CINCs warfighting
priorities, which are set forth in the IPL. Previously,
this direct link from the Chairman to the PPBS process did
not exist. General Herres statement summarizes well the
impact of the reorganization on the role of the Chairman:
One of the far-sighted results of the reorganization is
that the chairman has not only been given a number of new
responsibilities, he has been given the tools necessary
to carry them out. [Herres: 1987 4]
The JCS Vice Chairman, has duties as the Chairman of the
JROC and as vice chairman and sole uniformed member of the
DAB. He serves to fill a gap which existed previously
between combatant commanders, and the PPBS process for
authorization of operational requirements . The Vice
Chairman is then theoretically a very important link between
the CINCs and the military departments. As the connection
between the advocates or budget spenders and the builders or
budget cutters, he has the potential to enhance continuity,
reduce unnecessary duplication, and thereby, promote
military effectiveness. [Herres: 1987 3]
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From the DEPSECDEF' s side, a 1985 review of the effects
of the November 1984 Taft memo indicated that implementation
actions taken by OSD, the Service Departments, and the CINCs
resulted in a broadening of the role of the CINCs in the POM
process and in enhancing CINC warfighting capabilities. In
fact, the review determined that the Services took the steps
necessary to assist CINC involvement in program development
and to improve communications between the CINCs and the
Services, especially through their link with the component
commanders. [Cummings, et al . : 1986 24]
During the last budget exercise, CINC participation was
significantly enhanced. Congress directed that $32 billion
be cut from the 1989 portion of the two year FY 1988-1989
budget delivered to Congress in 1987. In revising the 1989
budget, in the short time frame allowed, the CINCs were
invited by OSD to assess and submit proposals on
recommendations made by the Services to implement the
necessary cuts [Defense News: 1988 34]. Guidelines for
making program reductions remained the same as for the
77formation of the FY 1989 budget - people, readiness, and
efficient acquisitions were to be preserved. [Defense News:
1988 43] .
For the first time, in December of 1987, the CINCs were
all summoned to Washington D.C. to make their priorities
known. [Taft: 1988 5] They were allowed to set their own
agenda during the first few days of the DRB. Of
significance was the relations that formed between SECDEF
Taft and the CINCs in this process. Mr. Taft personally
spoke with many of the CINCs including Generals Lindsay,
Piotrowski, and Woerner, the CINCs of the smallest commands
[Taft: 1988 5] . During the DRB, the CINCs acknowledged
that after objecting to several Service proposed cuts,
needed funds were restored [Defense News: 1988 43].
77
. This budget was originally guided by a two percent
real growth ceiling rather than the former three percent
level which DoD had enjoyed.
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While all of the CINCs' priorities could not be met,
many of their programs were restored as a result of this
DRB. Those programs which remained unfunded were at least
reviewed and considered along with the ideas of the JCS and
the Service Secretaries
.
A few examples of programs restored as a result of CINC
participation at the December DRB follow:
1. Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) Radar
Improvements, supported by CINCCENT. CINCLANT, and
CINC, North American Defense Command (NORAD);
2. Army ammunition and war reserve spares;
3. Dependents' schools program, which provides quality
education to military dependents;
4. Flying hours, operating tempos, and training levels;
5. JCS exercise program;
6. National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEAP);
7. Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radars (ROTHR) ; and
8. Some Navy ships which were to be retired were restored
through CINCLANT' s input. [Taft: 1988 5-6]
Lieutenant General Goodall confirmed that the Air
Force's proposal to cut one-third of the USSOC budget was
mitigated after protests were lodged. As a result, funds
were restored for several SOF programs, such as the AC-
13009U gunship, the aircrew training system, and the MH-
47E/MH-60K. Furthermore, DEPSECDEF Carlucci's direction
that readiness concerns be addressed first in budget
reductions appears to have saved the CINCs from even greater
damage than they are now experiencing. [Defense News: 1988
34]
Another positive spinoff from the Act is the increase in
invitations to CINCs to appear before Congress. The CINCs
can now express their concerns up front to those who are
responsible for approving the budget and appropriating
funds. 78
7 8
. Adapted from telephonic interview with Mr. Robert
Malis on 5 April 1988.
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From the Army' s perspective, heightening the visibility
of CINC requirements has led to a better appreciation of
CINC viewpoints, while increasing the influence of the
CINCs . The differing vantage points of the Army and the
CINCs had to be acknowledged prior to altering the system.
Curiously, the CINCs discovered that they themselves have
had difficulty in weighing their theatre' s geostrategic
requirements with those of competing CINCs. An overall
result was a more informed decision making process for both
the Army and the CINCs on their respective issues. The Army
hope is that as the CINCs become more involved in the PPBS
process, their demands for detailed information, which the
army finds hard to provide, will diminish, and they will
leave the number crunching to the services who are already
set up to perform this task. [Coggin & Nerger: 1987 98]
Even if all of the CINCs high priorities are not met,
the impetus of the Act ensures that their views will at
least be heard and considered. As General Goodall stated:
I am finding that at least, if we knock on their door
they'll answer. [Defense News: 1988 34]
Considering the present state of financial constraints it is
unrealistic to presume that increased participation for the
CINCs will result in high budgetary returns for their
efforts. Looking from a different perspective, the CINCs
may soon have to defend their budgets against reductions.
However, even if the Services ar not funding all CINC
programs, this does not imply that their concerns and
requirements are not receiving a fair hearing in the
defense decision making process for resource allocations.
Since the Taft memorandum was issued in 1984 three
major, formal changes have heightened the visibility of CINC
requirements
:
1. The submission of CINC IPLs to the SECDEF, DEPSECDEF,
and CJCS at the beginning of each PPBS cycle.
2. The independent participation of the CINCs in DRB
planning and program review, to include the
identification of those CINC issues which require
resolution in the current POM.
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3. The development of a separate CINC Annex to for each
of the Service's POMs
.
Add to these the support found in OSD, JCS, and the Services
through their heightened awareness of the CINCs warfighting
needs, and the growing level of satisfaction with CINC
participation may be understood.




The most important question on implementation of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act is whether it will result in better
resource decisions to obtain the best mix of equipment,
forces, supplies, and training for the 1990' s given the lean
fiscal and budgetary policy forecasted for that era.
With the current budgetary constraints stemming from
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill and other deficit reduction
measures, the CJCS, with his new responsibilities and
increased influence, will have to make some tough decisions
to ensure the development of national strategies that are
achievable, effective, and feasible within the budgetary
constraints set for the next six years. With the current
scarcity of funds, and the prevalent forecast for an era of
cut-back management, the question then becomes how can we
get the most return for our nation's dollars?
2 Negative View of Change
One negative view of CINC influence in this process
7 9
was expressed before the HASC by Lawrence Korb, former ASD
for Manpower, who stated that the CINC s influence on the
budget process was minimal. Mr. Korb ascribed this to the
lack of CINC participation in the early part of the budget
process, and to the large number of participants at DRB
meetings. The argument that the DRB has grown into an
unwieldy size has been advanced by others. Yet, the
antithesis of this view is that the DRB is now a more open
7 9
. Testimony was in 1987
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forum where needs may be heard, ending the search for
"advocates to champion their positions" [Cummings, et al
:
1986 22]. [Army Times: 1987 38] Whether the current goals
of interoperability and jointness are met in the balance
between those who must employ all operating forces within
any given theatre, and those who must structure those
forces, depends to some extent upon the personality and
influence of the person filling the position of the Vice
Chairman of the JCS
.
Although the Services are responsible for procuring
equipment and training forces, and the SECDEF is responsible
for assigning those forces which provide some degree of
coherence, it is the CINCs who are responsible for the
employment of those forces. Thus, the most significant
budgetary problem often is not directly addressed in
centralized Service and OSD budgeting:
The training, equipping,, and selecting of forces is not
carried out by the individuals who are responsible for
their command in combat. As a result, the Unified
Commanders may be insufficiently familiar or comfortable
with their forces. [Halperin: 1985 116]
This is an area where the Act sought a better balance, but
the degree of change has been moderate and the reforms have
not yet matured enough to provide data on the results. Some
reforms, such as separate budgets for each of the CINCs,
have yet to be implemented. These are also the more
substantial changes resisted by DoD and which require more
time to change. Few benefits are seen by OSD in instituting
separate CINC budgets. One problem already arose with the
improper management of the SOF budget . The Act which gave
the USSOC programs additional support resulted in
significant abuses which cause DoD to remove USSOC control
O Q
of those funds last year.
80
. When requests for SOF requirements were submitted
in the POM, many item authorizations were doubled, such as
for radios and other equipment items. In executing the
budget concerns arose " over the excesses in various
expenditures such as travel . (Adapted from telephonic
interview with MAJ Lower on 30 May 198T8.)
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The benefits of separate CINC budgets in an already
complex resource allocation process are viewed by some as
marginal to none. For these opponents, such as OSD, ten
additional CINC budgets would not result in an increase of
readiness or sustainability, but would further complicate an
already overburdened defense system. Further statutory
changes mandating the allocation of Service Department
programs by theatre and codifying more detailed changes in
the current system are also not considered as measures which
would improve the balance in DoD's PPBS. [Cummings: 1986
68]
The standards, phases, programs, and requirements of
the PPBS have defined and enumerated the types of documents
that should be prepared along with the how and when of
preparation and submission. Each of the various CINCs have
different concerns. Some are regionally and theatre
oriented, others are functionally based, some have component
commanders, and others do not. Some focus on sustainability
as their highest priority, while others are more concerned
with readiness first. Consider the difficulty in
interpreting the values and meanings of ten more budgets if
each were an original creation. Add this variable to an
already complex and overburdened defense system with well
defined roles and responsibilities for budgeting and the
impediments to implementation of the provisions of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act are evident. Four major drawbacks
exist in preventing implementation of the Act:
1
.
For the large amount of effort involved in planning,
building justifying, and managing the budget through
the PPBS cycle the programs enumerated in the law,, the
returns to visibility and readiness and sustainability
are minimal. Separate budgets are viewed by the CINCs
as detractors from their primary mission of preparing
for war.
2. Larger staffs would be required in the CINCs'
programing divisions, however, staffing guidelines do
not currently fulfill the program and budget needs of
the CINC. with current reductions and emphasis on
reducing the size of headquarters staffs, aid in this
area is not expected. Increasing the size of the
staffs can only be done "out of hide, " as done by
CENTCOM, PACOM, and others
.
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3. Better programing data is needed. The CINCs have
found their data in this area to be redundant and less
accurate than the Services who are manned for that
function
.
4 . The CJCS now serves as a more powerful advocate for
CINC programs and funding. Separate CINC budgets
would remove the Chairman from the process and may
leave the budget to speak for itself. [Lower: 1988
19]
Another problem is that the CINCS have little
analytical data upon which to base decisions and with which
to play the budget game. This same problem was also
identified by McNamara when he instituted PPBS. However, a
difference exists in that McNamara was able to change the
budget process in DoD quickly, while Congress makes changes
more slowly through consensus. [Joint DoD/GAO: 1983 21]
CINC staffs need more training and experience in the
unspoken rules of the budgetary game and in DoD's PPBS
process [Batchellor: 1986 iii]
.
One criticism argues that the detailed provisions of
the Goldwater-Nichols Act have weakened the roles of the
Service Chiefs. This opinion argues that as a result of
increasing the requirements for organizations not under the
purview of the Services (a) bureaucratic layers involved in,
budgeting will develop; (b) resources will be depleted from
the Services; and (c) optimum resource decisions for
particular Service missions will be subliminated into
inadequate solutions. Although strengthening the role of
the Secretaries was the intent of the Act, some congressmen
are still concerned that the provisions of the Act which
require consolidation of the Service Secretaries' and
Service Chiefs' staffs may actually weaken civilian control
of the military. [Goldich: 1987 5-9]
3 . Impediments to Change
The proper balance between present and future needs
must be decided upon. Whether the emphasis of the CINCs on
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Q 1
meeting readiness and sustainability on the one hand, and
the more future-oriented outlook of the Services' defense
planners on the other hand, will result from a new synergism
in resource allocation decision making is still a tentative
Q o
proposition. Many impediments to the increased
participation of the CINCs exist.
These problems include the distance between the
CINCs and the center of decision making and power-
Washington, D.C.; time delays incurred in informing the
CINCs of current PPBS developments as well as the limited
time frames in which the CINCs have to respond to POM
documentation; the shortfalls in CINC manpower for resource
allocation participation, particularly analytical experts;
and inexperience in playing the defense resource game.
These problems will act to constrain the CINCs influence and
participation in their new roles. The most important
variable of those cited above is distance. As the CINCs
make more frequent and lengthier visits to Capitol Hill and
the Pentagon in order to minimize this problem, the
resulting effect on the administration and operation of
their commands is yet unknown. The staff at USCINCPAC
commented that currently, no problems were evident from the
increased absence of Admiral Hays, but the long-run effects
of continuing such action could not be forecast. Another
persistent complication is the limited time frames in which
decisions must be made. The percentage of time the Services
have to make decisions and prepare documented responses is
compressed even further for the CINCs' responses to the
Services. Service component and subordinate Unified
O 1
. Readiness is the primary concern of the CINCs.
However, for certain CINCs, such as USCINCPAC, because of
their functional mission and area of responsibility,




. The four pillars of defense are force structure,
modernization, readiness, and sustainability.
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Commands can expect very short response times [USCINCPAC:
1987 1]
.
Although communication methods such as the PPBS
Electronic Delivery System (PEDS) are currently being
refined, the timeliness in the current distribution of the
PPBS documentation needs to be improved. The development
of PEDS was directed by DEPSECDEF Taft in October of 1985 to
replace the courier service being used and improve the
timeliness of the delivery of program review documentation.
See Figure 11 for a model of the PA&E PEDS concept.
[Polk: 1987 3-4]
One example of the results of impediments to
participation can be seen at the developments in the PPBS
analysis branch at USCINCPAC. Although the staff in the
Program and Budget Analysis Branch at USCINCPAC grew
Q C
slightly over the past few years, more work hours and
longer work days are still the only solution to the quick
response time dictated upon receipt of the Services' POMs
.
Prior to the Act, members of the Analysis Branch worked a
40-hour week. Afterwards, the branch was required to change
the focus of its work, increase its level of activity, and
work extra hours both during the week and on Saturdays to
complete critical actions in the PPBS cycle. The Chu study
in 1985 decided that no increases in CINC staffs would be
directed, leaving the CINCs to do the best they could from
Q /T
within their own limited assets.
8 3
. Adapted from Batchellor' s, CINC Involvement in the
PPBS. as well as from a personal interview with Mr. Malis at
USCINCPAC on 5 April 1988.
84 PEDS was developed as a means of transferring
classified program review information between the CINCs.
85 Growth in the staff occurred not by adding of
personnel to the size of the staffs,, but by taking personnel
"out of hide" from other areas within the command.
86
. Adapted from interview with Mr. Malis at USCINCPAC
on 5 April 1988.
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Figure 11. The PA&E PEDS Concept[Miklas: 1986 8-9]
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Two difficulties pinpointed by some of the CINCs
are: (a) inability to track how the requirements they
submit in their IPLs are reflected in the subsequent FYDP
which is forwarded to OSD, since they are still not formally
involved in the development of those plans, and (b) concern
over their lack of knowledge about special access programs-
weapons programs classified higher than top secret. Admiral
Hays recommended that some arrangement be developed to keep
the Unified Commanders more aware of the status of such
programs. [Defense News: 1988 34]
DoD and JCS advocate moderate changes and have
raised objections to some of the more substantial changes
encompassed by the Act such as the separate CINC budgets and
demanding joint officer specialty requirements. DoD desired
to change those aspects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act
regarding the new joint officer specialty which they felt
were overly restrictive. DoD objected to the length of
joint duty assignments, the qualifications required for
joint positions, restrictions on who could fill the
positions, and the educational requirements for certain
joint assignments. In hearings before the HASC in May and
June of 1987, the JCS testified that the new specifications
were extremely limiting, as they removed too many officers
from serving in joint assignments, detached many others from
their Services for too lengthy a period of time, and
eliminated others from assignments required for promotion to
flag or general level. Explicit rebuttals by the JCS over
the restrictiveness of the new joint officer specialty
requirements did not affect Congressional opinion. Instead,
the joint officer personnel guidelines became even more
restrictive in the amendments. Congress intended to allow
more time to see if the original provisions would work.
D. PERCEPTIONS OF A NEED FOR CHANGE
The need for change arose from the perception of those
proposing the DoD reorganization that the DoD focus was on
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functions instead of missions. The dichotomy between the
views of the "builders of force structure" [Herres: 1987
3] and the concerns of the combatant commanders is again
highlighted. The opinion of some of those who were
responsible for the reorganization legislation was that far
too much influence had shifted to DoD's resource managers
and as a result, the warfighter' s were suffering through an
acquisition process that did not support interoperability
and jointness. These advocates saw the defense system
suffering from excessive independence of the Services, and
insufficient central direction, leadership, and planning
which would require a significant strengthening of the
national command joint structure, namely, the Chairman and
JCS [Goldich: 1987 3] .
On the other side of the debate were those who believed
the system was working or that the existence of the Joint
System acted to confine individual Service initiatives.
These advocates sought to increase the dominance of the
Services and attributed current problems in budgetary and
operational area to several factors. First, since the end
on World War II national commitment to the military
establishment waned. Second, after Vietnam defense budgets
diminished even further and became inadequate. The effects
of excessive civilian and micromanagerial congressional
control of the DoD decreased DoD' s flexibility. And
finally, the last factor was the normal disorder and
conflict accompanying any war or in any large organization.
Nevertheless, both sides supported increasing the authority
and influence of the CINCs [Goldich: 1987 4-5]
.
One factor weighing against DoD was that the Chairman
and the JCS were considered to be governed by parochial
interests, and therefore were viewed as not capable of
providing unbiased and competent advice [Herres: 1987 3]
.
The Chairman was thought to arrive at positions which
represented the "lowest common denominator" by finding some
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consensus among the Service Chiefs [Herres: 1987 3] instead
of presenting the best alternative.
Although these criticisms may have been based on only
part of the truth, they gained sufficient acceptance to
create the current concern in both the public sector and
Congress that strong, active measures needed to be taken.
The American people and the Congress have told us in
no uncertain terms that they expect: more functional and
technical interoperability amongst the Services - the
capability to mesh systems and forces into an integrated
defense team. They do not believe that we are doing or
have done as well as we should in this regard - and they
are tired of footing what they perceive as a bill for
what all that seems to cost. [Herres: 1987 4]
In the area of defense budgeting three major areas were
criticized as a result of domineering Service interests:
1. The underfunding of operations, readiness, and
sustainability as opposed to investments and new major
weapons system acquisitions;
2. Inadequate funding for joint operations and warfare
programs not considered central to the Services'
perceptions of their main mission, such as, air, sea,
and amphibious lift; anti-terrorist and commando
forces; naval patrol craft; and tactical air support
for Army forces;
3. The exorbitant costs, poor performance, and untimel
delivery of weapons systems to their assigne
operational units. [Goldich: 1987 4]
This chapter has indicated both the benefits and
disbenefits of increased CINC participation in the resource
allocation process . It discussed the perceptions of the
various participants regarding the desire for or opposition
to the direction of this movement. The next chapter
summarizes the research performed for this thesis. It also
provides concluding comments and offers suggestions for
further research.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: REVIEW OF THE INCREASED
PARTICIPATION OF THE CINCS IN PPBS
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to present an overview of
the Goldwater-Nichols Act and a broadening of the role of
the CINCs in the PPBS process. The research addressed
several specific questions.
1. How can the CINCs be better integrated into DoD's PPBS
and Congressional budgeting?
a. How can improved participation within PPBS be
effected?
b. What types of information do the CINCs, in their
expanded role, need to participate effectively?
2. What factors impede more effective CINC involvement in
the DoD resource allocation process?
a. What factors impede effective participation within
DoD?
b. What factors impede effective participation from
the OSD?
c. What factors impede effective participation from
the external environment, e.g. Congress, and from





As we have seen, DoD's resource allocation process
underwent a series of both dramatic, as with McNamara
influence on the DoD budget process in 1961, and gradual
changes since the National Security Act of 1942. Generally,
radical change is not the norm. Congressional changes occur
very slowly and are the product of consensus building.
Within DoD, evolutionary rather than revolutionary changes
are also preferred. Therefore, the fact that the CINCs
involvement in the budget process did not change
immediately, was not unexpected [Baxter: manuscript 9].
As a result of these gradual changes, almost
imperceptibly since 1961, more and more of DoD's budget has
become governed by annual authorizations. To complicate
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matters, a dichotomy exists in that although Congress views
the budget in output (program) terms, authorizations and
appropriations remain input (resource) oriented [Joint
DoD/GAO: 1984 21]. Furthermore, a given fact is that
resources in peacetime will not be unconstrained and that
proper balances must be struck in order to assure
effectiveness in meeting national objectives. Tradeoffs
must be made between military capabilities and cost. Joint
or cross-service views are essential in those tradeoffs
affecting in the formulation of strategic doctrine and
policies, and the allocation of resources among the Service
Departments
.
Nevertheless, the current harbingers of reform came from
many directions of the political spectrum and substantial
support now exists to facilitate an increased voice for the
CINCs to assure that critical needs are not ignored. The
soundings of congressmen, industrial defense experts, and
professional military officers have opened the pathway for
changes which are flexible, constructive, and reasonable.
The reform movement which led to the passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act is now more visible. With the passage
of the Act there was an immediate commotion created as all
budget participants rushed to assess the impact of the law
on their areas of responsibility [Baxter: manuscript 8] . A
part of this increase in activity produced studies such as
the J-8 assessment of separate CINC budgets, the Government
Accounting Office (GAO) study directed by Congress to assess
the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act on the Unified
Commanders, and the CSIS study on how to best implement the
o n
law with respect to the CINCs. Future actions will be
based on the rigor and amount of steadfast leadership this
movement maintains along with financial considerations,
O -7
The results of the GAO study have not yet been
released and the CSIS study is currently ongoing. The
results of the CSIS study are anticipated to be ready in the
Fall with a book to follow in the Spring of 1989.
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political motives, and other external factors. Will the
invitations to Washington D.C. continue for the CINCs? And,
considering the effect of other participants in the defense
budget game, what results will ensue?
Certain aspects of the Act, such as providing the CINCs
"full operational command" over all forces assigned to their
commands, served to further strengthen the CINCs authority.
It enhanced coordination between the CINCs and their Service
component commanders. Both actions are indirect but
important to the resource allocation process.
On one side we are faced with the argument that Congress
may not have gone far enough to ensure the interest of the
CINCs within the PPB process and on the other side we are
faced with the perspective that perhaps Congress has gone
too far in mandating a unified SOF and strengthening the
voice of the CINCs . Time will tell whether the current
micromanagerial view of Congress will yield big payoffs in
efficiency and effectiveness within the DoD or whether the
burden of management and advocacy should be shifted again.
Nevertheless, active CINC participation in the resource
allocation decision making process may prove beneficial in




The main objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to
prevent an imbalance between the long range Service
Department goals oriented toward expansion and
modernization, and the cross-service or joint goals of
readiness and sustainability needed for warfighting
preparedness [Defense News: 1988 34] .
It is the defense budget that sets the parameters for
the future. The decision makers in the process must
determine which priorities best support our national
military strategy. The end product of the PPBS, the
allocation of defense resources, will ultimately affect how
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the CINCs will fight. This review of the role of the CINCs
indicates that CINC participation in the DoD resource
allocation process has increased and in its present stage
has heightened awareness of the CINCs' warfighting needs.
The CINCs are currently satisfied with the results. Five
of the ten CINCs who testified before Senate Armed Services
Committee on March 15th of this year stated without
reservation that the Act did lead to an expansion of their
role in determining how defense allocations are spent
[Defense News: 1988 34]. In general, the CINCs seem
satisfied with their increased role and with the direction
and momentum of the reform movement. They are confident
about the effects of their of their growing abilities to
contribute to PPBS processes. Comments from the CINCs show
a general optimism about the projected results of this Act.
The CINCs, JCS, and OSD all support cautious and gradual
reform measures and condemn radical ones. Therefore,
integration can be best performed on an incremental basis,
giving each of the major changes instituted since the Taft
memorandum in 1984 a chance to work.
The time constraints in DoD's PPBS remain unchanged. To
allow for the more effective participation of the CINCs, the
length of time for many PPBS events needs to be expanded.
To better integrate the CINCs into the PPBS staff members at
USCINCPAC recommended that (a) scheduled time be allotted to
the CINCs throughout the PPB process; (b) that specific
theatre allocations be given greater visibility; and (c)
that data exchange mechanisms be improved. To improve
participation within PPBS, the staff advocated opening the
President's budget to the CINCs' review and developing a
The five CINCs who testified were Admiral Lee
Baggett, Jr., USLANTCOM; Admiral Ronald Hays, USPACOM;
General George Crist, USCENTCOM; Lieutenant General Harry
Goodall, Deputy Commander, USSOC; and General Thomas
Richards, Deputy Commander, USEUCOM.
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"push" data system to keep the CINCs' headquarters informed
89
of program and budget activity affecting CINC interests.
In analyzing the types of information useful to the
CINCs in their expanded role, the CINCs need more access to
the Services' documentation. Particularly, the CINCs need
better program data. In October 1985, a review of CINC
participation in program formulation indicated that the
CINCs' data was less accurate than the Services and,
therefore, contributed little to program development [Lower:
1988 19] . The CINCs would also desire information which
would allow them to track outlays earmarked for their
commands through to execution. Following an item through
the execution process is extremely difficult. Finally, the
CINCs need better information from within their commands.
The communications link between the CINCs and their Service
component commanders and subordinate unified command needs
to be strengthened to improve participation in the PPBS.
The types of information needed by the CINCs to participate
effectively, in their expanded role, was summarized by
CINCPAC members into three main areas: (a) information on
the theatre allocation of items, (b) program activity data,
(c) information promoting visibility into acquisition
90decisions, and (d) Service-to-CINC information
Recently, DEPSECDEF Taft directed a review of the
reporting systems through which the Services display to the
CINCs how they are providing for theatre warfighting needs
[Taft: 1988 1] . In response to this review, USCINCPAC
addressed five major issues:
1 . CINC Representation in the POM Development - All of
the Services provide adequate opportunities for CINCs
to voice their concerns during the POM building
process. In this area, the IPL is a valuable tool as
the Services attach appropriate weights to the IPLs
and component commanders communicate well with Service
89 ...
. Adapted from interviews with COL Robert W.
Molyneux, Jr., Mr. Malis, and other staff members at




headquarters on specific items which support IPL
concerns
.
2 . CINC Knowledge and Use of Service Processes - The
Service systems in place since POM 88 have enhanced
component commanders' responses to requests for
information from USCINCPAC. However, the information
provided during budget review and execution still
needs to be improved. Automated published channels of
communication must be developed by each of the
Services to ensure the CINCs have access to the
necessary data to enable them to fulfill their role.
3. Timeliness of Information - A "push system" of
information is needed during budget execution and
review. Recommendations were for the CJCS to
institutionalize the system and expand the scope of
this pilot program.
4. Theatre Perspective - While highly visible programs
are easy to track through channels, large general
programs, such as theatre reserve stocks, are more
difficult to assess. A data base showing theatre
apportionment data under a base-case OPLAN for all POM
items which support CINC IPL concerns should be
developed and updated with the FYDP
.
5. CINC Integrated Priority Lists and POM Annexes - IPLs
serve to focus DoD's leadership on a few major problem
areas and provide the program development requirements
to the Services for POM ' building. In the last IPL
submission, USCINCPAC prepared two versions of the
IPL: (a) and executive summary which listed only key
warfighting concerns, and (b) an expanded list
detailing the programs which the CINC prefers to
support his warfighting needs. The executive summary
was submitted to OSD while the expanded list was
distributed to Service programmers.
To enhance the critical linkage between the CINC and his
Service component commanders, USCINCPAC developed Mission
Area Review Panels (MARPs) as a part of the formal
procedures for its staff to assist in compliance with the
Goldwater-Nichols Act and JCS Publication 2 [USCINCPAC:
1987 1-3] . From within the command, a chairman, who is the
functional expert for the particular issue or program area
under concern, is selected for each MARP as appropriate.
Service component commands also provide representatives for
the MARPs and subordinate unit commanders furnish input for
preparation and review of PPBS documents. The MARPs are
initially convened for the IPL and are later reconvened to
assess how the Services have supported each of the issues
after the POMs . If the MARP determines that a priority
issue was not supported, it then may become an issue for the
DRB. For CINCPAC, the Army POM is not specific enough.
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Determining how much of the POM is for CINCPAC is difficult.
Other information problems deal with timeliness. In
CINCPAC s case, obtaining timely Program Budget Guidance
(PBG) from Eighth Army and US Army Japan is difficult.
Important is the fact that USCINCPAC does not control these
two commands, it only speaks for them on resource issues.
The Unified Commanders do not submit a POM; instead program
requirements must be included in Service POMs [Lower: 1988
17]. 91 [USCINCPAC: 1987 1-3]
Congressional actions codified many of the initiatives
already begun within DoD and added others. Now, by law, the
CINCs are increasingly involved in planning, programing, and
budgeting in the defense resource allocation system. The
Act has served to increase the visibility and the voice of
the CINCs in the PPBS to assist them in the determination of
the resources needed for warfighting. Some critics advocate
that Congress has gone too far with the Goldwater-Nichols
Act and has given the CINCs too much visibility. Another
important concern is that the CINCs are neither ready nor
able to implement the provisions of the Act. [Lower: 1988
16]
Congress has the power to reduce the President's budget.
However, congressional interest has turned toward balancing
the CINCs' warfighting needs within the DoD resource
allocation structure. The demand for various CINCs at
congressional hearings has significantly increased over the
past year. Therefore, what Congress does with the budget
with respect to resourcing the CINCs is an issue for further
study. CINC programs that are a part of the budget when it
leaves DoD have little benefit if the funds are not




. Adapted from interviews at USCINCPAC s Planning and
Programing Division on 5 April 1988.
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From DoD's perspective reducing the congressional
tendency to micromanage the budget would significantly
improve DoD's PPBS [Batchellor: 1986 45]. For Congress,
increasing the voice and visits of the CINCs may be desired
to acquire more information for use in budget augmentation
or reduction. A general public presumption exists that a
direct link exists between the overall budget and the
defense budget. Wildavsky in The New Politics of the
Budgetary Process cites this supportive relationship between
budgetary norms where a decline in one promotes a
contraction to others [Wildavsky: 1988 401].
Budget balance comprises two kinds of equivalencies:
accepted limits on revenue and expenditure, and the desire
for these totals to come close together. Such limits
foster a sense of mutual dependence because all faced
similar constraints. The norm of balance engendered a
sense of self-sacrifice because each of the parts had to
limit their wants to achieve the broader goal of balance.
...Participants knew that their individual adherence to
the provisions of the budget contract would be rewarded by
the contract being kept by all other parties. Everyone
knew the size of the pie and the size of the pieces.
[Wildavsky: 1988 401]
As a result of these budgetary norms, defense spending is
anticipated to increase whenever the federal budget
increases. Congress made a decision to compel the
involvement of the CINCs in order to have less money spent
on the large acquisition projects and more on readiness and
sustainability . Congressional concern was reinforced by
interoperability problems such as Desert I and
communications problems in Grenada. From the budgetary
perspective, a sequencing problem exists in that while DoD
is trying to adhere to the two year cycle, Congress is still
92
on a one year schedule.
OSD does not want the CINCs to usurp their role in
force development. The needs of the various CINCs differ,
and it is OSD and the Services which must look at all the
various requirements across the board. An increase in power
to the CINCs may be considered a decrease in power to OSD.
92 Adapted from interview with Mr. Malis of the
Program and Budget Analysis Branch, at USCINCPAC.
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OSD views the insistence of Congress on having separate CINC
budgets as an unreasonable intrusion into their area of
responsibility. The impact of the Act in the area of
separate CINC budgets may be much smaller than many people
expect. OSD plans to comply with the stronger wording in
the recent amendments to the Act which mandate separate CINC
budgets. However, OSD may not comply in a way which some
Congressmen expect. OSD is planning to submit CINC budgets
dealing only with CINC headquarters and staffs, a smaller
amount of funds which fulfills requirements of the law and
uses the flexibility in the wording. Although some of the
CINC have added additional budget personnel to their staffs,
94they are not equipped to handle separate budgets. The
CINCs are not equipped to make tradeoffs between themselves
and the Services . And, the Services are no more or less
parochial than the CINCs. Therefore, it appears that JCS
96
needs to oversee the process.
Impediments to CINC involvement in the budget
allocation process exist both outside and within the various
commands. The adequacy, responsiveness, and timeliness of
data produced within command headquarters and between the
headquarters and component commands or subordinate unified
commands needs to be improved. The analytical expertise of
the headquarters staffs is also a limiting factor. With
respect to the external environment, CINC staffs need more
training and experience in the unspoken rules of the
budgetary game and in DoD's PPBS process to enhance the
affects of their increased visibility and influence on the
outcomes of the defense resource allocation process
.
93
. Adapted from telephonic interview with Mr. Leeland






. Adapted from telephonic interview with Mr. Malis on
4 April 1988.
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
If the strength of the DoD reorganization reform
movement becomes more comprehensive in nature, and if the
roles of participants continue to change in the quest for
better balance in the decision making process for the
allocation of defense resources, then it may follow that the
structure must also be altered to accommodate such changes.
Therefore, a question for further study is how should the
structure change to accommodate CINC participation to make
it more effective? Where can participation within PPBS be
most effective? Another area of concern is how can the
CINCs track outlays, requested by them in IPLs and budgeted
for their theatre areas by the Services, through the PPBS to
program execution and receipt of those resources in order to




DOD DIRECTIVE 7045.14, THE PPBS
SUBJECT: Implementation of the Planning, Programing, and Budgeting System
(PPBS)
References: (a) DoD Instruction 7045.7, "The Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System," October 29, 1969 (hereby canceled)
(b) DoD Directive 7045.14, "The Planning, Programing, and
Budgeting System (PPBS)," May 22, 1984
(c) DoD 5025. 1-M, "DoD Directives .System Procedures," April
authorized by DoD Directive 5025.1, October 16, 1980
(d) General Accounting Office (GAO) PAD-81-27, "A Glossary
of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process," March 1981
(e) through (m) , see enclosure 1
1981,
A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE
1. This Instruction reissues reference (a) and establishes procedural
guidance in support of reference (b) for the formulation, submission, analysis,
review, and approval of new and revised DoD plans, programs, and budgets; the
processing and approval of resource changes to the Five Year Defense Program
(FYDP) ; and the maintenance and updating of the FYDP structure.
2. It authorizes the publication of DoD 7045. 7-H, "FYDP Program Structure
Handbook," consistent with reference (c).
B. APPLICABILITY
This Instruction applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
the Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (0JCS),
the Unified and Specified Commands, and the Defense Agencies (hereafter
referred to collectively as "DoD Components").
C. DEFINITIONS
Terms used in this Instruction are defined herein and in reference (d).
Can be obtained from U.S. General Accounting Office, Document Handling and




1. The purpose of the PPBS is to produce a plan, a program, and finally, a
budget for the Department of Defense. The budget is forwarded to the President
for his approval. The President's budget is then submitted to Congress for
authorization and appropriation.
2. The PPBS processes are based on and consistent with objectives, policies,
priorities and strategies derived from National Security Decision Directives.
Throughout the three major phases of planning, programing, and budgeting the
Secretary of Defense will provide centralized policy direction while placing
program execution authority and responsibility with the DoD Components. The
DoD Components will provide advice and information as requested by OSD to permit
the latter to assess execution and accountability. Participatory management
involving the DoD Components shall be used in each phase to achieve the objec-
tive of providing the operational commanders-in-chief (CINCs) the best mix of
forces, equipment and support attainable within resource constraints. The
decisions (as modified by legislation or Secretary of Defense direction)
associated with the three major phases of the PPBS will be reflected in the
FYDP as Secretary of Defense approved programs for the military functions of
the Department of Defense. The FYDP will address the prior, current, budget
and program years.
E. PROCEDURES
1. Key PPBS Documents . See enclosure 2. These documents are:
a. Joint Long Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA)
;
b. Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD)
;
c. Defense Guidance (DG)
;
d. Program Objective Memoranda (POMs);
e. Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM)
;
f. Issue Books (IBs);
g. Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs);
h. Budget Estimates;
i. Program Budget Decisions (PBDs);
j. President's Budget.
2. PPBS Schedule . Timely publication of the PPBS documents is critical
to the management of the Department of Defense. Since the system represents
a dialogue among the many participants, the relevant documents, complete with
annexes, must be issued to allow adequate time for analysis and response. A
schedule of significant events in the PPBS process for the upcoming calendar
year shall be developed by the Executive Secretary to the Defense Resources
Board, assisted by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
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(OASD(C)) with input from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)),
and the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPA&E) and shall be
issued annually to establish the dates for:
a. Submission by the JCS of a recommended national military strategy
and related military advice;
b. Issuance of the DG
;
c. Submission and review of DoD Components' POMs
;
d. Submission by the JCS of the JPAM;
e. Development and processing of IBs;
f. Issuance of Secretary of Defense PDMs
;
g. Submission and review of the DoD Components' budget estimates;
h. Issuance of PBDs
;
i. Other significant items having an impact on the decisionmaking
cycle.
3. General System Description . Each of the documents cited below is
described in detail in enclosure 2. Enclosure 4 is a general systems flew
chart.
a. The PPBS is a cyclic process containing three distinct but inter-
related phases: planning, programing, and budgeting. The process provides
for decisionmaking on future programs and permits prior decisions to be
examined and analyzed from the viewpoint of the current environment (threat,
political, economic, technological, and resources), and for the time period
being addressed.
b. The planning period encompasses the upcoming FYDP period (mid-term)
plus a 10-year extended planning period (long-terra). In the planning phase
of the PPBS, the military role and posture of the United States and the Depart-
ment of Defense in the world environment are examined, considering enduring
national security objectives and the need for efficient management of resources.
The focus is on the following major objectives: defining the national military
strategy necessary to help maintain U.S. national security and to support U.S.
foreign policy 2 to 7 years in the future; planning the integrated and
balanced military forces necessary to accomplish that strategy; assuring the
necessary framework (including priorities) to manage DoD resources effectively
for successful mission accomplishment consistent with national resource limit-
ations; and providing decision options to the Secretary to help him assess the
role of national defense in the formulation of national security policy, and
related decisions. Planning goals and programing objectives, milestones,
progress, issues, and problems are discussed with the Secretary and remedial
plans and actions initiated, as appropriate.
c. The first fundamental documents in the PPBS cycle are the Joint
Long Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA) , the Joint Strategic Planning Document
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(JSPD) , complete with annexes, and the Military Departments' Long Range Plans.
They contain the independent JCS and Military Departments' military strategy,
advice and recommendations to be considered «nen developing the DG for the mid-
and long-term. In addition, commanders of Unified and Specified Commands also
provide the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Resources Board (DRB) , their
personal appraisals of major issues and problems of their commands that should
be addressed in the DG, including principal concerns and trends in both the
threat and the evolving U.S. response.
d. The final document of the planning phase is the DG which promulgates
defense policy, strategy, force planning, resource planning and fiscal guidance.
The fiscal, force and resource planning guidance reflect economic constraints
and the Secretary of Defense's management priorities.
e. The DoD Components develop proposed programs consistent with the
policy, strategy, force, resource, and fiscal guidance provided in the DG.
These programs, expressed in the POMs, reflect systematic analysis of missions
and objectives to be achieved, alternative methods of accomplishing them, and
the allocation of resources. In addition to the budget year, the program
period is the 4 years beyond the budget year for cost and manpower, 7 years
beyond the budget year for forces.
f. After the POMs are submitted, the JCS provide in the JPAM a risk
assessment based on the capability of the composite force level and support
program for the U.S. Armed Forces to execute the strategy outlined in the DG.
g. The POMs are analyzed, in the light of the JCS risk assessment, for
compliance with previous guidance documents. Issues are developed, staffed,
and compiled in Issue Books. The DRB then meets to discuss the issues.
Decisions made on the issues by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary are then
formally announced in the PDMs
.
h. With the establishment of program levels in the POM as modified by
PDMs, the budgeting phase begins with the DoD Components developing detailed
budget estimates for the budget years of the approved program. These estimates
are reviewed and analyzed during the Joint OMB/DoD Budget Review and are approved
or revised in budget decision documents. Decisions reached as a result of the
program review and promulgated in PDMs should not be reexamined in the budget-
ing phase, unless new information or new factors are brought to light.
i. The President's Budget is finalized and sent to Congress as the
final output of the PPBS
.
j . Following the enactment of the budget into authorization and appro-
priation acts by the Congress, several actions are taken to monitor accountabil-
ity and execution. The monitorship involves administrative control of funds;
reporting of actual results; assessment of applicability of those results to
the preparation of future plans, programs, and budgets; and supplying financial
information to DoD managers. The centerpiece of the execution process is the
annual apportionment of budget funds to the Military Departments and Defense
Agencies. Resource requirements are reconsidered, revised allocations made
and funds released or withheld for administrative or technical considerations.
Funds are subsequently obligated and expended in accordance with apportionment
guidelines. The Secretary of Defense's Performance Review is an integral element
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of the execution process. This recurring review of selected programs of high
priority and top level policy interest is a vehicle for Secretarial decisions
and the initiation of further review or action. Goals and objectives, mile-
stones, progress, issues and problems are discussed with the Secretary during
these reviews.
k. The interface between the weapons acquisition process, as defined in
DoD Directive 5000.1 (reference (k)) and DoD Instruction 5000.2 (reference (j)),
and the PPBS is achieved by designated membership of the Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) and the Defense Resources Board (DRB) , and
the requirement to develop an acquisition strategy for all major systems. In
the development of the acquisition strategy there are four distinct phases:
(1) concept development; (2) demonstration and validation; (3) full scale
development; and (4) production and deployment. Milestone decision points are
identified in the acquisition strategy in conjunction with these phases. A
requirement validation, based on the Military Department's justification of
a major system new start, is submitted as part of their POMs . Secretary of
Defense directions are included as part of his PDMs . At Milestone II, the
Secretary of Defense decides on program go-ahead and whether to proceed with
full scale development, based on the recommendation of the DSARC. Approval
to proceed is contingent upon the Military Department's demonstration that
sufficient funds are included in their POMs and extended planning annexes to
fund the acquisition and support of the weapon system.
4. FYDP and Reporting Requirement s
a. General
(1) The FYDP quantifies forces and resources associated with
Secretary of Defense approved programs for the Department of Defense. It
resides in an automated data base which is updated and published at least
three times a year. Major publications coincide with (a) submission of
Component POMs, (b) submission of budget estimates, and (c) submission of the
President's Budget. The FYDP contains forces, manpower, and total obligational
authority (TOA) identified to a program element structure aggregated into ten
major defense programs. Program elements within the 10 defense programs rep-
resent aggregations of organizational entities comprising the combat forces
and support functions of the Department of Defense. Resources are further
subdivided by resource identification codes (RICs) which identify force type,




(2) The FYDP is assigned Report Control Symbol (RCS) DD-COMP
(3) DoD 7045. 7-H, maintained by the ASD(C), contains the DoD pro-
gram structure; it includes all approved definitions, codes, and titles used
in the FYDP data base, and program and program element criteria.
(4) Program Change Requests (PCRs) will be used to propose out-
of-cycle changes to FYDP data that would result in a net change to a DoD
Component's resources. Pursuant to DoD 7110. 1-M (reference (e)), PCRs shall
be submitted by the gaining organization to reflect the resource impact of
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functional transfers. The resource impact of the transfer shall be incor-
porated in the next FYDP update only after having been approved by a Program
Change Decision (PCD). Approval for the functional transfer may be accomplished
by memorandum or other decision document, but must be signed by the Secretary
of Defense. PCRs will also be used to propose changes to the FYDP structure
definitions and codes which would result in no net change to a DoD Component's
resources. (See enclosure 6 for use and preparation of PCRs.)
(5) PCDs shall be used to reflect OSD decisions on PCRs. (See
enclosure 7 for use and preparation of PCDs.)
b. Other FYDP Usage
(1) The FYDP is used extensively as a data base for many related
processes within the Executive Branch. Within DoD, in addition to containing
the official published results of the PPBS process, it is also widely used as
a source of data both for analysis and as an input to alternative ways of
displaying and portraying actual and programed resources. The uses include:
the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the Congress; the Defense Manpower
Requirements Report, and the Defense Planning and Programming Category Reports.
(2) As a result of congressional requests, a special annual publi-
cation of the FYDP, containing the prior, current, and budget years, and a
procurement annex containing the prior, current, budget and four outyears, have
been developed and provided to various congressional oversight committee staffs
and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Since the FYDP outyear programs
reflect internal planning assumptions, FYDP data beyond the budget year shall
not be released outside the Executive Branch of the Government without the
expressed written consent of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
.
(3) The CBO has developed a Defense Resource Model (DRM) for use
as an analytical tool in support of alternative levels of defense resources.
Following the budget submission to Congress, budget year data are extracted
from the FYDP according to CBO specifications, which aggregate program ele-
ments and resource identification codes to unclassified summary levels for
input to the DRM. Data from the DRM are used by CBO to fulfill the legal
requirement for mission-oriented displays under Pub. L. 93-344 (reference (f)).
c. Subsystems and Annexes .
There are a number of data bases that are subsidiary to, or recon-
cilable with, the data in the FYDP. The sponsoring office is responsible for
design, installation, and maintenance of subsystems and annexes, their data
bases, and for compliance with DoD Directive 5000.19 (reference (g)). Currently
they are:
(1) Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and
Acquisition Data Base . All procurement line items in the Procurement Annex,
and all program elements in the RDT&E Annex are coded in accordance with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USDR&E)) mission area
structure, to be used as the basis for mission area analysis, justification of
major systems new starts, and the POM review of all acquisition activities.
Sponsoring Office : OUSDR&E . RCS DD-COMP(AR) 1092 .
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(2) RDT&E Annex . This Annex is the official reflection of the RDT&E
program elements approved during the review processes. It will be maintained
to reflect all applicable decisions and provide consistency with the FYDP.
Sponsoring Office : OASD(C) . RCS DD-COMP(AR) 1092 .
(3) Procurement Annex . This Annex is the official reflection of
the procurement line item programs approved during the review processes. It
will be maintained to reflect all applicable decisions and provide consistency
with the FYDP.
Sponsoring Office : OASD(C) . RCS DD-COMP(AR) 1092 .
(A) Construction Annex . This Annex is the official reflection of
the construction projects approved during the review process. It will be
maintained to reflect all applicable decisions and provide consistency with
the FYDP.
Sponsoring Office : OASD(C) . RCS DD-COMP(AR) 1092
5 . Decision Implementation
a. Secretary of Defense decisions normally will be identified in one
of the daeisicn documents described herein. In addition, reprograming actions
in accordance with DoD Instruction 7250.10 (reference (h)) shall be reflected
in FYDP updating. DoD Components will implement Secretary of Defense decisions
and will enter the forces, manpower, and cost data in the FYDP data file by
program element in accordance with DoD Instruction 7045.8 (reference (i)).
The ASD(C) shall issue a PCD directing FYDP updates to be submitted. The PCD
will include any special instructions, program structure changes, limitations,
and controls necessary for the update.
b. The Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) assists the
Secretary of Defense in deciding on affordability and other factors bearing on
the development of a weapon system in accordance with approved and proposed sched-
ules, to include provisions for support and maintainability of the system.
Reviews are held at several established milestones in the acquisition process
(DoD Instruction 5000.2, reference (j)) to determine if the weapon system is
ready to progress to the next phase, should be terminated, or held in current
phase of development. Documentation prepared for programs presented to the DSARC
by the Military Departments for review must include aggregated TOA financial data
projections which demonstrate that sufficient resources are in the total Military
Department FYDP and Extended Planning Annex to execute the program along with
needed support funding in accordance with acquisition plans recommended. Any
differences that may develop between the baseline program established at Mile-
stone II and the program included in the POM or budget submission must be
justified by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned, with respect
to acquisition management requirements to budget-to-cost.
c. In accordance with DoD Directive 5000.1 (reference (k)), mission
need determinations for proposed major system new starts are accomplished in
the POM review and the Secretary's decision and program guidance regarding the
Justification for Major System New Starts (JMSNS) are provided in the PDM.
This guidance and decision authorizes the DoD Components, when funds are avail-
able, to initiate the next acquisition phase.
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6. Limitations . Approval of programs in the DSARC or the PPBS process




The Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense
,
assisted by the OSD
staff, exercise centralized control of executive policy direction by concentrat-
ing on major policy decisions, defining planning goals, and allocating resources
to support these objectives, to include joint, DoD-wide, cross-Service and
cross-command programs.
2. The Heads of DoD Components shall:
a. Participate in the planning, programing, budgeting process described
above
b. Develop and execute the necessary programs.
c. Provide the day-to-day management of the resources under their
control
.
d. Audit and evaluate program execution.
e. Participate in meeting the objectives and requirements of national
security objectives as identified in all stages of the PPBS.
3. The Chairman, Defense Resources Board, and the Board's Members, under
references (1) and (m) , shall be responsible for:
a. The management and oversight of all aspects of the entire DoD plan-
ning, programing, and budgeting process.
b. Managing the planning process which develops the annual DoD DG
with the USD(P) in the lead.
c. Managing the POM review process, with DPA&E in the lead, to ensure
adherence to the fiscal and other mandatory guidance.
d. Overseeing the annual budget review process.
e. Minimizing the reevaluation of decisions in the absence of new
information or new factors.
4. The Executive Secretary to the DRB shall:
a. Coordinate DRB management of the entire PPBS process, in support
of the Board and the Chairman.
b. Manage the DRB agenda and meetings process.
c. Manage the DG preparation process.
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d. Manage the POM program review issue process.
e. Oversee the annual budget review process.
f. Chair the Program Review Group to support management of the
DRB program review process.
g. Record major decisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, taken on
advice of the DRB.
h. Prepare the annual PPBS calendar of key events, assisted by the
OASD(C), and with input from USD(P) and DPA&E.
i. Prepare, as appropriate, PPBS DoD Directives and Instructions,
assisted by the ASD(C), in coordination with USD(P) and DPA&E.
5. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:
a. Take the lead in the development of overall policy, strategy, force
and resource planning guidance.
b. Take the lead in developing and coordinating, with the DRB, the
publication of the DG.
6. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering shall:
a. Coordinate with ASD(C) , ASD(MI&L), and DPA&E the interface of the
acquisition process with the PPBS.
b. Coordinate review of the JMSNS provided by DoD Components in the




The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics) shall
be responsible for assisting in the development of resource planning goals,
programing objectives, and related guidance.
8. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) shall:
a. Coordinate the annual budget review in support of the DRB.
b. Be responsible for central control and management of the FYDP,
including DoD 7045. 7-H, "FYDP Program Structure Handbook."
c. In conjunction with the DPA&E, develop annual fiscal guidance for
the annual DG.
d. Assist the Executive Secretary to the DRB in the preparation of
the annual PPBS calendar of key events, with input from USD(P) and DPA&E.
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e. Assist the Executive Secretary to the DRB in the preparation of PPBS
Directives and Instructions, in coordination with USD(P) and DPA&E
;
f. Be responsible for coordinating the presentation and justification
of the budget to Congress.
9. The Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation shall:
a. Integrate the POM Preparation Instructions;
b. Coordinate the annual program review and the IB development in
support of the Executive Secretary to the DRB;
c. In conjunction with the ASD(C), develop fiscal guidance for the
annual DG.
G. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
Each DoD Component shall comply with the provisions of DoD Directive
5000.19 (reference (g)) within their respective areas of responsibility.
Reporting requirements are addressed in subsection E.4., above.
H. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION
This Instruction is effective immediately. Forward three copies of imple-
menting documents to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) within
120 days.
VINCENT PURITANO






2. Description of Key Planning, Programing, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
Documents
3. Definition of Issue Books and Assignment of Responsibility
4. PPBS Flow Chart
5. The FYDP Concepts and Structure
6. Instructions for the Use and Preparation of Program Change Requests
(PCRs)
7. Instructions for Use and Preparation of Program Change Decisions (PCDs)
and Program Budget Decisions (PBDs)
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DESCRIPTION OF KEY PLANNING, PROGRAMING, AND
BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS) DOCUMENTS
A. JOINT LONG RANGE STRATEGIC APPRAISAL (JLRSA)
The JLRSA shall be submitted by the JCS to provide transition from long-
range to mid-range strategic planning. The JLRSA is intended to stimulate more
sharply focused strategic studies. Additionally, the JLRSA influences the
development of the JSPD.
B. JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING DOCUMENT (JSPD)
The JSPD shall be submitted by the JCS to provide military advice to the
President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense. It
shall contain a concise, comprehensive military appraisal of the threat to
U.S. interests and objectives worldwide, a statement of recommended military
objectives derived from national objectives, and the recommended military
strategy to attain national objectives. It shall include a summary of the JCS
planning force levels required to execute the approved nationa] military
strategy with a reasonable assurance of success, and views on the attainability
of these forces in consideration of fiscal responsibility, manpower resources,
material availability, technology, industrial capacity, and interoperability
in joint and cross-Service programs. The JSPD shall also provide an appraisal
of the capabilities and risks associated with programed force levels, based on
the planning forces considered necessary to execute the strategy as a benchmark,
and shall recommend changes to the force planning and programing guidance. The
JSPD provides a vehicle for an exchange of views on defense policy among the
President, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
C. DEFENSE GUIDANCE (DG)
After consideration of the military advice of the JCS, as expressed in
the JLRSA and JSPD, a draft of the DG is issued to solicit comments of all DoD
Components, including the CINCs, on the major issues, problems, and resource
constraints in developing and programing- forces to execute the policy, strategy,
and management direction. The draft DG is also provided to the Department of
State, the Staff of the National Security Council, and the Office of Management
and Budget for comment. The final version of the DG, which is an output of
the planning phase, serves as an authoritative statement directing defense
policy, strategy, force and resource planning, and fiscal guidance for develop-
ment of the POMs . The DG will consist of the following elements: near and
long-term threat assessment and opportunities; policy and strategy guidance;
force planning guidance; resource planning guidance; fiscal guidance; and
unresolved issues requiring further study.
D. PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDA (POMs)
Annually, each Military Department and Defense Agency shall prepare and
submit to the Secretary of Defense a POM that is consistent with the strategy
and guidance, both programmatic and fiscal, as stated in the DG. Major issues
that are required to be resolved during the year of submission must be identified.
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Supporting information for POMs will be in accordance with the annual POM
Preparation Instructions or requirements established by DoD Directive or
Instruction.
E. JOINT PROGRAM ASSESSMENT MEMORANDUM (JPAM)
The JPAM shall be submitted by JCS for consideration in reviewing the
POMs, developing IBs, and drafting PDMs . It shall provide a risk assessment
based on the composite of the POM force recommendations and include the views
of the JCS on the balance and capabilities of the overall POM force and sup-
port levels to execute the approved national military strategy. When appro-
priate, the JCS shall recommend actions to achieve improvements in overall
defense capabilities within alternative funding levels directed by the
Secretary of Defense.
F. ISSUE BOOKS (IBs)
1. Based on a review of the POMs in relation to the DG and JPAM, issues
shall be prepared by the OSD staff, the DoD Components and OMB. One-page
outlines of proposed major issues may be submitted by any DRB or Program Review
Group (PRG) (a working group subordinate to the DRB) member. The issues should
have broad policy, force, program, or resource implications. Particular
emphasis should be given to cross-Service issues that have not been adequately,
or consistently, addressed in the POMs. Major issues that were decided during
the previous year's program and budget review should be addressed only if some
major new factors have appeared since that decision.
2. The proposed issues shall be reviewed by the PRG, which shall recommend
whether or not they are appropriate for DRB consideration. The selected issues
shall be developed by an issue team under the direction of a lead office design-
ated by the PRG, and assigned to one of the IBs. (See enclosure 3 for a des-
cription of the IBs and assignment responsibilities.) IBs will be sent to the
DRB for their review. The full DRB will meet to discuss the issues. The major
issues that are raised during the program review will be measured against the
DG, against available budgetary resources, and against the management initi-
atives. The program produced as a result of the review should demonstrate the
maximum degree of policy implementation consistent with national resource limit-
ations. The Deputy Secretary of Defense will make all appropriate decisions
after consultation with the Secretary.
G. PROGRAM DECISION MEMORANDA (PDMs)
DRB program review decisions shall be recorded in a set of PDMs, signed
by the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and distributed to the DoD
Components and OMB. The PDMs will then be the basis for the budget submissions.
H. BUDGET ESTIMATES
Annually, each DoD Component shall submit its budget estimates to the
Secretary of Defense in accordance with DoD 7110. 1-M (reference (e)). The
budget estimates shall include the prior, current, and budget fiscal years
(budget year plus one for programs requiring Congressional authorization) in
accordance with established procedures. Data for the outyears (the 4 years
beyond the budget year) will be derived from, or be consistent with, the FYDP
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DEFINITION OF ISSUE BOOKS
AND
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Policy and Risk Assessment book (1) is intended to focus attention on
broad Defense-wide policy, strategy and resource allocation issues, and to esti-
mate the risk associated with the proposed programs submitted by the DoD
Components. This book will contain two major sections. The first will be a
broad overview of the effectiveness of the proposed programs in carrying out
the force planning priorities stated in the Defense Guidance. The second will
be an evaluation of how well the POMs carry out the strategy. This second
section will draw heavily from the material presented in the JPAM, but may
include other views as well. Risks and shortcomings affecting the success of
the strategy will be identified. The information that will be provided in this
book is intended to establish the overall context within which subsequent, more
detailed* force and program decisions will be made. USD(P) and the JCS shall be
the main contributors to Section I and DPA&E and the JCS to Section II. USD(P)
shall be responsible for assembling the book as called for by the schedule.
B. The Nuclear Forces book (2) will include both Strategic and Theater Nuclear
Force issues. USDR&E, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security
Policy) (ASD(ISP)), and DPA&E shall be the main contributors with DPA&E respon-
sible for assembling the book as called for by the schedule.
C. The Conventional Forces book (3) will include General Purpose Forces issues.
USDR&E, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
(ASD(ISA)), and DPA&E shall be the main contributors with DPA&E responsible
for assembling the book as called for by the schedule.
D. The Modernization and Investment book (4) will include all issues which are
predominantly of a modernization and investment nature that are not appropriate
to include in the Nuclear and Conventional Forces Books. USDR&E, ASD(MI&L)
and DPA&E shall be the main contributors and USDR&E will be responsible for
assembling the book as called for by the schedule.
E. The Readiness and Other Logistics book (5) will include readiness and
logistics related issues. ASD(MI&L) shall be the main contributor and
responsible for assembling the book as called for by the schedule.
F. The Manpower book (6) will include manpower related issues. ASD(MI&L)
and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (ASD(HA)) shall be the
principal contributors with ASD(MI&L) responsible for assembling the book as
called for by the schedule.
G. The Intelligence book (7) will be confined to Defense elements of the National
Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) , the Defense Reconnaissance Support Program
(DRSP) , and other compartmented Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
(TIARA) . Other issues concerning TIARA will be addressed in the Modernization
and Investment Book. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DUSD(P))
and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) jointly shall prepare the Intelligence Book, and USDR&E
shall have overall responsibility for assembling the book as called for by the
schedule. Due to the classification this book will be reviewed by selected
members of the DRB in executive session.
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H. The Management Initiatives book (8) will review the application in the POMs
of the principles enunciated in the acquisition management initiatives and
review and summarize the economies and efficiencies submissions. In addition
to any specific issues raised in accordance with paragraph F of enclosure 2,
the Management Initiatives book will include a review of JMSNS proposals; pose
alternatives approving, modifying or disapproving such proposals; conduct a
similar review for multi-year contracts; and propose decision alternatives
that would improve the application of the acquisition management initiatives
or provide increased economies and efficiencies. USDR&E, ASD(MI&L) , and ASD(C)
shall be the principal contributors to the book and USDR&E will be responsible
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1. The FYDP is the official document which summarizes forces and re-
sources associated with the programs approved by the Secretary of Defense
(prescribed in PDMs, PCDs , budget decisions, and other Secretary of Defense
decision documents) for the Department of Defense. The FYDP, which contains
prior year (PY) , current year (CY)
,
budget year (BY) and BY + 1 through BY + 4
(BY + 7 for forces), is published 3 times a year and reflects the total
resources programed by the Department of Defense, by fiscal year. A historical
FYDP is published annually, following the POM update of the FYDP, and contains
prior year resource data consistent with the official accounting records for
fiscal years 1962 through the prior year.
2. In its first dimension, the FYDP is composed of ten major defense
programs (5 combat force-oriented programs and 5 centrally managed support
programs) used as a basis for internal DoD program review, and in its second
dimension, by the input-oriented appropriation structure used by the Congress
in reviewing budget requests and enacting appropriations. Hence, it serves a
purpose of cross-walking the internal review structure with the congressional
review structure. This two-dimensional structure and attendant review methodo-
logy provide a comprehensive approach to accounting for, estimating, identify-
ing, and allocating resources to individual or logical groups of organizational
entities, major combat force or support programs referred to as program elements
(For description of program elements, see section C. , below).
3. These program elements are designed and quantified in such a way as
to be both comprehensive and mutually exclusive, and are continually scruti-
nized to maintain proper visibility of defense programs. This scrutiny includes
vigilance over the resources necessary to equip, man, operate, maintain, and
manage a class of combat unit or type of support activity. The elements are
frequently rearranged and reaggregated in ways to provide summary categories
and FYDP dimensions different from the ten major force and support programs.
Since there are varying criteria for mission categories, the Department of
Defense has not restricted such analytical schemes to a single display format,
favoring instead a more dynamic approach to analytical tools.
4. The approval of the ASD(C), or his designee, must be obtained prior
to making any changes to the FYDP structure.
B. PROGRAMS
1. A program is an aggregation of program elements that reflects a
force mission or a support function of the Department of Defense and contains
the resources allocated to achieve an objective or plan. It reflects fiscal
year time-phasing of mission objectives to be accomplished, and the means
proposed for their accomplishment.
2. The FYDP is comprised of ten major defense programs as follows:
Program 1 - Strategic Forces
Program 2 - General Purpose Forces
Program 3 - Intelligence and Communications
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Program 4 - Airlift and Sealift Forces
Program 5 - Guard and Reserve Forces
Program 6 - Research and Development
Program 7 - Central Supply and Maintenance
Program 8 - Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel
Activities
Program 9 - Administration and Associated Activities
Program - Support of Other Nations
3. The major programs of the FYDP fall within the general organiza-
tional areas of responsibility within the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
as shown below. However, since resources in these programs may overlap areas
of management and functional responsibility, the programs are not considered
to be the exclusive responsibility of any one particular organizational ele-
ment of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
a
.
Program 1 - Strategic Forces . Offices of Prime Responsibility
(PR) : USD(P); USD(R&E); DPA&E . Strategic forces are those organizations and
associated weapon systems whose missions encompass intercontinental or trans-
oceanic inter-theater responsibilities. Program 1 is further subdivided into
strategic offensive forces'and strategic defensive forces, including operational
management headquarters, logistics, and support organizations identifiable and
associated with these major subdivisions.
b. Program 2 - General Purpose Forces . Offices of PR : USDR&E ;
DPA&E . General purpose forces are those organizations and associated weapon
systems whose mission responsibilities are, at a given point in time, limited
to one theater of operations. Program 2 consists of force-criented program
elements, including the command organizations associated with these forces,
the logistics organizations organic to these forces, and the related support
units which are deployed or deployable as constituent parts of military forces
and field organizations. Also included are other programs, such as the Joint
Tactical Communications Program (TRI-TAC) , JCS-directed and coordinated exer-
cises, Coast Guard ship support program, war reserve materiel ammunition and
equipment, and stockfunded war reserve materiel.
c. Program 3 - Intelligence and Communications . Offices of PR :
USDR&E and USD(P) . Consists of intelligence, security, and communications
program elements, including resources related primarily to centrally-directed
DoD support mission functions, such as mapping, charting, and geodesy activities,
weather service, oceanography, special activities, nuclear weapons operations,
space boosters, satellite control and aerial targets. Intelligence and com-
munications functions which are specifically identifiable to a mission in
the other major programs shall be included within the appropriate program.
d. Program 4 - Airlift and Sealift Forces . Offices of PR :
USDR&E; DPA&E . Consists of program elements for airlift, sealift, traffic
management, and water terminal activities, both industrially- funded and non-
industrially-funded, including command, logistics, and support units organic
to these organizations.
e. Program 5 - Guard and Reserve Forces . Offices of PR : ASD(RA) ;
DPA&E . The majority of Program 5 resources consist of Guard and Reserve training
units in support of strategic offensive and defensive forces and general pur-
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pose forces. In addition, there are units in support of intelligence and
security; airlift and sealift; research and development; central supply and
maintenance; training, medical, and other general personnel activities; admin-
istration; and support of other nations.
f. Program 6 - Research and Development . Office of PR : USDR&E .
Consists of all research and development programs and activities that have not
yet been approved for operational use and includes:
(1) Basic and applied research tasks and projects of potential
military application in the physical, mathematical, environmental, engineering,
biomedical, and behavioral sciences.
(2) Development, test, and evaluation of new weapon systems,
equipment, and related programs.
g. Program 7 - Central Supply and Maintenance . Office of PR :
ASD(MI&L) . Consists of resources related to supply, maintenance, and service
activities, both industrially-funded and nonindustrially-funded, and other
activities, such as first and second destination transportation, overseas pert
units, industrial preparedness, commissaries, and logistics and maintenance
support. These functions or activities, which are usually centrally managed,
provide benefits and support necessary for the fulfillment of DoD programs.
h. Program 8 - Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel
Activities . Offices of PR : ASP (HA) ; ASD(MI&L) . Consists of resources
related to training and education, personnel procurement, personnel services,
health care, permanent change of station travel, transients, family housing,
and other support activities associated with personnel. Excluded from this
program is training specifically related to and identified with another major
program. Housing, subsistence, health care, recreation, and similar costs and
resources that are organic to a program element, such as base operations in
other major programs, are also excluded from this program. Program 8 functions
and activities, which are mainly centrally managed, provide benefits and sup-
port necessary for the fulfillment of DoD programs.
i. Program 9 - Administration and Associated Activities . Office of
PR: ASD(C) . Consists of resources for the administrative support of depart-
mental and major administrative headquarters, field commands, and administration
and associated activities not accounted for elsewhere. Included are activities
such as construction planning and design, public affairs, contingencies,
claims, and criminal investigations.
j. Program - Support of Other Nations . Office of PR : ASD(ISA) .
Consists of resources in support of international activities, including Service
support to the Military Assistance Program (MAP), foreign military sales, and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) infrastructure.
C. PROGRAM ELEMENTS
1. A program element is a primary data element in the FYDP and generally
represents aggregations of organizational entities and resources related
thereto. Program elements represent descriptions of the various missions of
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the Department of Defense. They are the building blocks of the programing and
budgeting system and may be aggregated and reaggregated in a variety of ways:
a. To display total resources assigned to a specific program;
b. To display weapon systems and support systems within a program;
c. To select specified resources;
d. To display logical groupings for analytical purposes;
e. To identify selected functional groupings of resources.
2. The program element concept allows the operating manager to partici-
pate in the programing decision process since both the inputs and outputs
shall be quantified in program element terms. Each program element may contain
forces, manpower, or dollars, or any combination thereof, depending on the defi-
nition of the element.
D. RESOURCE IDENTIFICATION CODES (RICs)
1
.
RICs are used to identify the types of resources assigned to each
program element. An explanation of the types of RICs follows:
a. Force Codes . The force resource identification code is a four-
digit code used to identify specific hardware items or weapon systems, by type
and model, such as aircraft, missiles, ships, and specific force organizations
such as divisions, brigades, battalions, and wings.
b. Manpower Codes . The manpower resource identification code is a
four-digit code used to identify officer, enlisted, and civilian manpower both
in the active and the Guard and Reserve establishments. Separate codes permit
the recognition of students, trainees, cadets and ROTC enrollees, and identify
civilians as either U.S. direct hire, foreign direct hire, or foreign indirect
hire.
c. Appropriation Codes . The appropriation resource identification
code is a four-digit code used to identify all appropriation accounts contained
in the President's budget as well as those of a historical nature applicable
to the FYDP prior-years period. These codes in most cases relate to Treasury-
assigned appropriation symbols.
2. Each DoD Component submitting data to the DoD FYDP has been assigned
codes for use in reporting such data in response to guidance for updating
the FYDP. The visibility of these resource identification codes by program




INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE AND PREPARATION
OF PROGRAM CHANGE REQUESTS (PCRs)
A. PCRs shall be used to request changes requiring a net increase or decrease
in a DoD Component's resources as recorded in the latest FYDP, when the
document expressing such a decision and requiring that increase or decrease
does not provide sufficient detail to permit FYDP updating. A PCR may also be
used to request program and program element restructures or resource identifi-
cation codes, or for modification or deletion of such codes in connection with
the above actions.
B. PCRs may be originated by DoD Components and submitted to the Secretary
of Defense through the ASD(C) over the signature of the head of the Component
concerned or his designee (attachment 1 to this enclosure shows the prescribed
format), in accordance with the following instructions:
1. PCR Number . Assign PCR numbers in consecutive sequence starting with
1 each calendar year. The Component identifier code as prescribed by DoD
7045. 7-H and a prefix designating the calendar year will precede each number
(for example N-4-01). Numbers assigned to proposals that are subsequent]
y
withdrawn or canceled shall not be reused.
2. Title . Assign a brief title to each PCR which adequately describes
the subject matter of the request.
3. FYDP "as of" Date . Enter the date of the specific FYDP update on
which the proposal is based.
4. Principal Action Officer . Enter the name, organization, and phone
number of the individual most knowledgeable of the proposed change.
5. Justification.
a . Functional Transfers
(1) Briefly describe the rationale for the transfer, provide
a summary of the functions being transferred, including the organizations
involved; and any additional supportive data including a copy of the required
approval of the transfer (see paragraph 212.1 and Chapter 442 of DoD 7110. 10-M
(reference (e)). A copy of the memorandum of agreement shall be attached to
the PCR. Detailed displays, in the following format, showing resource net change
impact in terms of program elements, manpower, and appropriations shall be
provided either in the justification section of the PCR or attached to the PCR.
FY FY FY FY FY
Program Element Code & Title
Civilian Direct Hire
Operation & Maintenance (O&M)
Program Element Code & Title
Civilian Direct Hire
O&M
+ 11 + 12 + 13 + 13 + 13
+ 220 + 220 + 230 + 230 + 230
- 11 - 12 - 13 - 13 - 13
- 220 - 220 - 230 - 230 - 230
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(2) Continuation sheets may be used to provide any additional
documentation in support of the proposal, or to provide any additional clari-
fication deemed appropriate.
(3) The gaining organization is responsible for preparation
of PCRs relating to functional transfers.
b. Other PCR Actions Requiring Net Resource Changes . Briefly
describe the change which results in the net increase or decrease in the
Component's resources. Provide any supportive data or rationale for the
proposed change. Detailed resource displays similar in format prescribed for
functional transfers in subparagraph B.5.a.(l) above, are required.
c. Program Structure Changes . Briefly describe the rationale for
the proposal, provide a summary of the resources affected by the change, and
any additional supportive information that may be of value in assessing the
proposal. The following specific information is required:
(1) Proposed Implementation Date . The request must indicate
in which FYDP update the proposal, if approved, should be implemented. If a
special update is desired, provide detailed justification and explanation why
the proposal cannot be accommodated during a regularly scheduled update.
(2) Fiscal Years Affected . The FYDP is the single most compre-
hensive data base in the Department of Defense for prior year information. To
preserve consistency and to provide comparability with outyear data, structure
change proposals should include prior years when the necessary data are avail-
able.
(3) Program Element Changes
(a) If new program elements are requested or data are
being shifted among program elements, net changes in resources for the first
unexecuted fiscal year affected shall be provided. The format for this dis-
play follows, and may be included in the body of the PCR or as an attachment





























PE 4 - 2,400 - 650 - 1,100 -355,000 - 6
Identify specific appropriations and amounts for each.
(b) The above data are required for the first unexecuted
fiscal year only and shall be used to assess the impact of the proposal on the
resource content of the programs and program elements affected.
(c) Assessment of the organizational impact of the change
will be provided. For example, if the proposal will subdivide a DoD Component's
funded activities into several programs or program elements, this information
shall be provided.
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(d) Enclosure 5 provides guidance for programs and pro-
gram elements. All requests for structure changes shall be evaluated against
this guidance. If the proposal deviates significantly from this guidance,
detailed justification for such deviation shall be provided.
(e) New or revised program element definitions that will
result if the proposal is approved shall be appended to the PCR. Revised
definitions should include a marked-up version of the current definition and a
final version of the proposed revision (attachment 2 to this enclosure shows
sample definitions).
(f) If a program element is being deleted or designated
as historical, a brief explanation is required.
(g) Program element title changes shall be included in
the revised definition, or if the request is for a title change only, it shall
be so stated and explained in the request.
(4) RIC Changes . RIC changes (additions, deletions, title changes)
shall include an explanation or existing authorization for the change.
6. Thirty copies of functional transfer PCRs and fifteen copies of all
other PCRs shall be forwarded to the Director for Program aud financial Control,






2. Department of Defense Program Element Definitions
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE AND PREPARATION OF
PROGRAM CHANGE DECISIONS (PCDs)
AND PROGRAM BUDGET DECISIONS (PBDs)
A. PROGRAM CHANGE DECISIONS (PCDs) .
1. PCDs shall be used to reflect Secretary of Defense decisions on PCRs
,
to provide detailed guidance for updates of the FYDP and related annexes, and
for other decisions the Secretary may make.
2. PCDs are formatted in a manner compatible with PCRs, using SD Form 428
(Program Change Decision) (attachment 1 to this enclosure)
in accordance with the following instructions:
a. PCD Number . Enter the request number assigned to the PCR. When
the PCD is originated without benefit of PCR input or responds to two or more
PCRs, the letter X preceding the year will be assigned (for example, X-4-01).
For FYDP update PCDs, and in special cases as determined by OASD(C), the
letter Z will be assigned.
b. Implementing Component . Enter the DoD Component designated to
implement the decision. Wheu more than one Component is involved, insert
"all" or "see below." In the latter case, specify the Components that are
required to implement the decision.
c. Program Element Code . Enter the code as assigned by DoD 7045. 7-H.
When more than one element is involved, insert "various" and identify each
program element in the body of the decision.
d. Guidance . Enter relevant DoD issuance or official (for example,
DoD Instruction 7045.7, or ASD(C)).
e. Discussion/Evaluation/Decision .
(1) Provide a brief summary of the proposed change as original-
ly submitted by the PCR, or outline the objective of the proposed change and
provide summary background information to explain why the change is needed.
(2) Include an evaluation of the logic of the proposed change,
and the variances or alternatives considered. Include all significant infor-
mation that might influence the decision.
(3) Include the actual decision, either approved or disap-
proved or the approval of an alternative. If an alternative or modification
to the original proposal is being approved, coordination with the Components
shall be effected and the staffing results indicated in the PCD or covering
memorandum. If disapproved, the reasons for disapproval shall be stated.
(4) The decision shall be described in program element terms.
(5) The PCD shall specify when the change will be incorporated
in the FYDP. If OASD(C) determines that a special update to the FYDP is
justified, the date for that update will be specified in the PCD.
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f. Signature and Date . Normally, PCDs will be signed by ASD(C) or
his designee.
B. PROGRAM BUDGET DECISIONS (PBDs)
1. General . The data applied to the PBD (attachment 2), and its continua-
tion sheet (attachment 3), are variable and shall not be confined to a specific
pattern. As frequently as possible, the decision will be expressed by use of
a single-page document:
2. Specific Entries . Enter data in accordance with detailed instructions
prescribed by the annual Program/Budget instructions.
3. Attachments . When an out-year impact (first year beyond the budget
year) is apparent, the decision record that accompanies the PBD will express the
impact in program element terms.
Attachments - 3
1. Program Change Decision, SD Form 428
2. Program Budget Decision
3. PBD Continuation Sheet
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PROGRAM CHANGE DECISION PCR NUMBER
IMPLEMENTING DOD COMPONENT PROGRAM ELEMENT CODE GUIDANCE
ADJUSTMENT REQUESTED
SIGNATURE AND DATE
SD OCT~69 428 PAGE OF PAGES
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY








(TOA, Dollars in Millions)
FY 1984 FY 1985
DECISION Date
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PBD Continuation Sheet No.
DETAIL OF EVALUATION: (Continued)
SUMMARY OF ECONOMIES AND EFFICIENCIES: Not applicable
OUTYEAR IMPACT:
(TOA, Dollars in Millions)
FY 1986 FY 1987 FY 1988 FY 1989
Service Estimate
Alternative










Enclosure 8 (pages 8-1 and 8-2)
INSTRUCTIONS FOR RECIPIENTS
The following pen and page changes to DoD Instruction 7045.7, "Implementation of the
Planning, Programing, and Budgeting System (PPBS)," May 23, 1984, are authorized:
PEN CHANGES
Page 10, Enclosures. Change "Enclosures - 7" to "Enclosures - 8"
Add a new enclosure, "8. Participation in the Planning,
Progranming and Budgeting System by the Ccrananders in Chief
of the Unified and Specified Commands (CINCs)"
PAGE CHANGES
Insert: Attached Enclosure 8 (pages 8-1 and 8-2)
EFFECTIVE DATE





WHEN PRESCRIBED ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN. THIS TRANSMITTAL SHOULO BE FILED WITH THE BASIC DOCUMENT
SD FORM 106-1 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE
1 MAR 84
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PARTICIPATION IN THE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING SYSTEM
BY THE COMMANDERS IN CHIEF OF THE
UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS (CINCs)
A. Objective
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System should
provide the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified
Commands (CINCs) the best mix of forces, equipment, and support
attainable within resource constraints. This enclosure
describes how the CINCs participate in each phase of PPBS.
B.
The CINCs shall be invited to provide, at the beginning of
the Defense Guidance (DG) drafting process, their personal
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for major changes to
the existing DG. These comments, along with those of Defense
Resources Board (DRB) members, shall be considered during the
drafting process. Successive drafts of the DG shall be
forwarded to the CINCs for comment. The DRB shall meet with the
CINCs before the final draft is provided for the Secretary's
signature in order to consider their views on the adequacy of
the DG ' s treatment of policy, strategy, forces, and resource
planning guidance.
C. Programming Phase
The primary interaction between the CINCs and the Military
Departments shall be through component commanders. At a time
specified by the Military Departments, each CINC shall identify
his requirements to the Service commands responsible for
providing programming support. The components shall be afforded
every opportunity to resolve CINC concerns. In addition, direct
communications between the CINCs and the Military Departments
may be used to resolve CINC problems and concerns during Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) development.
Each CINC shall prepare a list of his high priority needs,
prioritized across Service and functional lines and with
consideration of reasonable fiscal constraints. These
Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) shall be submitted to the
Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) on a date
determined by the Executive Secretary to the DRB (Programming
Phase)
. The IPLs are intended to provide visibility for those
few key problem areas which, in the judgment of a CINC, require
the highest-priority attention by the Department of Defense in
finding solutions.
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In order to assess the degree of responsiveness to CINC
requirements in the POMs , there must be sufficient visibility of
the manner in which those requirements were considered. Each
Military Department, therefore, shall prepare a Unified and
Specified Command Annex to the POM that clearly identifies the
CINCs' requirements, whether they were met in the POMs, and
provide supporting rationale where such needs were not met. The
IPL submitted by the CINCs shall form the framework for this
Annex, with supporting details derived from the CINCs'
requirements. The CINCs shall review the POMs and submit to the
Executive Secretary to the DRB outlines of major issues each
would like to have discussed during the program review. In
addition, CINCs shall be afforded the opportunity to participate
on program review issue teams and in "out-of-court" settlements.
The CINCs shall meet, at the beginning of the program review,
with the Secretary of Defense and the DRB to present their views
on the national military strategy and the adequacy of the POMs
to meet that strategy. Finally, the CINCs shall attend such
other sessions of the DRB as the Deputy Secretary deems
necessary. The CJCS shall serve as the spokesman for the CINCs
in their absence.
D. Budgeting Phase
Normally, the CJCS shall present CINC concerns during the
OSD/OMB budget review and during discussion of major budget
issues with the Deputy Secretary. The Chairman shall establish




DEPSECDEF MEMORANDUM TO MEMBERS OF THE DRB AND nurq nvUNIF
J?Tg^SS SPECIFIED COMMANDS, DATEE> 14[NOVEMBER 1984SUBJECT: ENHANCEMENT OF THE CINCS ROLE IN PPBS '
I have carefully reviewed the recommendations of the members
of the Defense Resources Board and of the Commanders-in-Chief
(CINCs) of the Unified and Specified Commands on ways to enhance
the role of the CINCs in the POM development process and in the
DRB Program Review. I appreciate very much the suggestions that
have been made by each of you in this regard, not only in making
recommendations but in commenting on the proposals of others.
The comments submitted addressed four major areas of concern:
the CINCs' submission of prioritized requirements, the relation-
ship between the CINCs and the Military Departments during POM
development, the visibility of responses in the POMs to CINC
requirements, and the participation of the CINCs in the DRB
Program Review process.
The following actions are to be taken in conjunction with the
development of the FY 1987 POMs and in preparation for the FY 1987
Program Review. Where elements of such actions are already under-
way, this memorandum confirms the requirement for such actions.
CINCs* Submission of Prioritized Requirements
The CINCs will, as previously, submit clearly identified
requirements to the Military Departments through their component
commanders. In addition, each CINC shall prepare a separate list
of their higher priority needs, prioritized across Service and
functional lines and with consideration of reasonable fiscal
constraints. Copies of that list should be submitted to the
Secretary of Defense, to ae, and to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in December of each year.
Tracking CINC Concerns During POM Development
The POM development process remains the responsibility of the
Military Departments. The primary interaction between the CINCs
end the Military Departments shall continue to be through the
component commanders. All three Military Departments have taken
steps to strengthen the links between the CINCs and their
component commanders. I endorse such steps and encourage any
additional actions needed along these lines.
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In addition, the CINCs should have an opportunity for direct
interface with the Military Departments on issues of concern to
them. Direct conununicat ions between the CINCs and the Military
Departments should be used to resolve CINC problems and concerns
during POM development.
Visibility of CINC Reoui remeht s in the POMs
In order to assess the degree of responsiveness to CINC
requirements in the POMs, there must be sufficient visibility of
the manner in which those requirements were addressed. In the
past, when confronted with DRB issues of unfunded CINC
priorities, it has been difficult to measure that shortfall
against other priorities which were accommodated in the POMs.
In the future, there should be a separate annex for each POM
which clearly identifies the CINCs' requirements as submitted
through their component commands, whether they were met ij\ the
POM, with supporting rationale where such needs were not met.
The POM Preparation Instructions shall be adjusted accordingly.
Participation of the CINCs in the DRB Program Review Process
Several suggestions were made to increase the CINCs' role in
the Program Review process. At present, the CINCs must raise
Program Review issues through a DRB member as issue sponsor.
CINCs attend only the special DRB meetings set aside to hear
their views on the POMs and the DRB meeting on Issue Book One,
Policy and Risk Assessment.
The CINCs will in the future be permitted to raise Program
Review issues independently. Issue outlines submitted by the
CINCs will be subject to the same procedure currently used for
selecting and assigning issues for consideration by the DRB.
I will invite relevant CINCs to attend the~URB~Trogram~'Review
meetings when the issues they have raised will be considered.
Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
.
In connection with the consideration of these issues, the
Chairman of the JCS has proposed several changes in the role
played by the JCS in the development of the POMs. Specifically,
he has ^proposed that the JCS should review and coordinate the
concerns of the CINCs and provide them to the Military Depart-
ments, and that the CINCs should present their unresolved con-
cerns with the POMs to the JCS before the POMs are completed.
These changes, along with any others relating to the participa-
tion of the JCS in the PPBS process, will be reviewed by the DRB
on the recommendation of the Chairman of the JCS. Until they
have been reviewed and approved, their implementation is
deferred.
tfilliara H. Taft, IV
APPENDIX C




"9 161. Combatant commands: establishment
"(a) Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.—With the
advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall
—
"(1) establish unified combatant commands and specified
combatant commands to perform military missions; and
"(2) prescribe the force structure of those commands.
"(b) Periodic Review.—<1) The Chairman periodically (and not
less often than every two years) shall
—
"(A) review the missions, responsibilities (including geo-
graphic boundaries), and force structure of each combatant
command; and
"(B) recommend to the President, through the Secretary of
Defense, any changes to such missions, responsibilities, and
force structures as may be necessary.
"(2) Except during time of hostilities or imminent threat of hos-
tilities, the President shall notify. Congress not more than 60 days
after—
"(A) establishing a new combatant command; or
"(B) significantly revising the missions, responsibilities, or
force structure of an existing combatant command.
"(c) Definitions.—In this chapter
"(1) The term 'unified combatant command' means a military
command which has broad, continuing missions and which is
composed of forces from two or more military departments.
"(2) The term 'specified combatant command means a mili-
tary command which has broad, continuing missions and which
is normally composed of forces from a single military depart-
ment.
"(3) The term 'combatant command' means a unified combat-
ant command or a specified combatant command.
"§ 162. Combatant commands: assigned forces; chain of command
"(a) Assignment of Forces.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph
(2), the Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all
forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant
commands to perform missions assigned to those commands. Such
assignments shall be made as directed by the Secretary of Defense,
including direction as to the command to which forces are to be
assigned. The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that such assign-
ments are consistent with the force structure prescribed by the
President for each combatant command.
"(2) Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense,
forces to be assigned by the Secretaries of the military departments
to the combatant commands under paragraph (1) do not include
forces assigned to carry out functions of the Secretary of a military
department listed in sections 3013(b), 5013(b), and 8013(b) of this
title.
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"(3) A force assigned to a combatant command under this section
may be transferred from the command to which it is assigned only
—
"(A) by authority of the Secretary of Defense; and
"(B) under procedures prescribed by the Secretary and ap-
proved by the President.
"(4) Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all
forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a unified
combatant command shall be assigned to, and under the command
of, the commander of that command. The preceding sentence applies
to forces assigned to a specified combatant command only as pre-
scribed by the Secretary of Defense.
"(b) Chain of Command.—Unless otherwise directed by the Presi-
dent, the chain of command to a unified or specified combatant
command runs—
"(1) from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and
"(2) from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the
combatant command.
"§ 163. Role of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff 10 use 163.
"(a) Communications Through Chairman op JCS; Assignment
of Duties.—Subject to the limitations in section 152(c) of this title,
the President may
—
"(1) direct that communications between the President or the
Secretary of Defense and the commanders of the unified and
specified combatant commands be transmitted through the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
"(2) assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and
the Secretary of Defense in performing their command function.
"(b) Oversight by Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff.—(1) The
Secretary of Defense may assign to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff responsibility for overseeing the activities of the combatant
commands. Such assignment by the Secretary to the Chairman does
not confer any command authority on the Chairman and does not
alter the responsibility of the commanders of the combatant com-
mands prescribed in section 164(bX2) of this title.
"(2) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Sec-
retary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as
the spokesman for the commanders of the combatant commands,
especially on the operational requirements of their commands. In
performing such function, the Chairman shall
—
"(A) confer with and obtain information from the com-,
manders of the combatant commands with respect to the
requirements of their commands;
' (B) evaluate and integrate such information;
"(C) advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense with respect to the requirements of the combatant
commands, individually and collectively; and
"(D) communicate, as appropriate, the requirements of the
combatant commands to other elements of the Department of
Defense.
"§ 164. Commanders of combatant commands: assignment; powers
and duties
"(a) Assignment as Combatant Commander.—(1) The President
may assign an officer to serve as the commander of a unified or
specified combatant command only if the officer
—
"(A) has the joint specialty under section 661 of this title; and
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"(B) has served in at least one joint duty assignment (as
defined under section 668(b) of this title) as a general or flag
officer.
"(2) The President may waive paragraph (1) in the case of an
officer if the President determines that such action is necessary in
the national interest.
"(b) Responsibilities or Combatant Commanders.—(1) The com-
mander of a combatant command is responsible to the President and
to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions assigned
to that command by the President or by the Secretary with the
approval of the President '
(2) Subject to the direction of the President, the commander of a
combatant command
—
"(A) performs his duties under the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary of Defense; and
"(B) is directly responsible to the Secretary for the prepared-
ness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the
command.
"(c) Command Authority or Combatant Commanders.—(1)
Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of
Defense, the authority, direction, and control of the commander of a
combatant command with respect to the commands and forces
assigned to that command include the command functions of—
"(A) giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands
and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the
command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of
military operations, joint training, and logistics;
"(B) prescribing the chain of command to the commands and
forces within the command;
"(C) organizing commands and forces within that command as
he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the
command;
"(D) employing forces within that command as he considers
necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;
"(E) assigning command functions to subordinate com
manders;
"(F) coordinating and approving those aspects of administra-
tion and support (including control of resources and equipment,
internal organization, and training) and discipline necessary to'
carry out missions assigned to the* command; and
"(G) exercising the authority with respect to selecting
subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff,
suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial, as pro-
vided in subsections (e), (0, and (g) of this section and section
822(a) of this title, respectively.
"(2XA) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that a commander of
a combatant command has sufficient authority, direction, and con-
trol over the commands and forces assigned to the command to
exercise effective command over those commands and forces. In
carrying out this subparagraph, the Secretary shall consult with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
"(B) The Secretary shall periodically review and, after consulta-
tion with the Secretaries of the military departments, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commander of the combatant
command, assign authority to the commander of the combatant
command for those aspects of administration and support that the
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Secretary considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the
command.
"(3) If a commander of a combatant command at any time consid-
ers his authority, direction, or control with respect to any of the
commands or forces assigned to the command to be insufficient to
command effectively, the commander shall promptly inform the
Secretary of Defense.
"(d) Authority Over Subordinate Commanders.—Unless other-
wise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense
—
"(1) commanders of commands and forces assigned to a
combatant command are under the authority, direction, and
control of, and are responsible to, the commander of the combat-
ant command on all matters for which the commander of the
combatant command has been assigned authority under subsec-
tion (c);
"(2) the commander of a command or force referred to in
clause (1) shall communicate with other elements of the Depart-
ment of Defense on any matter for which the commander of the
combatant command has been assigned authority under subsec-
tion (c) in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the
commander of the combatant command;
"(3) other elements of the Department of Defense shall
communicate with the commander of a command or force re-
ferred to in clause (1) on any matter for which the commander
of the combatant command has been assigned authority under
subsection (c) in accordance with procedures, if any, established
by the commander of the combatant command; and
"(4) if directed by the commander of the combatant command,
the commander of a command or force referred to in clause (1)
shall advise the commander of the combatant command of all
communications to and from other elements of the Department
of Defense on any matter for which the commander of the
combatant command has not been assigned authority under
subsection (c).
"(e) Selection or Subordinate Commanders.—(1) An officer may
be assigned to a position as the commander of a command directly
subordinate to the commander of a combatant command or, in the
case of such a position that is designated under section 601 of this
title as a position of importance and responsibility, may be rec« 10 USC 601.
ommended to the President for assignment to that position, only—
-
"(A) with the concurrence of the commander of the combatant
command; and
"(B) in accordance with procedures established by the Sec-
retary of Defense.
"(2) The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement under
,
paragraph (1) for the concurrence of the commander of a combatant >
command with regard to the assignment (or recommendation for
assignment) of a particular officer if the Secretary of Defense deter-
mines that such action is in the national interest.
"(3) The commander of a combatant command shall
—
"(A) evaluate the duty performance of each commander of a
command directly subordinate to the commander of such
combatant command; and
"(B) submit the evaluation to the Secretary of the military
department concerned and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
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"(f) Combatant Command Staff.—(1) Each unified and specified
combatant command shall have a staff to assist the commander of
the command in carrying out his responsibilities. Positions of
responsibility on the combatant command staff shall be filled by
officers from each of the armed forces having significant forces
assigned to the command.
"(2) An officer may be assigned to a position on the staff of a
combatant command or, in the case of such a position that is
10 USC 601. designated under section 601 of this title as a position of importance
and responsibility, may be recommended to the President for assign-
ment to that position, only
—
"(A) with the concurrence of the commander of such com-
mand; and
"(B) in accordance with procedures established by the
Secretary of Defense.
"(3) The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement under
paragraph (2) for the concurrence of the commander of a combatant
command with regard to the assignment (or recommendation for
assignment) of a particular officer to serve on the staff of the
combatant command if the Secretary of Defense determines that
such action is in the national interest
"(g) Authority To Suspend Subordinates.—In accordance with
procedures established by the Secretary of Defense, the commander
of a combatant command may suspend from duty and recommend
the reassignment of any officer assigned to such combatant
command.
"S 165° Combatant commands: administration and support
"(a) In General.—The Secretary of Defense, with the advice and
assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall provide
for the administration and support of forces assigned to each
combatant command.
"(b) Responsibility or Secretaries of Military Departments.—
Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of
Defense and subject to the authority of commanders of the combat-
ant commands under section 164(c) of this title, the Secretary of a
military department is responsible for the administration and sup-
port of forces assigned by him to a combatant command.
'
"(c) Assignment of Responsibility to Other Components of
DOD.«=After consultation with the Secretaries of the military
departments, the Secretary of Defense may assign the responsibility
(or any part of the responsibility) for the administration and support
of forces assigned to the combatant commands to other components
of the Department of Defense (including Defense Agencies and
combatant commands). A component assigned such a responsibility
shall discharge that responsibility subject to the authority, direc-
tion, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the
authority of commanders of the combatant commands under section
164(c) of this title.
"§ 166. Combatant commands: budget proposals
"(a) Combatant Command Budgets.—The Secretary of Defense
shall include in the annual budget of the Department of Defense
submitted to Congress a separate budget proposal for such activities
of each of the unified and specified combatant commands as may be
determined under subsection 0)).
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"Os) Content of Proposals.—A budget proposal under subsection
(a) for funding of activities of a combatant command shall include
funding proposals for such activities of the combatant command as
the Secretary (after consultation with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff) determine; oe appropriate for inclusion. Activities
of a combatant command ror which funding may be requested in
such a proposal include the following:




0)) Court-Martial Jurisdiction.—Section 822(a) (article 22(a) of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice) is amended
—
10 USC 822.
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (7) as paragraphs
(4) through (9), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new para-
graphs (2) and (3):
"(2) the Secretary of Defense;
"(3) the commanding officer of a unified or specified com-
batant command;",
(c) Repeal of Section 124.—(1) Section 124 is repealed.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 3 is amended
by striking out the item relating to that section.
SEC. 212. INITIAL REVIEW OF COMBATANT COMMANDS 10 USC 161 note.
(a) Matters To Be Considered.—The first review of the missions,
responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force struc-
ture of the unified and specified combatant commands under section
1610)) of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 211 of this
Act, shall include consideration of the following:
(1) Creation of a unified combatant command for strategic
missions which would combine
—
(A) the missions, responsibilities, and forces of the Strate-
gic Air Command;
(B) the strategic missions, responsibilities, and forces of
the Army and Navy; and
(O other appropriate strategic missions, responsibilities,
and forces of the aoned forces.
(2) Creation of a unified combatant command for special
operations missions which would combine the special operations
missions, responsibilities, and forces of the armed forces.
(3) Creation of a unified combatant command for transpor-
tation missions which would combine the transportation mis-
sions, responsibilities, and forces of the Military Traffic
Management Command, the Military Sealift Command, and the '
Military Airlift Command. /
(4) Creation of a unified combatant command for missions Asia,
relating to defense of Northeast Asia.
(5) Revision of the geographic area for which the United
States Central Command has responsibility so as to include
—
(A) the ocean areas adjacent to Southwest Asia; and
(B) the region of the Middle East that is assigned to the Middle East
United States European Command.
(6) Revision of the geographic area for which the United Central
States Southern Command has responsibility so as to include America,
the ocean areas adjacent to Central America.
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Alaska.
Reports.
10 USC 133 note.
10 USC 162 note.
10 USC 164 note.
(7) Revision of the geographic area for which the United
States Pacific Command has responsibility so as to include all of
the State of Alaska.
(8) Revision of the missions and responsibilities of the United
States Readiness Command so as to include—
(A) an enhanced role in securing the borders of the
United States; and
(B) assignment of regions of the world not assigned as
part of the geographic area of responsibility of any other
unified combatant command.
(9) Revision of the division of missions and responsibilities
between the United States Central Command and the United
States Readiness Command.
(10) Elimination of the command designated as United States
Forces, Caribbean.
(b) Deadline.—The first report to the President under such sec-
tion shall be made not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act
SEC. 213. REPEAL OF CERTAIN LIMITATIONS ON COMMAND STRUCTURE
(a) Prohibition Against Consolidating Functions of the Mili-
tary Transportation Commands.—Section 1110 of the Department
of Defense Authorization Act, 1983 (Public Law 97-252; 96 Stat. 747),
is repealed.
(b) Prohibition Against Altering Command Structure for
Military Forces in Alaska.—Section 8106 of the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 1986 (as contained in section 101(b) of
Public Law 99-190 (99 Stat 1221)), is repealed
SEC 214. TRANSITION * ' '
(a) Assignment of Forces to Combatant Commands.—Section
162(a) of title 10, United States Code (as added by section 211 of this
Act), shall be implemented not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act
(b) Waiver of Qualifications for Assignment as Combatant
Commander.—(1) The President may waive, as provided in para-
graph (2), the requirements provided for in section 164(a) of title 10,
United States Code (as added by section 201 of this Act), relating to
the assignment of commanders of the combatant commands.
(2) In exercising such waiver authority, the President may, in the
case of any officer
—
(A) waive the requirement that the officer have the joint
specialty;
(B) waive the requirement under section 664 of such title (as
added by section 401 of this Act) for the length of a joint duty
assignment if the officer has served in such an assignment for
not less than two years; and
(C) consider as a joint duty assignment any tour of duty
served by the officer as a general or flag officer before the date
of the enactment of this Act (or being served on the date of the
enactment of this Act) that was considered to be a joint duty
assignment or a joint equivalent assignment under regulations
in effect at the time the assignment began.
(3XA) A waiver under paragraph (2XA) may not be made more
than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(B) A waiver under paragraph (2KB) or (2XC) may not be made
more than four years after the date of the enactment of this Act
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(4) A waiver under this subsection may be made only on a case-by-
case basis.
(c) Selection and Suspension From Duty of Subordinate Offi-
cers.—Subsections (e), (0, and (g) of section 164 of title 10, United
States Code (as added by section 211 of this Act), shall take effect at
the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date of the enactment
of this Act, or on such earlier date as may be prescribed by the
Secretary of Defense.
(d) Budget Proposals.—Section 166 of title 10, United States Code
(as added by section 211 of this Act), shall take effect with budget
proposals for fiscal year 1989.
Effective date.
10 USC 164 note.
Effective date.
10 USC 166 note.
TITLE III—DEFENSE AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE FIELD ACTIVITIES
SEC 301. ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE AGENCIES
AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FIELD ACTIVITIES
(a) In General.—Chapter 8 is amended—
(1) by redesignating section 191 as section 201; and
(2) by striking out the chapter heading and the table of
sections at the beginning of such chapter and inserting in lieu
thereof the following:
"CHAPTER 8—DEFENSE AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE FIELD ACTIVITIES
"Subchapter
" I. Common Supply and Service Activities




"SUBCHAPTER I—COMMON SUPPLY AND SERVICE
ACTIVITIES
••Can
"191. Secretary of Defense: authority to provide for common performance of supply
or service activities.
"192. Defense Agencies and Department of Defense Field Activities: oversight by
the Secretary of Defense.
"193. Combat support agencies: oversight
"194. Limitations on personnel.
"§ 191. Secretary of Defense: authority to provide for common
performance of supply or service activities
"(a) Authority.—Whenever the Secretary of Defense determines
such action would be more effective, economical, or efficient, tfye
Secretary may provide for the performance of a supply or service
activity that is common to more than one military department by a
single agency of the Department of Defense.
"(b) Designation or Common Supply or Service Agency.—Any
agency of the Department of Defense established under subsection
(a) (or under the second sentence of section 125(d) of this title (as in
effect before the date of the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986)) for the perform-
ance of a supply or service activity referred to in such subsection
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